Showing posts with label PRO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PRO. Show all posts

Monday, December 15, 2014

In Defiance of All Logic - A Family Court Face Lift

A FAMILY COURT FACE LIFT
An Article by the Honorable Kelly C. Wall, with contributions and edits from Sarinia M. Feinman, Esq.
Published in SIDEBAR Summer 2014 by the Montgomery Bar Association, Montgomery County Pennsylvania.

This article defies logic in most of the aspects presented. The failure to see the full perspective of every party involved is clear. It seems that the writers are SO IMPRESSED WITH THEMSELVES AND THEIR CAREERS that they have completely ignored the reason they are involved in the first place.

How does someone who sits on the Family Court Bench lose sight of the necessity and the people standing before them? And how do they introduce changes which fail to correct or address any of the issues presented. Promptly abandoning the statements presented in her Inquirer Judicial Candidate Questionaire in 2009.

The Judicial Branch does NOT have authority to write (or re-write) law. Is the Legislature aware of these actions?

Prepare for one convoluted clueless ego trip.


Prior to going on the family bench, I practiced family law for several years. I remember showing up at the judges’ courtroom for short list conferences; there were so many lawyers present in the Courtroom that it felt like a social hour. My fellow lawyers would sit and catch up on each other’s lives as we waited for our turn in the judges’ chambers. That was the perception I had when I was assigned to the Family Bench in January of 2010.smoke-mirrors-effusion

Boy was I shocked!

Shocked? Judge Wall had no knowledge or awareness about the working of the Family Court. Short List conferences are wasted days for the litigants and the lawyers.

Unrepresented litigants are the last to be called. They wait the entire day observing 'the dance.'

Lawyer & Lawyer go to the Judge's Chambers. Their unwelcome clients sit and wait. There is no record of the lawyers conference with the judge. Their clients have no idea what was discussed. Just an outcome, which is often an indication that the requested hearing will be scheduled.

This is NOT the "transparent and open to the public" fable from Judge Wall's Election Questionnaire.


The first few months I kept questioning my staff about the whereabouts of the attorneys of record
for the conferences. I quickly learned that the days of litigants having two attorneys were gone and we were lucky if there were one or two cases on the list with even one attorney!

This took MONTHS to figure out? BTW, if it took MONTHS, it was not 'quickly learned'.

The 'luck' has another name which is best explained by Canon 1.
"A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."

The 'luck' indicates a lack of independence, integrity, and impartiality which improper or at least appears to be improper. The 'luck' contradicts Canon 1's duty of 'access to justice for all' that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.


The dockets were littered with the names of attorneys who, long ago, were fired, replaced or simply not being paid. I soon discovered that the Family Court system was overwhelmed with self-represented parties. This problem was so pervasive that in 2013 a new rule was passed requiring Pro Se litigants to enter their appearances in support and custody cases if there was no active attorney.

Blame it on the litigants? Paying their lawyers to sit in a room for half a day at $300/hour doing nothing - or socializing. Perhaps that explains why the litigant fired, replaced or did not pay their attorney. $300/hour to socialize. Seriously?

Filing an appearance is one page. Name. Address. Phone Number. Signature. This filing would not overwhelm a second grade student.

Blame the unrepresented litigants? Require more from the unrepresented litigants than from the lawyers. Falsely suggest that you are requiring it for their benefit.

A 'pervasive' litter problem caused by the overwhelming volume of self-represented parties is best addressed by Canon 2.
"A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently."

"Luck' is an absence of objectivity and open-mindedness, and a clear bias and prejudice which undermines and fails to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have matters heard fairly and impartially.

In the Questionnaire, Judge Wall indicated her "care and compassion will ensure that I treat all litigants equally" - a clear contradiction to the 'luck' of having EVEN ONE lawyer in the courtrooms.


