Showing posts with label injury. Show all posts
Showing posts with label injury. Show all posts

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Federal Crimes: Neglect of Constitutional Challenge

There is no Rule 1.6 exception available in any of the following definitions of federal crimes.




18 U.S.C. Section 1.
“Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.” U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 .Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

“Any judge or attorney who does not report such judges for treason as required by law may themselves be guilty of misprison of treason,” 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.

"Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. [Citations.]" (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).

Another federal statute permits any citizen to file a lawsuit in the federal courts to obtain a court order requiring a federal official to perform a mandatory duty and to halt unlawful acts. This statute is Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

This is one of the most important tools to fight corruption in government offices that is immunized by the mob mentality of the system. The federal crime reporting statute requires anyone knowing of a federal crime to promptly report it to a federal court (or other federal officer), and requires federal judges to receive that information and any evidence, as part of his administrative duties. (The judge has no immunity for misconduct related to this administrative requirement).

Title 18 U.S.C. § 2. Principals.
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.Note: The legislative intent to punish as a principal not only one who directly commits an offense and one who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" another to commit an offense, but also anyone who causes the doing of an act which if done by him directly would render him guilty of an offense against the United States. Case law decisions: Rothenburg v. United States, 1918, 38 S.Ct. 18, 245 U.S. 480, 62 L.Ed. 414, and United States v. Giles, 1937, 57 S.Ct. 340, 300 U.S. 41, 81 L.Ed. 493.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3. Accessory after the fact.
Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States had been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of felony).
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Every person who, under color or any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State of Territory, subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Title 42 U.S.C § 1985 Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
(1) Preventing officer from performing duty. If two or more persons ... conspire to prevent ... any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties.

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; ... or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985 pertains to a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights,
(1) to prevent an officer from performing a duty;
(2) obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror;
(3) or depriving persons of rights or privileges.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Action for neglect to prevent conspiracy
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in the preceding section [42 USCS § 1985], are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses to do so, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action, and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefore, and may recover not exceeding five thousand dollars damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) the Supreme Court addressed the availability of a cause of action directly under the Constitution in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), in which damages were sought against Federal Bureau of Investigation agents for violation of fourth and fifth amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that "where the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court must entertain the suit. Id. at 681-82. "Where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. at 684."

Misprision: the deliberate concealment of one's knowledge of a treasonable act or a felony.

18 U.S. Code § 2382 - Misprision of Treason
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.


SO IT BEGS THE QUESTION.... Why has every member of the United States Government who has been notified of the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 failed to take any action? Is it a demonstration of the usurpation of all government authority by a judiciary held hostage by the American Bar Association.

Friday, October 17, 2014

Make me an instrument of your peace...

Lord, make me an instrument of Your peace;
Where there is hatred, let me sow love;
Where there is injury, pardon;
Where there is discord, harmony;
Where there is error, truth;
Where there is doubt, faith;
Where there is despair, hope;
Where there is darkness, light;
And where there is sadness, joy.

O Divine Master, Grant that I may not so much seek
To be consoled as to console;
To be understood as to understand;
To be loved as to love.

For it is in giving that we receive;
It is in pardoning that we are pardoned;
And it is in dying that we are born to eternal life.

Kind of an empowering message that has been the basis of my life and my morality... since the days when I started singing in church. Powerful stuff.



What kind of world is this that we are living in where are our loved or hated for the color of our skin?
What kind of emptiness would make you so unkind?
what vein and heartless arrows have poisoned your minds?
What kind of place is this where we have all arrived?
Tell them they're forgiven. But, tell them that they lie.

What kind of world is this when we dare to place upon the backs of our sisters so we can carry on?
What kind of heart pretends what it feels is true?
I know a love much stronger than the ghosts that follow you.
What kind of fool would judge me by the color of my eyes?
Tell them they're forgiven. But, tell them that they lie.

Five hundred years of days and sorrows
- maybe selfish love is just too strong -
life only lasts for a moment we'll turn around one day and be gone
So I cry... tell them they lie
Yea I cry... tell them they lie
Tell them they lie.
Tell them they lie.


do nv dah go hv i

America's history Revisited: Tell Them They Lie

image3Sadly, in the assembly of this post, I learned of the passing of Priscilla Coolidge. Within the short span of one article, there was tremendous hope from a 'song' which had to be one of the earliest I ever learned... to the message that this is nothing new. It is not the first time any government has lied to it's people. To the sadness of the loss of a 'Gypsy Queen' who influenced my life.... for that, I thank you.

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

To the United States Congress, President, Supreme Court

Rule 1.6 is a state law, enacted by EVERY state judiciary, which collaterally causes a denial of constitutional rights, the rule of law, and protection of the law. All under the guise of lawyer confidentiality. The lawyers keep silent vigil on the corruption and injustice not exposing the massive injustice caused nationwide by
Rule 1.6 – Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct


The state disciplinary board’s aggressive enforcement of Rule 1.6 (which is kept confidential) keeps lawyers silent while purporting to protect an imagined judicial integrity. The rhetoric of the American Bar Association misdirects identification of the problem which they authored and recommended to every state judiciary.

One Rule. Made Law. Each State. Every State.
Undermining Justice. Usurping Authority.
(1984 – 2009)
Lawyers mandated to silence… in Congress, the White House, in Government.
Cash for Kids. Foreclosures through fraud. Injustice.
In 2013, non-Lawyers finally found it and filed a Constitutional Challenge.


The state supreme court has a conflict of interest because they enacted it, so we took it to federal court.

The federal district court improperly dismissed (and neglected to mention they were required to follow the PA version of Rule 1.6). #13-4614

The third circuit court affirmed and denied en banc review (while also neglecting to mention they were required to follow the PA version of Rule 1.6). #13-4591
________________________________________

We hereby present
the Supreme Court of the United States,

the United States Congress, and

the President of the United States


a Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct

An unconstitutional law in every state which causes inescapable injustice and excuses and ignores judicial misconduct and corruption.

Rule 1.6 requires that Rule 1.6 be kept confidential.

Rule 1.6 requires the courts to conceal their corruption and injustice caused by Rule 1.6 – the same unconstitutional law being challenged.

Rule 1.6 is exposed; yet, the problem law still permits fraud, corruption and injustice to conceal itself.

Rule 1.6, an invalid and void unconstitutional law, is relentless.


PREEMPTION

Befitting a constitutional law, doctrine or statute, federal preemption continues to draw the interest and resources of the highest court in the land.

The U.S. Supreme Court accepts petitions for certiori and decides preemption cases.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE

The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution, and the laws and treaties stemming from it, are the supreme law of the land.

U.S. CONSTITUTION. Article VI, clause 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.


The Supreme Court has held that when there is a conflict between a state and federal law, the state law is invalidated because the federal law is supreme.

Even a state regulation designed to protect the state’s vital interest must yield because
“under the Supremacy Clause, from which our preemption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”

The Supreme Court defined preemption to “be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”


PREEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE

The Constitution itself has already clearly made and announced the fundamental judgment regarding the relation of federal and state power: so long as the federal government has the constitutional power to enact the law, then the federal law is granted supremacy over conflicting state actions.

There are numerous instances of the Supreme Court, and lower courts, stating that the process of determining appropriate preemption is an inquiry into congressional intent; however, the intent of the Constitution is clearly to preempt every state law which would abridge, diminish, subvert or deny rights and privileges which were secured for the People.

But the roots of the doctrine are most clearly seen in Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall stated: “The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.”


CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW

The legitimacy of construction by an unelected entity in a republican or democratic system becomes an issue whenever the construction is controversial, as it frequently is.


RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

Conceding, in 1934, the limited competence of legislative bodies to establish a comprehensive system of court procedure, and acknowledging the inherent power of courts to regulate the conduct of their business, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the lower federal courts not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes.

Their operation being restricted, in conformity with the proviso attached to the congressional authorization, to matters of pleading and practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus judicially promulgated neither affect the substantive rights of litigants nor alter the jurisdiction of federal courts and the venue of actions therein and, thus circumscribed, have been upheld as valid.

Under the Rules Enabling Act, procedural rules may not modify “any substantive right” but laws in conflict with the rules are “of no further force or effect.”

While Challenging Rule 1.6 of the Rules Of Professional Conduct, the Federal Court was obligated under Rule 1.6 to dismiss the matter but neglected to indicate the reason. Rule 1.6 mandates they conceal that Rule 1.6 is the reason. Instead, like a child caught by surprise, they just made stuff up…


THE CONSTITUTION IS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND

The Judiciary may make rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Federal Courts may make rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Federal Courts may make local rules, unless they violate substantive rights.

States may enact laws, unless they violate substantive rights.
State Judiciary may enact rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Local state courts may make local rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
The Rules of Professional Conduct have been enacted into law, unless they violate substantive rights.

The Federal Court Local Rules for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopt the Rules of Professional Conduct enacted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which includes Rule 1.6 which violates substantive rights provided in the Constitution of the United States.

Where substantive rights are violated, directly or collaterally, the law is repugnant to the Constitution and a nullity.

No matter how deeply the mandate of Rule 1.6 is buried and concealed, THE LAW MAY NOT VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.


The judiciary have buried an unconstitutional law so deep in the law books that they never expected any non-lawyer to find it, and survive to prove it while being denied their constitutional rights and the protection of the law.


Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 83(a) allows for Local Rules under 28 USC § 2072 and 2074.

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”

28 U.S. Code § 2072 – Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.

28 U.S. Code § 2074 – Rules of procedure and evidence; submission to Congress; effective date
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law. The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to proceedings then pending, except that the Supreme Court shall not require the application of such rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, in the opinion of the court in which such proceedings are pending, the application of such rule in such proceedings would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former rule applies.
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Local Rule 83.6(IV)(b)(para 2)
“The Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by this court are the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania…”


THE RULE-MAKING POWER AND POWERS OVER PROCESS

Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct of their business. However, this power too is derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them.


LIMITATIONS TO THE RULE MAKING POWER.

The principal function of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as regards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state in convenient form principles of substantive law previously established by statutes or decisions.

But no such rule “can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.”

This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity, and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the guidance of lower courts, and to rules “which lower courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred.”

As incident to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, witnesses, counsel, and jurors by self-preserving rules for the protection of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of justice.

The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable powers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice, and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in the custody of law.

Such powers are said to be essential to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.

The courts of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence exists.


JURISDICTION – CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY

Congress’s authority is limited by provisions of the Constitution such as the Due Process Clause, so that a limitation on jurisdiction that denied a litigant access to any remedy might be unconstitutional.

Congress is also free to legislate away prudential restraints and confer standing to
the extent permitted by Article III.

“Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III’s requirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). That is, the actual or threatened injury required may exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974). Examples include United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Gladstone Realtors v. Village ofBellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 n.4, 11–12 (1976). For a good example of the congressionally created interest and the injury to it, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–75 (1982) (Fair Housing Act created right to truthful information on availability of housing; black tester’s right injured through false information, but white tester not injured because he received truthful information). It is clear, however, that the Court will impose separation-of-powers restraints on the power of Congress to create interests to which injury would give standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–78 (1992). Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion in Lujan, reiterated the separation-of-powers objection to congressional conferral of standing in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 29, 36 (1998) (alleged infringement of President’s “take care” obligation), but this time in dissent; the Court did not advert to this objection in finding that Congress had provided for standing based on denial of information to which the plaintiffs, as voters, were entitled.


NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE – Scope and Operation

Clause 18.
The Congress shall have Power * * * To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

The Necessary and Proper Clause, sometimes called the “coefficient” or “elastic” clause, is an enlargement, not a constriction, of the powers expressly granted to Congress. Chief Justice Marshall’s classic opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 1818 set the standard in words that reverberate to this day. “Let the end be legitimate,” he wrote, “let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end.


JURISDICTION – SUPREME COURT

Implicit in the argument of Marbury v. Madison is the thought that the Court is obligated
to take and decide cases meeting jurisdictional standards.

“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, (1821).


DECLARATORY OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

But one who challenges a statute or possible administrative action need demonstrate only a realistic danger of sustaining an injury to his rights as a result of the statute’s operation and enforcement and need not await the consummation of the threatened injury in order to obtain preventive relief, such as exposing himself to actual arrest or prosecution. When one alleges an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest but proscribed by statute and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he may bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Similarly, the reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.


JURISDICTION - EXECUTIVE ORDER

The Constitution was clearly intended to preempt state law.

Where state constitutions may not delegate statutory authority which exceeds the limits of authority and infringes upon the substantial rights protected by the Constitution of the United States law, Executive departments and agencies shall construe, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only when the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute….


Respectfully,

We petition the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Congress and the President of the United States to take immediate action to repeal the rule, legislate a constitutional amendment or issue an executive order which indicates that Rule 1.6 which causes a collateral loss of constitutional rights and protection of the law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL and a nullity.


Terance Healy
Todd M. Krautheim

Sunday, July 13, 2014

Notes for OUR Government

Rule 1.6 is a state law, enacted by EVERY state judiciary, which collaterally causes a denial of constitutional rights, the rule of law, and protection of the law. All under the guise of lawyer confidentiality. THE LAWYERS KEEP SILENT VIGIL ON THE CORRUPTION AND INJUSTICE. They know better... but fear exposing the massive injustice caused by Rule 1.6.

The state disciplinary board's aggressive enforcement of Rule 1.6 (which is kept confidential) keeps lawyers silent while purporting to protect an imagined judicial integrity. The rhetoric of the American Bar Association misdirects identification of the problem which they authored and recommended.

One Rule. Made Law. Each State. Every State.
Undermining Justice. Usurping Authority.
(1984 - 2009)
Lawyers mandated to silence... in Congress, the White House, in Government.
Cash for Kids. Foreclosures through fraud. Injustice.
non-Lawyers finally found it and filed a Constitutional Challenge.


The state supreme court has a conflict of interest because they enacted it, so we took it to federal court.
The district court improperly dismissed (and neglected to mention they were required to follow the PA version of Rule 1.6).
The third circuit court affirmed and denied en banc review (while also neglecting to mention they were required to follow the PA version of Rule 1.6).

Rule 1.6 requires that Rule 1.6 be kept confidential.

Rule 1.6 requires the courts to conceal their corruption and injustice caused by Rule 1.6 - the very unconstitutional law being challenged.

Even where you know the problem law (Rule 1.6), the problem law was permitting fraud, corruption and injustice to conceal itself.

Rule 1.6, an invalid and void unconstitutional law, is relentless.

But, Rule 1.6 is exposed and IT'S DAYS ARE NUMBERED.

I promised Sandy Fonzo that I would provide the Cash for Kids families with closure by exposing how it happened and by making sure it was prevented in the future.

Every. Person. Matters.