I also learned that there was a plethora of repetitious filings; the Pro Se parties would often file several petitions at one time containing the same averments but different titles, or they would file petitions for modification within weeks or months of agreed orders or comprehensive orders entered after
protracted hearings. The cases were burdened with economic issues, drug and alcohol abuse, and/or mental health problems. With no attorneys available for guidance or counsel, the judges were forced to wear several hats: judge, attorney, therapist and parent. We were seeing people at their lowest point with
no legal assistance and no place to turn but to the Court system. The end result was a family court system burdened with climbing inventories, escalating emergency petitions, long delays in scheduling, and a drain on the Court and Court Administration’s time and resources.

A PLETHORA OF REPETITIOUS FILINGS. AT THE SAME TIME. SAYING THE SAME THING. This is a FALSEHOOD. The unrepresented don't have the time for that. NOBODY HAS TIME FOR THAT.

The cases burdened with other issues, abuses and problems... LIKE ALL CASES.

This is Family Court where the litigants are adults seeking an informed resolution to the issue before the court.

The tremendous disdain for unrepresented litigants is again indicated where absent an "attorney for guidance or counsel" the judge is forced to be judge, attorney, therapist and parent.

The statement lacks any logical connection to any reality. Perhaps Judge Wall has had a stroke.


In 2013, President Judge William J. Furber, Jr. asked me to step in as Administrative Judge of Family Court. I was both flattered that he believed I was capable of taking on that role with only three years under my belt in the third largest County in Pennsylvania, but I was also scared - very scared! It was a big undertaking and I never do things half way. I agreed to take on the challenge but only after Judge Furber assured me he would support my changes and commit to recognizing the importance of the Family Bench. I accepted the challenge and then the fun started!

Only a fool would promise to support changes prior to analysis and review. Another self-serving paragraph where the vocabulary contradicts the statements. Capable? Scared - Seriously? BIG UNDERTAKING? Challenge? Support? Commit?

These sentences are constructed without logic or purpose.


I met with a diverse group of family attorneys and together we came up with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Family Court, from the Bar’s perspective. Michael R. Kehs and
Cheryl Leslie from Court Administration were extremely supportive and helpful in adding to the Court’s perspective. As result of those meetings, a big picture plan emerged to make our Family Court
more responsive to the needs of the litigants. Now, I just needed to figure out how to get there!

Who has Judge Wall Completely Ignored? No participation by the unrepresented Pro Se litigants. The handwriting is on the wall. The big plan to address the needs of the litigants.


Some of the changes were easy: We initiated fees for petitions to modify, provided more stringent requirements for in forma pauperis status, and encourage our judges to enter more interim orders.

How do these changes address the NEEDS of the litigants? THEY DON'T!!

Fees for Petitions
- Additional costs for the litigants.
- No added value to litigant.
- No added benefit for litigant.

Stringent In Forma Pauperis Requirements
- More effort required by the litigants
- More stringent requirements PLACED UPON THE DESTITUTE without any benefit for the litigant
[In Healy v Healy...]
[Judge Wall has failed to address an IFP petition filed on December 7, 2010]
[Judge Wall has failed to address an IFP petition filed on December 14, 2010]
[Judge Carluccio has failed to address an IFP petition filed on August 15, 2011]
[Judge Carluccio has failed to address an IFP petition filed on September 19, 2011]
[My contribution to THE PLETHORA of repetitious filings.]
[Judge Page revoked an IFP without explanation to prevent an Appeal to Superior Court]
[To have that revocation appealed, it would be necessary to FIRST obtain an IFP. Seriously.]

Interim Orders
- More interim orders.
- No justification or explanation for this.
- I suggest caution where ex parte orders are concealed and prevented from any proceeding.


Thanks to Judge Del Ricci, my colleagues on the Civil Bench cheerfully adopted some family cases in 2013 and were immensely helpful in putting a dent in our huge inventories. Those small changes were very positive and have laid the framework for the bigger change that are in motion at this time.