JUSTICE IS COMING.




Befitting a constitutional law, doctrine or statute, federal preemption continues to draw the interest and resources of the highest court in the land.

The U.S. Supreme Court accepts petitions for certiori and decides preemption cases.


THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE

The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution, and the laws and treaties stemming from it, are the supreme law of the land.


U.S. CONSTITUTION. Article VI, clause 2.
Article VI.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.


The Supreme Court has held that when there is a conflict between a state and federal law, the state law is invalidated because the federal law is supreme.

Even a state regulation designed to protect the state’s vital interest must yield because
“under the Supremacy Clause, from which our preemption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”

The Supreme Court defined preemption to “be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”


Preemption Jurisprudence

The Constitution itself has already clearly made and announced the fundamental judgment
regarding the relation of federal and state power: so long as the federal government has the constitutional power to enact the law, then the federal law is granted supremacy over conflicting state actions.

There are numerous instances of the Supreme Court, and lower courts, stating that the process of determining appropriate preemption is an inquiry into congressional intent; however,the intent of the Constitution is clearly to preempt every state law which would abridge, diminish, subvert or deny rights and privileges which were secured for the People.

But the roots of the doctrine are most clearly seen in Marbury v. Madison, where
Chief Justice Marshall stated: “The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion."


CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW

The legitimacy of construction by an unelected entity in a republican or democratic system becomes an issue whenever the construction is controversial, as it frequently is.


RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

Conceding, in 1934, the limited competence of legislative bodies to establish a comprehensive system of court procedure, and acknowledging the inherent power of courts to regulate the conduct of their business, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the lower federal courts not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes.

Their operation being restricted, in conformity with the proviso attached to the congressional authorization, to matters of pleading and practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus judicially promulgated neither affect the substantive rights of litigants nor alter the jurisdiction of federal courts and the venue of actions therein and,thus circumscribed, have been upheld as valid.

Under the Rules Enabling Act, procedural rules may not modify “any substantive right” but laws in conflict with the rules are “of no further force or effect.”

While Challenging Rule 1.6 of the Rules Of Professional Conduct, the Federal Court was obligated under Rule 1.6 to dismiss the matter but neglected to indicate the reason. Rule 1.6 mandates they conceal that Rule 1.6 is the reason. Instead, like a child caught by surprise, they just made stuff up...

To recap...
The Constitution is Supreme law.
Judiciary may make rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Federal Courts may make rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Federal Courts may make local rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
States may enact laws, unless they violate substantive rights.
State Judiciary may enact rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Local state courts may make local rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
The Rules of Professional Conduct have been enacted into law, unless they violate substantive rights.
(Even if they do so collaterally to non-lawyers who are not mandated by them.)

No matter how deeply they bury the mandate of Rule 1.6... THEY MAY NOT VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.
The Courts know this. The lawyers know this. So, why are they violating your rights?

They hide behind their Rule 1.6 Confidentiality and deny your CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, ... jail your children, steal your house, or destroy your life. They know what they are doing is ultimately unlawful. The judiciary have buried an unconstitutional law so deep in the law books that they never expected any non-lawyer to find it, and survive to prove it.






FRCP Rule 83(a) allows for Local Rules under 28 USC 2072 and 2075
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”).
28 U.S. Code § 2072 - Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
28 U.S. Code § 2074 - Rules of procedure and evidence; submission to Congress; effective date
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law. The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to proceedings then pending, except that the Supreme Court shall not require the application of such rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, in the opinion of the court in which such proceedings are pending, the application of such rule in such proceedings would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former rule applies.
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.
Local Rule 83.6(IV)(b)(para 2)The Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by this court are the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania...



The Rule-Making Power and Powers Over Process

Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct of their business. However, this power too is derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them.


Limitations to The Rule Making Power.

The principal function of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as regards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state in convenient form principles of substantive law previously established by statutes or decisions.

But no such rule “can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.”

This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity, and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the guidance of lower courts, and to rules “which lower courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred.”

As incident to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, witnesses, counsel, and jurors by self-preserving rules for the protection of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of justice.

The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable powers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice, and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in the custody of law. 332

Such powers are said to be essential to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.

The courts of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence exists.


JURISDICTION - Congressional Authority

Congress’s authority is limited by provisions of the Constitution such as the Due Process Clause, so that a limitation on jurisdiction that denied a litigant access to any remedy might
be unconstitutional.

Congress is also free to legislate away prudential restraints and confer standing to
the extent permitted by Article III.
438 “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise
would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III’s requirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). That is, the actual or threatened injury required may exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974). Examples include United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Gladstone Realtors v. Village ofBellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 n.4, 11–12 (1976). For a good example of the congressionally created interest and the injury to it, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–75 (1982) (Fair Housing Act created right to truthful information on availability of housing; black tester’s right injured through false information, but white tester not injured because he received truthful information). It is clear, however, that the Court will impose separation-of-powers restraints on the power of Congress to create interests to which injury would give standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–78 (1992). Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion in Lujan, reiterated the separation-of-powers objection to congressional conferral of standing in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 29, 36 (1998) (alleged infringement of President’s “take care” obligation), but this time in dissent; the Court did not advert to this objection in finding that Congress had provided for standing based on denial of information to which the plaintiffs, as voters, were entitled.



Clause 18. The Congress shall have Power * * * To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.


NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE - Scope and Operation

The Necessary and Proper Clause, sometimes called the “coefficient” or “elastic” clause, is an enlargement, not a constriction, of the powers expressly granted to Congress. Chief Justice Marshall’s classic opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 1818 set the standard in words that reverberate to this day. “Let the end be legitimate,” he wrote, “let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end.


JURISDICTION - Supreme Court

Implicit in the argument of Marbury v. Madison is the thought that the Court is obligated
to take and decide cases meeting jurisdictional standards.

“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, (1821).


DECLARATORY OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

But one who challenges a statute or possible administrative action need demonstrate only a realistic danger of sustaining an injury to his rights as a result of the statute’s operation and enforcement and need not await the consummation of the threatened injury in order to obtain preventive relief, such as exposing himself to actual arrest or prosecution. When one alleges an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest but proscribed by statute and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he may bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Similarly, the reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues. 549


EXECUTIVE ORDER

The Constitution was clearly intended to preempt state law.

Where state constitutions may not delegate statutory authority which exceeds the limits of authority and infringes upon the substantial rights protected by the Constitution of the UNited Stateslaw, Executive departments and agencies shall construe, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only when the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute....

Friday, May 16, 2014

Constitutional Rights References

If you are involved in a Rule 1.6 concealed injustice the following cases will likely have no impact - because you have lost your constitutional rights.

Let your experience be your guide.


Boyd v. United, 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885)
Justice Bradley, "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the Courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be Obsta Principiis."


Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
"It will be an evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government outside supreme law finds lodgement in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution."


Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.644
"Constitutional 'rights' would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied."


Juliard v. Greeman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)
Supreme Court Justice Field, "There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States... In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it. All else is withheld."


Mallowy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
"All rights and safeguards contained in the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are equally applicable."


Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 491; 86 S. Ct. 1603
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no 'rule making' or legislation which would abrogate them."


Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 p. 442
"An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."


Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 7; 8 S. Ct. 568, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958)
"...in our country the people are sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to them by taking away their citizenship."


Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights."


Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)
"The claim and exercise of a Constitution right cannot be converted into a crime"... "a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law".


Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas., 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)
Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.


CORRUPTION OF AUTHORITY:


Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 26 S. Ct. 688 50 L.Ed 1057
United States Senator convicted of, among other things, bribery.


Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S. Ct. at 261 (1882)
"No man [or woman] in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."


*Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 678, 694
Acts in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of fairness and due process.


*Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270, 286
Society's commitment to institutional justice requires that judges be solicitous of the rights of persons who come before the court.


*Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 359, 371, 374
Acts in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of fairness and due process.


Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438
"Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."


Owen v. City of Independence
"The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental authority is assured that he will be compensated for his injury."


Perry v. United States, 204 U.S. 330, 358
"I do not understand the government to contend that it is any less bound by the obligation than a private individual would be..." "It is not the function of our government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error."


*Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 533
Before sending a person to jail for contempt or imposing a fine, judges are required to provide due process of law, including strict adherence to the procedural requirements contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating but an aggravating factor.


U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound to obey it."

"It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives."


Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)

Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.

DISMISSAL OF SUIT:

Note: [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.] It can be argued that to dismiss a civil rights action or other lawsuit in which a serious factual pattern or allegation of a cause of action has been made would itself be violating of procedural due process as it would deprive a pro se litigant of equal protection of the law vis a vis a party who is represented by counsel.

Also, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 - Relief from Judgment or Order (a) Clerical Mistakes and (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.


Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)
Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.


Walter Process Equipment v. Food Machinery, 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
... in a "motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted". From this vantage point, courts are reluctant to dismiss complaints unless it appears the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).


EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW


Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-258 (1942)
"However inept Cochran's choice of words, he has set out allegations supported by affidavits, and nowhere denied, that Kansas refused him privileges of appeal which it afforded to others. *** The State properly concedes that if the alleged facts pertaining to the suppression of Cochran's appeal were disclosed as being true, ... there would be no question but that there was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."


Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)
Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."


Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893), Citations Omitted
"Undoubtedly it (the Fourteenth Amendment) forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights... It is enough that there is no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class. ...And due process of law within the meaning of the [Fifth and Fourteenth] amendment is secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."


Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337 (1885)
"The rule of equality... requires the same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the constitutents of each class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances".


Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332
"Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application fo the law. 'All men are equal before the law,' "This is a government of laws and not of men,' 'No man is above the law,' are all maxims showing the spirit in which legislatures, executives, and courts are expected to make, execute and apply laws. But the framers and adopters of the (Fourtheenth) Amendment were not content to depend... upon the spirit of equality which might not be insisted on by local public opinion. They therefore embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty."


HABEUS CORPUS:


Duncan v. Bradley, No. 01-55290 (9th Circ., 12-24-02)
A state trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on an entrapment defense, in a second trial on drug sale charges, amounted to prejudicial constitutional error where evidence presented at a first trial warranted such an instruct. To read entire text of the opinion, see http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0155290p.pdf


JUDICIAL IMMUNITY:

See Judicial Immunity page for more citations (links) and news articles regarding the topic.
See also, 42 USC 1983 - Availability of Equitable Relief Against Judges.

Note: [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.] Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions. Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act or for their administrative/ministerial duties, or for violating a citizen's constitutional rights. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing a judicial act; he is performing a ministerial act.
Nowhere was the judiciary given immunity, particularly nowhere in Article III; under our Constitution, if judges were to have immunity, it could only possibly be granted by amendment (and even less possibly by legislative act), as Art. I, Sections 9 & 10, respectively, in fact expressly prohibit such, stating, "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States" and "No state shall... grant any Title of Nobility." Most of us are certain that Congress itself doesn't understand the inherent lack of immunity for judges.

Article III, Sec. 1, "The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior."
Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Spring 1986 21 n3, p 509-516, "Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants' civil rights." - Robert Craig Waters.

Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859)
"No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence."

Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion at page 140 said, "If (federal judges) break the law, they can be prosecuted." Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion at page 141) said, "Judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted and punished for crimes... The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution".

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)
Note: Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it". See also In Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (188); U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).


Cooper v. O'Conner, 99 F.2d 133
There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign.


Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)
A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts.


Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 227-229, 108 S. Ct. at 544-545 (1987); Westfall v.Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1987); United States v. Lanier (March 1997)
Constitutionally and in fact of law and judicial rulings, state-federal "magistrates-judges" or any government actors, state or federal, may now be held liable, if they violate any Citizen's Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities, or guarantees; including statutory civil rights.
A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.


Gregory v. Thompson, F.2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974)
Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception being for acts done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.


Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92 Okla 32, 227 F. 417
"The courts are not bound by an officer's interpretation of the law under which he presumes to act."


Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)
"... the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."

"In declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank".

"All law (rules and practices) which are repugnant to the Constitution are VOID".
Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states "NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, ... or equal protection under the law", this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional.


Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)
"Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction."


Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984); 104 S. Ct. 1781, 1980, 1981, and 1985
In 1996, Congress passed a law to overcome this ruling which stated that judicial immunity doesn't exist; citizens can sue judges for prospective injunctive relief.
"Our own experience is fully consistent with the common law's rejection of a rule of judicial immunity. We never have had a rule of absolute judicial immunity. At least seven circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity... to prevent irreparable injury to a citizen's constitutional rights..."

"Subsequent interpretations of the Civil Rights Act by this Court acknowledge Congress' intent to reach unconstitutional actions by all state and federal actors, including judges... The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state [federal] from denying any person [citizen] within its jurisdiction the equal protection under the laws. Since a State [or federal] acts only by its legislative, executive or judicial authorities, the constitutional provisions must be addressed to those authorities, including state and federal judges..."

"We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar to relief against a judicial officer acting in her [his] judicial capacity."


Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 at 288 (1991)
A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity; however, even in a case involving a particular attorney not assigned to him, he may reach out into the hallway, having his deputy use "excessive force" to haul the attorney into the courtroom for chastisement or even incarceration. A Superior Court Judge is broadly vested with "general jurisdiction." Provided the judge is not divested of all jurisdiction, he may have his actions excused as per this poor finding.


Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)
Note: By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person). When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the Judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges' orders are not voidable, but VOID, and of no legal force or effect.

The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."


Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349
Some Defendants urge that any act "of a judicial nature" entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing.
A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.


Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity, finding that both necessary immunity prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986), the Ninth Circuit, en banc, criticized the "judicial nature" analysis it had published in Rankin as unnecessarily restrictive. But Rankin's ultimate result was not changed, because Judge Howard had been independently divested of absolute judicial immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction.


U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (State use of), 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697
When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction.


U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."

"It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives."


Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326
When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.


JURISDICTION:


NOTE: It is a fact of law that the person asserting jurisdiction must, when challenged, prove that jurisdiction exists; mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished.

Albrecht v. U.S.
Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)
"The United States District Court is not a true United States Court, established under Article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court."


Basso v. UPL, 495 F. 2d 906
Brook v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633
Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers."


Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)
Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases.
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
Mack v. United States, 07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia
"The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policy making is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."


Mack v. United States, 07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia
"Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete and enumerated ones."


Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938)
"The term 'District Courts of the United States' as used in the rules without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are Legislative Courts, properly speaking, and are not district courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the district courts of the United States (98 U.S. 145) does not make it a 'District Court of the United States'.

"Not only did the promulgating order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the omission of provision for the application of the rules the territorial court and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended."

McNutt v. General Motors, 298 U.S. 178
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
"We have held, however, that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction."
Owens v. The City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980)
Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442


JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:


United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I at 16 (1976)
"It is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by extreme and dubious legal argument."


PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY (DEMONSTRATIONS):


Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347; 6 S. Ct. 2673; 49 L. Ed. 2d (1976)
"Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."


Miller v. U.S., 230 F. 2d. 486, 490; 42
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one, because of his exercise of constitutional rights."


Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
"No state shall convert a liberty into a license, and charge a fee therefore."


Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Alabama, 373 U.S. 262
"If the State converts a right (liberty) into a privilege, the citizen can ignore the license and fee and engage in the right (liberty) with impunity."
United States Constitution, First Amendment
Right to Petition; Freedom of Association.


PROBABLE CAUSE:


Brinegar v. U.S., 388 US 160 (1949)
Probable Cause to Arrest - Provides details on how to determine if a crime has been or is being committed.


Carroll v. U.S., 267 US 132 (1925)
Probable Cause to Search - Provides details on the belief that seizable property exists in a particular place or on a particular person.


Draper v. U.S. (1959)
Probable cause is where known facts and circumstances, of a reasonably trustworthy nature, are sufficient to justify a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being committed. Reasonable man definition; common textbook definition; comes from this case.


PRO SE RIGHTS:


Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425

Litigants can be assisted by unlicensed laymen during judicial proceedings.


Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)
"Following the simple guide of rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice"... "The federal rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." The court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice.


Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 449
"The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, are not to be defeated under the name of local practice."


Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905
"... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws."


Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rule 17, 28 USCA "Next Friend"
A next friend is a person who represents someone who is unable to tend to his or her own interest.


Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)
"Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient"... "which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240;

Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.


Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)
"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment."


NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415); United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715; and Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969)
Members of groups who are competent nonlawyers can assist other members of the group achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged with "unauthorized practice of law."

Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals
The plaintiff's civil rights pleading was 150 pages and described by a federal judge as "inept". Nevertheless, it was held "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to technicalities."


Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)
It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).


Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)
"Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for the law."


Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional Rights."


Schware v. Board of Examiners, United State Reports 353 U.S. pages 238, 239.
"The practice of law cannot be licensed by any state/State."


Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925)
"The practice of law is an occupation of common right."
Nowhere can be found a competent attorney that is able to execute the proper remedy without embarrassing the Court, Corpus Juris Secundum 2d Vol. 7 section 25.


Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 that, â€Å“No accused may be deprived of, his liberty as the result of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied assistance of counsel.”


At the present time, Bar Attorneys (Public Vessels) are not Assistance of Counsel and defense is severely limited by being represented by an attorney since the Texas Code of Professional Conduct permits a defendant to have only four choices of input in his defense, 1) what plea to enter, 2) whether to testify, 3) whether to appeal, and 4) whether to opt for a jury trial. Best said a “trial by jury”.

Monday, March 17, 2014

ARTICLE III REQUIREMENTS ARE MET

A case or controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendant is properly placed before the court.

(1) an “injury in fact”;

The Court acknowledged the Plaintiffs injury in the Memorandum of the Court dated October 29, 2013.
“[Plaintiffs] assert, inter alia, that Rule 1.6 denies a Pro Se litigant of an opportunity to petition the government for redress of grievances, denies a Pro Se litigant of life, liberty and or property without due process of law; causes a denial of constitutionally protected rights by the State and as such is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.”

(2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury had to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.

From Appellee Breif page 14.
“Attorney General Kathleen Kane has never has anything to do with Healy or Krautheim themselves, or with their previous litigation efforts (in which they allegedly were injured)”

Attorney General Kane acknowledges the failure to take any action to address the injuries to the Plaintiffs, to investigate the extensive reports of the judicial misconduct and corruption, and the damage caused to the plaintiffs because of the failure of the Attorney General to enforce the laws of the commonwealth.

The Pennsylvania Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The office has the responsibility for the prosecution of crime prosecuted by the commonwealth, including organized crime, public corruption, and consumer protection. The Attorney General represents the commonwealth in all actions brought by or against the commonwealth, reviews all proposed rules and regulations by commonwealth agencies.


The failure of the Attorney General to enforce the laws of the commonwealth, and also the Attorney General's failure to follow the law, directly caused the resultant injury to the plaintiffs.

The Attorney General's inaction in the matter further causes the inescapable injustice to the plaintiffs which continued for years.

Once an act of misconduct occurred within a courtroom, the failure of the Attorney General to enforce the law and to address the injustice and resultant public corruption sacrificed the integrity of the judiciary and caused the plaintiffs situation to worsen without any possibility for resolution.

(3) A showing that it 'be likely, as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable outcome.

A ruling that Rule 1.6 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL resolves the matter for the plaintiffs and returns them to the state with their previously denied rights and liberties available with equal protection under the law.

A ruling that Rule 1.6 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL permits the Attorney General to perform the law enforcement responsibilities required of the office of Attorney General.

A ruling that Rule 1.6 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL permits the judiciary to acknowledge address and resolve matters before their courts without a mandate to ignore and deny injustice, judicial misconduct and public corruption.

A ruling that Rule 1.6 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL permits the legislature to resume responsible management of the laws of the commonwealth


RETURN TO REPLY BRIEF INDEX

Thursday, January 30, 2014

Appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT











Terance Healy
Todd M. Krautheim#13-4591
on behalf of the United States
v.
Kathleen Kane
Pennsylvania Attorney General
and
The Attorneys General of the United States



Appeal to
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
from the Order and Memorandum entered in
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
on the 29th day of October, 2013.


Submitted by :
Terance Healy
871 Mustang Road
Warrington, PA 18976
215-343-1686

Todd M. Krauitheim
207 Woodspring Circle
Doylestown, A 18901


TABLE OF CONTENTS


Jurisdictional Statement
District Court
Court of Appeals
Filing Dates
Final Order

Issue #1
Issue #2
Issue #3
Issue #4
Issue #5
Background
Personal
Appendices

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT #13-4591


JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

DISTRICT COURT

The jurisdiction of the District Court is invoked under 28 USC 1331, 1343, and 1345, this being an action:
- authorized by law to challenge the constitutionality of State law;
- to redress the deprivation under State law, statute , ordinance or regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States which provides for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
- seeking relief providing for the protection of civil rights;
- brought on behalf of the United States

The venue is properly placed in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania fir civil action;
- where a substantial p[art of the events giving rise to the claim occurred;
- where plaintiffs are residents of the judicial district
- where defendant is an officer of the state acting in official capacity or under color of legal authority

Evidence of proper standing has been presented in the true and factual circumstances and actions documented and admissions filed with the United Sates District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.


COURT OF APPEALS

The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit is invoked as memorandum and Order being appealed from has been issued by the United states District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.


FILING DATES

On August 8, 2013, a Complaint Constitutional Challenge was filed in the United states District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On October 29, 2013, a Memorandum and Order was filed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On November 26, 2013, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On December 2, 2013, A Notice of Appeal was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On December 2, 2013, an Order was filed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying the Motion for Reconsideration.


FINAL ORDER

As Such, the Appellants appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the FINAL ORDER dated October 29, 2013.




ISSUE #1

Did the Court fail to act pursuant to FRCP 5.1(b) CERTIFICATION BY THE COURT of a Constitutional Challenge?


HISTORY OF ISSUE

On August 8, 2013, Plaintiffs (Appellants) filed the Complaint – Constitutional Challenge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (#13-4614).