It's peculiar because Judge DelRicci and Judge Carluccio already took credit for clearing much of the court backlog in an event recorded on ITUNES and published in several periodicals and papers.


With the assistance of Sarinia M. Feinman, Chair of the Family Law Section, and various volunteers from
the Section’s sub-committees, we have made great strides. I wanted to take this opportunity to share the new rules that have been passed or are forthcoming and introduce the new programs that will
streamline Family Court procedures and bring aid to the Pro Se litigants.

LAWYERS MAKING WORK FOR LAWYERS. The only profession which can spontaneously create an economy for their workers. Injustice generates more revenue than justice.


Finally, I want to recognize the people who are willingly lending their assistance and expertise to changing the face of the Family Court.

"bring aid to the Pro Se litigants"
WHAT? WHERE? WHEN? HOW?

A Bar Association lawyer, with input from other lawyers under her direction.... WHAT GREAT STRIDES?

There is no logic to any statements.
There is no logic to any action.
There is only an imaginary benefit to the litigant.
What has been accomplished? assisted? changed? for all the gratitude?

The only benefit is EXTRA fees.
The suggestion that using a lawyer to obtain an interim order from a judge can circumvent the current procedure and law.
HOW IS UNDERMINING THE CASE OF A PRO SE LITIGANT BENEFICIAL?

Where is that benefit for the Pro Se Litigant? It was the alleged motivation and purpose of the proposed changes.






EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION & DIVORCE
Moving Equitable Distribution online
- Much to my surprise, I discovered that the equitable distribution (ED) scheduling system was not automated and the filing system was comprised of 5 x 7 cards! There was no way to track cases once a Grounds Order was issued moving the matters to equitable distribution, and there were open cases from the late 1990s! An intern painstakingly created a spreadsheet identifying cases where Grounds Orders were filed before 2012, which were then Continued on next pagedesignated for the ED Special Master program as described below. Cheryl Leslie is in the process of working with our IT department to incorporate the scheduling of ED cases into the existing family scheduling system. The new ED system will allow the Equitable Distribution Masters’ office to issue scheduling orders and Court Administration will be able to track the cases and keep them moving on a timelier basis from the date of the Grounds Order through the entry of the final Divorce Decree.

Equitable Distribution Special Master’s Program
- Once we identified the 220 plus oldest cases with no current activity, we designated them for the ED Special Master’s program. We enlisted the aid of the Honorable Arthur R. Tilson, who agreed to sit as a special master in equitable distribution to hear these cases and enter recommendations.

Within a few months, through the combined efforts of Cheryl Leslie, Judge Tilson and Margaret Carter, 1 administrative assistant to the senior judges, we were able to reduce the inventory of the oldest cases by nearly 200! The program will continue indefinitely as we try to bring the inventory up to date to prepare for the automation of the equitable distribution scheduling system, the new local equitable distribution rule, and the new Court procedures to effectuate the new rule.

Equitable Distribution Rule Change
- After working with the Family Law Section Chairs, Christian V. Badali in 2013 and Sarinia M. Feinman in 2014 for over a year, as well as the ED Sub-Committee of the Family Law Section, President Judge Furber and I signed NEW Local Rule 1920.73(c), which was certified by the Prothonotary, Mark Levy, on May 20, 2014. This Rule was to become effective 30 days after it was published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin
on June 7, 2014. Thus, the new Rule became effective as of Monday, July 7, 2014, but the new ED Fee ($400.00) that accompanies the Rule will not become effective until Monday, August 4, 2014, as the Prothonotary needed more time to get all of the computer programming and forms in place.