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(b) Summons Issuance. Individual summons were prepared by Deputy Clerk Patricia A. Jones, signed, sealed and issued to Plaintiffs for service in accordance with FRCP Rule 4(c).

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5.1(a) , Plaintiffs (Appellants) served the Constitutional Challenge, summons and notice upon each Attorney General by the United States Postal Service using certified mail, return receipt requested.

On September 6, 2013, Plaintiffs provided the court with proof of service and certified mail receipts to all Attorneys General. The seventy seven page document was not properly entered into the docket by the Court.

The Information in the proof of service document filed on September 6, 2013 was not properly entered into the docket.
Plaintiffs (Appellants) called this to the attention of the Clerk on September 11. 2013.
Plaintiffs (Appellants) called this to the attention of the Clerk on Octo0ber 18, 2013
Plaintiffs (Appellants) called this to the attention of the Court in a MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS TO THE DOCKET filed on October 21, 2013.

During each meeting with the Clerk, the issue of Certification by the Court was presented but not addressed or acted upon.

After October 21, 2013 with information from the proof of service documents having been properly entered into the docket, 'answer due' dates were calculated documenting the failure of EVERY Attorney General to provide a timely response to the Constitutional Challenge.

Only one of the fifty six (56) Attorneys General was represented and registered to receive electronic notices after filing an untimely motion on behalf of Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane.

The docket reflects the failure of fifty-five (55) Attorneys General to answer or file an appearance or register for notices in the matter as required by law.

On September 6, 2013, an untimely motion on behalf of Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane was filed. The motion was not served upon the fifty-five (55) other Attorneys General, who additionally had not registered for electronic notices as required by law.

The 'Transaction Report' on the Docket indicates the motion was immediately terminated on September 6, 2013.

The 'Transaction Report' on the Docket indicates no connection to the Plaintiffs Response filed on September 11, 2013.

The Motion, which specifically 'does not represent the other defendants” who were not served with the document, was GRANTED on September 16, 2013.

On September 16, 2013, the 'Parties Report' from the Docket indicates a conversion of each Attorney General to an 'Unrepresented Party PRO SE'.

The 'Transaction Report' on the Docket indicates no connection between the Order of the Court dated September 16, 2013 and the Motion Filed on September 6, 2013 or the Plaintiffs' (Appellants') Response filed on September 11, 2013.

Plaintiffs (Appellants) prepared MOTION FOR INDICATION OF INTENTION TO DEFAULT which were filed on October 21, 2013 and served upon each of the 56 Attorneys General. Docket #14-67

The Docket fails to include the Motion prepared and served upon Maryland Attorney General Douglas Gansler.

On October 23, 2013, the Court DENIED the Motions without opportunity for an answer or other response from the Attorneys General.


LAW

RULE 5.1 CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE – NOTICE, CERTIFICATION, AND INTERVENTION

Rule 5.1(b) Certification by the Court. The court must, under 28 U.S.C. 2403, certify to the appropriate attorney general that a statute has been questioned.

The purpose of 'certification' is to assure and confirm that an attorney general has been appropriately notified of the constitutional challenge of a statute. If a default should occur due to non-response or failure to answer the summons, the certification by the court serves the purpose of indicating that the default was a deliberate and intentional act by the attorney general.

Local Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 7.1(c) indicates “Unless the Court directs otherwise, any party opposing the motion shall serve a brief in opposition together with such an answer or other response that may be appropriate, within fourteen (14) days after service of the motion.”


ANSWER

Did the Court fail to act pursuant to FRCP 5.1(b) CERTIFICATION BY THE COURT of a Constitutional Challenge?

YES. The Court failed to certify to the Attorneys General that a statute had been questioned.




ISSUE #2

Did the Court fail to act pursuant to Rule 5.1(c) INTERVENTION of a Constitutional Challenge?


HISTORY OF ISSUE

On August 8, 2013, Plaintiffs (Appellants) filed the Complaint – Constitutional Challenge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (#13-4614).

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(b) Summons Issuance. Individual summons were prepared by Deputy Clerk Patricia A. Jones, signed, sealed and issued to Plaintiffs for service in accordance with FRCP Rule 4(c).

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5.1(a) , Plaintiffs (Appellants) served the Constitutional Challenge, summons and notice upon each Attorney General by the United States Postal Service using certified mail, return receipt requested.

On September 6, 2013, Plaintiffs provided the court with proof of service and certified mail receipts to all Attorneys General. The seventy seven page document was not properly entered into the docket by the Court.

The Information in the proof of service document filed on September 6, 2013 was not properly entered into the docket.
Plaintiffs (Appellants) called this to the attention of the Clerk on September 11. 2013.
Plaintiffs (Appellants) called this to the attention of the Clerk on Octo0ber 18, 2013
Plaintiffs (Appellants) called this to the attention of the Court in a MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS TO THE DOCKET filed on October 21, 2013.

During each meeting with the Clerk, the issue of Intervention pursuant to Rule 5.1(c) was presented but not addressed or acted upon.

On October 29, 2013, the Court dismissed the Complaint - Constitutional Challenge.

On November 26, 2013, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed.

On December 2, 2013, a Notice of Appeal was filed appealing the Order of October 29, 2013.

On December 2, 2013, the Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 5, 2013, a Summons and Complaint – Constitutional Challenge was accepted by the U.S. Attorney.


LAW

RULE 5.1 CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE – NOTICE, CERTIFICATION, AND INTERVENTION
Rule 5.1(c) INTERVENTION; FINAL DECISION ON THE MERITS. Unless the court sets a later time, the attorney general may intervene within 60 days after the notice is filed or after the court certifies the challenge, whichever is earlier. Before the time to intervene expires, the court may reject the constitutional challenge, but may not enter a final judgment holding the statute unconstitutional.

Rule 5.1(d) NO FORFEITURE. A party's failure to file and serve the notice, or the court's failure to certify, does not forfeit a constitutional claim or defense that is otherwise timely asserted.


ANSWER

Did the Court fail to act pursuant to Rule 5.1(c) INTERVENTION of a Constitutional Challenge?

YES. The court failed to act pursuant to Rule 5.1(c).
The court did not set a later time for intervention.
The Notice of the Constitutional Challenge was filed on August 8, 2013. The US Attorney accepted service of a summons and complaint on December 5, 2013. The attorney general did not intervene within 60 days after the notice was filed.
The court did NOT certify the challenge.

Pursuant to Rule 5.1(c), the failure of the court to certify the challenge and allow for the intervention by the attorney general prohibits the court from entering a final judgment holding the statute unconstitutional.




ISSUE #3

Did the Court ignore, deny, prevent and obstruct the Attorneys General from intentional default in the matter?

HISTORY OF ISSUE

As presented in Issue #1 and Issue #2, the court has demonstrated deliberate intentional actions which ignore the Federal Rules of Civil procedure.

As presented in Issue #1 and Issue #2, the court has taken an active position to deny and prevent the Attorneys General from any answer, response or non-response action which would indicate their decision to default on this matters.

The Docket and the related docket reports demonstrate activity by the court which misrepresents the matter, the activity in the matter, and any attempt to correct the inaccurate information contained in the docket.

The neglectful and deliberate actions of the Court demonstrate extraordinary efforts to remove the Attorneys General from the matter, excusing every failure to respond or answer while preventing the opportunity for deliberate and intentional default.

Certification would require the Attorneys General to respond indicating the constitutionality of the statute, or to not respond indicating their informed intentional default.

ANSWER

Did the Court ignore, deny, prevent and obstruct the Attorneys General from intentional default in the matter?