The new Local Rule includes a slightly modified Form for the Praecipe to Transmit the Record, and completely new Form for a Motion for Entry of Grounds Order and Appointment of Equitable Distribution Master. In an effort to avoid the extreme backup in the ED process, in order to obtain a Grounds Order and proceed to an ED Master, beginning on August 4th, you will have to pay the $400.00 fee to get to the Master. Further, as part of the new Rule, you will not be able to get scheduled before an ED Master until you certify that your discovery is completed and you are ready to have a meaningful conference and/or hearing with the Master to work towards settlement of the case. The hope is that this will force parties to come prepared to the first conference before the Master with an informed knowledge of the assets and liabilities that comprise the marital estate, so that the parties can discuss settlement or be able to schedule a timely hearing. Moreover,the new Rule should reduce the number of Pro Se filers who are simply seeking to divide up personal property where there are no other marital assets. In summary, the new Rule will ensure that only those cases that really need the Masters’ attention will have to be scheduled, thereby resulting in less delay and a reduced inventory for the ED Masters.

Date of Separation Issues
- Another change that has been enacted is the elimination of Special Masters being assigned to deal with date of separation issues that arise in divorce cases. It came to the Court’s attention, via the Chair of the Family Law Section, Sarinia M. Feinman, that there was no clear path of what was to occur procedurally once a full hearing was held before a Special Master regarding date of separation and Exceptions were filed to the Special Master’s Recommendation. There were no clear rules outlining whether this would be a De Novo Hearing or Oral Argument before the assigned Judge.

I discovered that Pro Se parties and/or cases with counsel were having full “on the record” hearings before the Special Master only to be potentially obliged to have another full hearing before the assigned Judge. This not only seemed like a waste of time and money for the clients, but also for the Special
Masters and Judges. Therefore, since there are no state or local rules designating special masters for date of separation issues, moving forward, if a date of separation issue arises, the assigned Judge will hear that issue from the outset, and Special Masters will no longer be utilized for this purpose, so as to promote efficiency for everyone and limit the delay.

If you would like to hear more about the new ED process that went into effect as of July 7th, please attend the Family Law Section Meeting and luncheon on Wednesday, August 6, 2014 at noon for a Town Hall Meeting, where there will also be an opportunity for feedback and questions from practitioners.

Special thanks to Cheryl Leslie, Erin Carter, our Equitable Distribution Masters, Gordon M. Mair and Bruce L. Goldenberg, and the Family Law Section’s Equitable Distribution Sub-Committee for their hard work, assistance and cooperation in updating our Equitable Distribution System.

MOTIONS COURT
- Overwhelmingly, the biggest request I received from the family lawyers was to create a Family Court
Motions Court. One of the greatest challenges we face is crafting procedures for a dedicated Motions
Court while maintaining the integrity of our “One Judge - One Family” policy which ensures that one
judge is assigned to a family throughout the case. The advantage to our “One Judge - One Family” system
is that we have a unique perspective of our individual families and can enter comprehensive orders rather
than having litigants appear before a different judge every time they enter the Courthouse.

Presently, family judges conduct short list conferences which are scheduled four to six weeks after a petition is filed. Parties can file emergency petitions seeking a quicker disposition of matters; however, judges are often inundated with petitions that do not rise to the level of an emergency and they have to weed out the real emergencies from the cases that can wait for a short list date.

A dedicated Motions Court would allow judges to hear certain matters on their cases much more quickly and efficiently. The benefits to a motions court system are threefold; parties can resolve problems quickly as a matter could be scheduled within days, orders will be issued that same day from the bench, and judges will reduce their short list matters which will allow more timely listings for protracted cases.

Although the details of the Motions Court are still being worked out with a local rule anticipated to go into effect in early 2015, you can expect that the matters handled in Motions Court will be those that are appropriate for decisions to be made from the bench and those matters that take no more than 10 minutes to argue on both sides. As of now, my Motions Court dates for the remainder of this year will be as follows: July 30; August 27; September 10 & 24; October 15 & 20; November 12 & 26; and December 10 & 22. Commencing in January of 2015, my Motions Court will generally be scheduled on the second and
fourth Wednesdays of the month. The Honorable Gail A. Weilheimer will also be participating in the Motions Court, and she will be providing her Motions Court dates in the near future. Some of the other Family Court Judges have expressed an interest in the new Motions Court rule, so that they may also participate in this program for their cases.

Special thanks to Cheryl Leslie, Joel B. Bernbaum, chair of the Family Law Section Motions Court sub-committee, as well as the other members of the sub-committee for their hard work, assistance and cooperation in assisting to get the Family Motions Court underway.

FRIEND OF THE COURT
- Presiding over Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) cases is one of the more challenging opportunities the family judge faces. There are well over forty cases per week and the litigants are angry, scared or emotionally drained. We are extremely fortunate to have the presence of Carol Horvitz and the volunteers from the Women’s Center who lend assistance and guidance to the Court. However, it quickly became apparent to me that a majority of the cases involved deteriorating familial relationships rather than
domestic abuse. The volunteers are wonderful at working with the parties to encourage settlements; however they are limited to what kind of advice they can give as they are not attorneys. I have observed numerous lost opportunities to direct Pro Se litigants toward the Lawyer Referral Service for consultations or to Domestic Relations or Court Administration to file family petitions.

I originally teamed up with Joo Park and Harry Byrne, co-chairs of the Pro Bono Committee, to discuss putting together a group of volunteers to represent Pro Se litigants in PFA Court. Our project got a big boost when Sharron L. Rex, a former Custody Conciliator in Montgomery County, offered to help launch a PFA volunteer program. The MBA has also expressed an interest in teaming up with the Temple University
Beasley School of Law to enact a third-year student volunteer program for PFA Court.

Additionally, we are in the process of observing similar programs in both Allegheny and Bucks Counties and have received insightful input from Legal Aid representatives and the Women’s Center. With the help of a talented group of people, we are currently in the process of developing a “Friend of the Court” program, whereby both plaintiffs and defendants may receive free representation in our weekly PFA Court by licensed attorneys or students working under the guidance of a licensed attorney. The goal is to provide training to the volunteers in exchange for CLE credits who will, in turn, donate their time
and efforts to representing both plaintiffs and defendants and lend guidance to steer Pro Se litigants away from PFA Court and toward the services they need to resolve their domestic disputes. Although there are many factors yet to be determined such as funding, office space, and administration, we are very
excited about this program and hope to see a working model in the late fall.

SUPPORT
- Gary Kline, Director of the Montgomery County Domestic Relations Office (“DRO”), has been recognized by the Commonwealth on an annual basis for the record amount of past due support collected by his office. To ensure thatthe trend continues, we have been collaborating on ways to decrease the number of contempt hearings that the judges have to hear on a weekly basis and put pressure on the defendants to force them to pay up. Every Friday morning, the DRO officers wheel over large boxes filled to the brim with the files representing the obligors who failed to pay their monthly support orders. Defendants often have multiple cases with large arrears and many are repeat offenders.

In a project aimed at reducing delinquent child support among the most egregious payers, DRO has selected specific cases and assigned them to Judge Barrett and me. The goal for the officer in DRO is to have the case removed from the general Friday contempt list by obtaining an initial payment on the support obligation. The defendants are contacted after being scheduled and told this is their last chance to comply before seeing a judge. If a payment is obtained, the case is removed from the list and scheduled for the next court list before the assigned judge. The case is then monitored for the next several months’ payments and the cycle continues until such time as the payments are received for four to six months consecutively, or the defendant obtains employment and a wage attachment is issued. If a hearing is necessary, the assigned judge has the option of finding the defendant in contempt and ordering incarceration or placing them in the monthly monitoring program. The key for the program to be a success is the rapid access directly to the court in front of the assigned judge, who is familiar with the party and the history of nonpayment.

Another benefit is that the program will reduce the Friday lists and eliminate multiple judges making decisions on the same group of delinquent obligors. Although the program is still in its infancy, to date, more than 70% of the cases identified have made regular payments.