YES, the Court has ignored, denied, prevented and obstructed the Attorneys General from intentional default in the matter.




ISSUE #4

Did the court incorrectly dismiss the matter without basis in law while failing to substantiate any justification for dismissal in law, doctrine or case law?


HISTORY OF ISSUE

The Court has written that the decision was based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which does not subject this matter to dismissal, and the Younger abstention which is not relevant to the constitutional matter before this Court, and Article III which grants judicial power to the District Court for cases which arise under the US Constitution.

Plaintiffs respectfully address the issues presented by the Court's Memorandum dated October 29, 2013.

Plaintiffs have filed this Constitutional Challenge to address the denial of their civil rights and liberties which are guaranteed by the US Constitution.

The denial of their rights and liberties has been caused by an improperly and unlawfully enacted state law – Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968, Article V, Section 10(c), “... the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure, and conduct of all courts... if such rules are consistent with Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.” As Rule 1.6 causes the denial of substantive rights of a litigant, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court lacks the authority required to properly and lawfully enact Rule 1.6 into law.

The Plaintiffs have been directly harmed by the denial of their constitutionally protected rights. The harm suffered will continue until the law which mandates that the state courts ignore their rights is nullified and their rights and liberties are restored.

The Constitutional Challenge before this court is a NECESSITY. The Challenge presents the loss of constitutionally protected rights and liberties and the irreparable harm and inescapable injustice which occurs when basic rights and liberties are irretrievably denied and prevented.

While the plaintiffs have clearly stated their singular intention to present the constitutional challenge to this Honorable Court for review, the Court has inappropriately and incorrectly written “that plaintiffs seek review and rejection of decisions previously made by the Pennsylvania state courts.” The state court records are evidentiary for the purpose of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of actions mandated by the law being challenged.

The Court incorrectly writes that “it is clear that plaintiffs are, at bottom, asking the Court to consider and reverse determinations made in the state court divorce and mortgage foreclosure proceedings.”

The referenced footnote on page eight correctly indicates “To the extent that plaintiffs do “not, [in their complaint,] complain of injuries caused by a state court decision,” and instead raise “a direct challenge to the constitutionality” of Rule 1.6, their complaint is “not subject to dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Gray v Yavil, 513 F. App'x 210,212(3d Cir. 2013)

Plaintiffs have not petitioned this Honorable Court to affirm or reject any decision or opinion of the state court. Plaintiffs concur with the Court that the constitutional challenge is “not subject to dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”

This matter is properly placed in the US District Court as the proper court of first instance for a Constitutional Challenge. The underlying state court cases are not the subject of review. The state court actions and decisions are the evidence which demonstrates the constitutional issue and the necessity for this challenge.

The state court lacks jurisdiction to address a Constitutional Challenge where the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution have been denied as a consequence of a state law. Additionally, the state court is prevented from a proper review of the matter as the law being challenged mandates and prevents any proceeding or remedy at the state level. The constitutionality of the law must be addressed at a federal level.

The state supreme court's direct responsibility for authoring, enacting and enforcing the law in question represents an undeniable conflict of interest which would preclude the state supreme court from proper jurisdiction. The state supreme court is prevented by Rule 1.6 from acting sua sponte to address the unconstitutional law. Rule 1.6 resists lawful resolution of the constitutional issue further demonstrating the necessity of this matter before this Honorable Court.

The Younger Abstention does not apply to this constitutional issue as there can be no state proceeding which affords any opportunity to raise this federal/constitutional claim.

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5.1(a)(2) Constitutional Challenge to a Statute – Notice, Certification, and Intervention, Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane and the Attorneys General of the United States have been served with the Constitutional Challenge as “a party that files a pleading, written motion, or other paper drawing into question the constitutionality of a federal or state statute must promptly serve the notice and paper on the Attorney General of the United States if a federal statute is questioned – or on the state attorney general if a state statute is questioned.”

There has been no record on the Court docket regarding Certification by the Court with the Attorneys General that a statute has been questioned pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5.1(b).

Attorney General Kathleen Kane and this Court have improperly understated and paraphrased the law being challenged in this matter with the implication that the plaintiffs are challenging 'attorney-client privilege'. Plaintiffs are challenging the constitutionality of Rule 1.6 in it's entirety.

Analysis of Rule 1.6 indicates it is not a necessity for justice. It was only after Rule 1.6 was enacted into law that the denial of Constitutional Rights became lawful and injustice was ignored.

Once this Court has ruled on the constitutionality of the law, the litigants rights will be restored and state court will be lawfully permitted to hear, address and resolve the injustices experienced in the state courts. The Judiciary will have the ability and opportunity to correct injustices and restore their integrity through each judges own actions and rulings. The judiciary should never have been mandated to suffer the loss of integrity required to conceal injustice.

The evidence in support of the facts in the complaint demonstrate the denial of constitutionally protected rights by the state courts. Those civil rights and liberties have been denied and ignored as a mandate of the law being challenged.

The Plaintiffs have yet to present this Court with their experience in the state courts which clearly demonstrates the denial of their rights, the injustices experienced in their respective cases, and the inability of the courts and the government to permit due process and procedure to petition the government for redress of grievances.

The relief requested will not usurp state jurisdiction or authority, or overturn any state decision(s) or opinion(s). The remedy will permit the state court to address parties in an unbiased, unaffected and fully informed equal forum.

It is not appropriate or lawful for this Honorable Court to dismiss this Constitutional Challenge and further deny, delay and prevent the plaintiffs from their civil rights and liberties under the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs have presented their 'injury in fact” and the causal connection between the injury and the law being challenged. A determination that Rule 1.6 is unconstitutional would permit the injury to be addressed by restoring their constitutional rights in the state courts.

The injury is defined, documented and evident upon review of the state court record.

The chance of future injury occurring is likely and demonstrated by the matter already indicated for inclusion in this matter. In Healy v Healy where a defective and void series of court orders has been used as the basis for a penalty in excess of $300,000 ordered in March 2013.

The chance of future injury occuring is actual and demonstrated in the matter of Healy v Miller, where a defective and void order from Healy v Healy has been improperly presented by Miller in November 2013 as a valid order of the court with statement that the validity of the defective and void order, a nullity, cannot be collaterally challenged in an Action for Ejectment.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT #13-4591


ANSWER

Did the court incorrectly dismiss the matter without basis in law while failing to substantiate any justification for dismissaal in law, doctrine or caselaw?

YES, the court has incorrectly dismissed the matter without basis in law while failing to substantiate any justification for dismissal in law, doctrine or caselaw.

The Court's review of the pleadings indicates proper subject matter jurisdiction, a valid statement of a claim for which relief can be granted, proper authority and jurisdiction for this Court to proceed with the matter, and a concise statement of the case being presented to the Court.

As the Court is not required to dismiss the matter under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, or Younger abstention.

Article III of the US Constitution provides jurisdiction and authority to the Court for all cases which arise under the constitution.



ISSUE #5

Did the Court fail to reconsider the matter based on an incorrect application of LRCP Rule 7.1(g) where FRCP Rule 52(b) applies to an action which concludes the matter before the court?


HISTORY OF ISSUE

On October 29, 2013, in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a)(1), The Court filed a Memorandum and Order writing its findings of facts specially and stating its conclusions of law separately.

On November 26, 2013, Plaintiffs (Appellants) filed a Motion for Reconsideration timely pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52(b).

A Certificate of Service was filed concurrently with the Motion for Reconsideration on November 26, 2013.

On December 2, 2013, while awaiting the Court's decision on the Motion for Reconsideration and pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a Notice of Appeal was filed timely appealing to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the Order and Memorandum dated October 29, 2013.

On December 2, 2013, The Court issued an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration as untimely pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 7.1(g).

There had/has been no response filed by any of Attorneys General regarding to the Motion for Reconsideration.


LAW

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(b) applies to Pleadings and Motions generally.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6(c)(1)(B) Time for Motion Papers applies to Motions generally with an exception “when these rules set a different time.”

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52(b) Findings and Conclusions by the Court permits the court to amend its judgment on a parties motion filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.

Local Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 7.1(c) indicates “Unless the Court directs otherwise, any party opposing the motion shall serve a brief in opposition together with such an answer or other response that may be appropriate, within fourteen (14) days after service of the motion.”

Local Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 7.1(g) permits “Motions for reconsideration or reargument shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment, order or decree concerned.”

Local Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania do not indicate any effective date or revocation with regard to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6 or Rule 52.


ANSWER

Did the Court fail to reconsider the matter based on an incorrect application of LRCP Rule 7.1(g) where FRCP Rule 52(b) applies to an action which concludes the matter before the court?

Where Plaintiffs (Appellants) have acted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has incorrectly applied LRCP Rule 7.1(g) and failed to recognize the exception permitted pursuant to FRCP Rule 52(b) applicable to an action which concludes the matter before the court which permits the parties to file a motion no later than 28 days after entry of judgment.

Plaintiffs (Appellants) respectfully request their uncontested Motion for Reconsideration be GRANTED.




BACKGROUND – THE NECESSITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALENGE

( Healy v Healy )
Since 2007, after years of seeking assistance from local, state and federal law enforcement and being summarily disregarded; and after years of requests seeking local, state and federal government involvement were completely ignored; and after years of filing documents exposing the deliberate injustice which were summarily dismissed without review or explanation. The failure of everyone in a position to address or resolve any legal issue was absolute and the failure to provide any explanation was unacceptable.

Those who were ignoring the clear and well-documented reports of the injustice were concealing the matter and enabling and causing further injustice.

Those who were deliberately failing to follow state law and documented court procedure excused their own misconduct without consequence and never explained, justified or addressed their actions.

The state court absolved without penalty the failure of others to follow court orders; to follow state law; and to follow court procedures. This 'courtesy' was not granted to plaintiff, Terance Healy. Never. Ever. EVERY false allegation against plaintiff, Terance Healy, was scheduled with the state court for immediate review and was required to be disproved. Plaintiff, Terance Healy, followed every state court order issued in the matter whether the order was valid, invalid, unjust, void, voidable, within or outside the jurisdiction of the court. Even where the order was unconstitutional. Even where the court order caused irreparable harm.

Plaintiff, Terance Healy, petitioned the state court to address and correct their improper, unlawful and unjust actions. The state court ignored and dismissed those pleadings. As a result of diligence and perseverance, the injustice is well-documented on the state court record.

Everyone acting, or not acting, in any regard failed to remedy or resolve any issue and each believed their actions were lawful.

Since 2007, a lack of jurisdiction was the most frequent reason given for inaction by law enforcement even where the law clearly indicated their proper jurisdiction for the situation.

Since 2007, no explanation was provided for the injustice of the state court. Eighteen judges have been assigned to the divorce matter. None have explained the injustice. Each subsequent judge sacrifices their integrity to deny, conceal and endorse the lack of integrity of the prior judges in the matter.

The injustice was inescapable. Any order could be raised in any court at any time by any party to cause an additional injustice which the court would not explain or justify. Appeals filed timely and served properly were prevented from being transmitted to the appellate court. The law, the truth, court procedures and jurisdiction were not a necessity or a concern to the state court.

It was necessary to determine the cause of the complete breakdown of the legal system and the state judiciary, and why each level of law enforcement and the judiciary believed their actions were lawful.

It was necessary to find, define, document and address a law that made deliberate injustice 'lawful'.

Rule 1.6 is the unconstitutional law which mandates deliberate injustice.

Rule 1.6 must be followed by legal professionals, lawyers, law professors, district attorneys, attorneys general, the judiciary, a majority of each state legislature, a majority of the United States Congress, employees of the United States Department of Justice, the legal counsel consulted by law enforcement agencies, the legal counsel who advise the media, and many others.

Since 2007, every person and court to whom plaintiff, Terance Healy, pleaded for assistance and relief was mandated to follow Rule 1.6 – Confidentiality of Information. Non-legal professionals were advised to ignore the injustice by their legal counsel who is mandated to follow Rule 1.6. The mandated 'confidentiality' extends to any explanation for actions or inaction.

Enabled and excused by the unconstitutional Rule 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION, the direct violation of procedures and law prevents resolution of the matter


PERSONAL

Plaintiff (Appellant), Terance Healy, has defined the situation of what it is like to experience the loss of Constitutional rights as follows:

I am a sane man dealing with an absolutely insane situation. Every person in a position to help has acted improperly in direct violation of procedures and the law preventing the resolution of any matter… they each make the situation worse… NO ONE HELPED.

The impact and effect of the loss of rights and the inability to have them respected and addressed by the state courts has resulted in his being homeless, destitute, losing all his property, having no prospects for improvement, denied and prevented from any recovery or survival as every effort to persevere and enjoy life causes further litigation and attacks in a court which has ignored his inalienable right to life liberty.

Plaintiff (Appellant), Terance Healy, receives no public assistance in any form from any local, state or federal programs. After suffering the humiliation of applying and being turned down, the opportunity to address the decision can only be addressed in state courts where his rights have been summarily dismissed and ignored.

Plaintiff (Appellant), Terance Healy, has had his life and his family annihilated. After years of being prevented any custody or visitation with his children by the court, the courts direct involvement of his children, the relationship with every member of his family has been severed.

While prevented and hindered from recovery and survival at every turn , the litigation in federal courts has been extended and delayed based on unsubstantiated and baseless statements.

Each improper action of the court requires more and more effort to research and prepare a required response or action where daily survival has been hindered. The court is requiring a destitute person to incur additional expenses, pressure and stresses to accomplish a task which if his constitutionally protect rights were available, the situation would not exist.

There is no future when the rights of the people are being ignored.


SUMMARY

Terance Healy and Todd Krautheim have filed a Constitutional Challenge with the Attorneys General of the United States regarding Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct as the rule causes the complete denial of constitutionally protected rights while subverting justice and corrupting the integrity of the judiciary.

When enacted into law by each of the state courts at the behest and misguided recommendation of the American Bar Association, a guideline of professionally acceptable conduct was made LAW making it unlawful and illegal to act in an ethical and moral manner under threat of facing prompt, immediate disciplinary prosecution.

Healy and Krautheim seek a determination that the state law is unconstitutional which will restore their rights in the state, and restore the integrity of the judiciary and the reputation of professionals involved in the process and enforcement of law.

The Attorneys General of the United States have lawfully acted to default in this matter and their deliberate efforts and intentions, lawful under Rule 1.6, have been denied, prevented and delayed by the court.

A finding of 'unconstitutional' will permit the state to address litigants with their civil rights in full force and effect without a 'lawful' mandate which denies law, obstructs justice and negatively affects the integrity of the courts.

An Oral Argument is requested.


RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Terance Healy       Todd M. Krautheim