In addition to the new support monitoring program, our new Sheriff, Russell Bono, has committed the resources of his office to the ongoing collection of outstanding child support.

The Sheriff has turned up the pressure on support delinquents by conducting routine roundups which are covered by the media and have resulted in the collection of thousands of dollars in a short period. Moreover, Gary Kline was happy to report that Montgomery County has the lowest number of DRO bench warrants it has ever recorded, and has over 100 less than the closest similarly sized county in the region.

Gary Kline reported 267 outstanding warrants at this time (which includes defendants who reside outside of the state) as compared to 800 a few years ago. Way to go Gary Kline and Sheriff Bono!

SUMMARY
-There are still so many things to do! We will continue to assess programs and staff duties to improve Family Court Services. We will continue to identify any problems as they arise and strive to find solutions for those problems, so as to promote efficiency and expediency in the Court system.

Many thanks to Court Administrator Michael R. Kehs and President Judge William J. Furber, Jr. who kept his promise and supported the new changes, and a special thanks to Sarinia M. Feinman, of the law firm of Vetrano & Vetrano, for her incredible contributions, support, and hard work.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the Honorable Rhonda Lee Daniele for her many years of service as Administrative Judge of Family Court. I have gained new found respect for her and wish to thank her for all of her hard work.



This article is pure disinformation and misdirection.

Friday, May 16, 2014

Constitutional Rights References

If you are involved in a Rule 1.6 concealed injustice the following cases will likely have no impact - because you have lost your constitutional rights.

Let your experience be your guide.


Boyd v. United, 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885)
Justice Bradley, "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the Courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be Obsta Principiis."


Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
"It will be an evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government outside supreme law finds lodgement in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution."


Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.644
"Constitutional 'rights' would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied."


Juliard v. Greeman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)
Supreme Court Justice Field, "There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States... In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it. All else is withheld."


Mallowy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
"All rights and safeguards contained in the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are equally applicable."


Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 491; 86 S. Ct. 1603
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no 'rule making' or legislation which would abrogate them."


Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 p. 442
"An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."


Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 7; 8 S. Ct. 568, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958)
"...in our country the people are sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to them by taking away their citizenship."


Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights."


Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)
"The claim and exercise of a Constitution right cannot be converted into a crime"... "a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law".


Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas., 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)
Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.


CORRUPTION OF AUTHORITY:


Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 26 S. Ct. 688 50 L.Ed 1057
United States Senator convicted of, among other things, bribery.


Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S. Ct. at 261 (1882)
"No man [or woman] in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."


*Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 678, 694
Acts in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of fairness and due process.


*Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270, 286
Society's commitment to institutional justice requires that judges be solicitous of the rights of persons who come before the court.


*Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 359, 371, 374
Acts in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of fairness and due process.


Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438
"Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."


Owen v. City of Independence
"The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental authority is assured that he will be compensated for his injury."


Perry v. United States, 204 U.S. 330, 358
"I do not understand the government to contend that it is any less bound by the obligation than a private individual would be..." "It is not the function of our government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error."


*Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 533
Before sending a person to jail for contempt or imposing a fine, judges are required to provide due process of law, including strict adherence to the procedural requirements contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating but an aggravating factor.


U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound to obey it."

"It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives."


Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)

Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.

DISMISSAL OF SUIT:

Note: [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.] It can be argued that to dismiss a civil rights action or other lawsuit in which a serious factual pattern or allegation of a cause of action has been made would itself be violating of procedural due process as it would deprive a pro se litigant of equal protection of the law vis a vis a party who is represented by counsel.

Also, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 - Relief from Judgment or Order (a) Clerical Mistakes and (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.


Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996)
Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law.


Walter Process Equipment v. Food Machinery, 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
... in a "motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted". From this vantage point, courts are reluctant to dismiss complaints unless it appears the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).


EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW


Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-258 (1942)
"However inept Cochran's choice of words, he has set out allegations supported by affidavits, and nowhere denied, that Kansas refused him privileges of appeal which it afforded to others. *** The State properly concedes that if the alleged facts pertaining to the suppression of Cochran's appeal were disclosed as being true, ... there would be no question but that there was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."


Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)
Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."


Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893), Citations Omitted
"Undoubtedly it (the Fourteenth Amendment) forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights... It is enough that there is no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class. ...And due process of law within the meaning of the [Fifth and Fourteenth] amendment is secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."


Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337 (1885)
"The rule of equality... requires the same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the constitutents of each class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances".


Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332
"Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application fo the law. 'All men are equal before the law,' "This is a government of laws and not of men,' 'No man is above the law,' are all maxims showing the spirit in which legislatures, executives, and courts are expected to make, execute and apply laws. But the framers and adopters of the (Fourtheenth) Amendment were not content to depend... upon the spirit of equality which might not be insisted on by local public opinion. They therefore embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty."


HABEUS CORPUS:


Duncan v. Bradley, No. 01-55290 (9th Circ., 12-24-02)
A state trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on an entrapment defense, in a second trial on drug sale charges, amounted to prejudicial constitutional error where evidence presented at a first trial warranted such an instruct. To read entire text of the opinion, see http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0155290p.pdf


JUDICIAL IMMUNITY:

See Judicial Immunity page for more citations (links) and news articles regarding the topic.
See also, 42 USC 1983 - Availability of Equitable Relief Against Judges.

Note: [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.] Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions. Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act or for their administrative/ministerial duties, or for violating a citizen's constitutional rights. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing a judicial act; he is performing a ministerial act.
Nowhere was the judiciary given immunity, particularly nowhere in Article III; under our Constitution, if judges were to have immunity, it could only possibly be granted by amendment (and even less possibly by legislative act), as Art. I, Sections 9 & 10, respectively, in fact expressly prohibit such, stating, "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States" and "No state shall... grant any Title of Nobility." Most of us are certain that Congress itself doesn't understand the inherent lack of immunity for judges.

Article III, Sec. 1, "The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior."
Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Spring 1986 21 n3, p 509-516, "Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants' civil rights." - Robert Craig Waters.

Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859)
"No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence."

Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion at page 140 said, "If (federal judges) break the law, they can be prosecuted." Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion at page 141) said, "Judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted and punished for crimes... The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution".

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)
Note: Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it". See also In Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (188); U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).


Cooper v. O'Conner, 99 F.2d 133
There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign.


Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)
A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts.


Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 227-229, 108 S. Ct. at 544-545 (1987); Westfall v.Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1987); United States v. Lanier (March 1997)
Constitutionally and in fact of law and judicial rulings, state-federal "magistrates-judges" or any government actors, state or federal, may now be held liable, if they violate any Citizen's Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities, or guarantees; including statutory civil rights.
A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.


Gregory v. Thompson, F.2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974)
Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception being for acts done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.


Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92 Okla 32, 227 F. 417
"The courts are not bound by an officer's interpretation of the law under which he presumes to act."


Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)
"... the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."

"In declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank".

"All law (rules and practices) which are repugnant to the Constitution are VOID".
Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states "NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, ... or equal protection under the law", this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional.


Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)
"Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction."


Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984); 104 S. Ct. 1781, 1980, 1981, and 1985
In 1996, Congress passed a law to overcome this ruling which stated that judicial immunity doesn't exist; citizens can sue judges for prospective injunctive relief.
"Our own experience is fully consistent with the common law's rejection of a rule of judicial immunity. We never have had a rule of absolute judicial immunity. At least seven circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity... to prevent irreparable injury to a citizen's constitutional rights..."

"Subsequent interpretations of the Civil Rights Act by this Court acknowledge Congress' intent to reach unconstitutional actions by all state and federal actors, including judges... The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state [federal] from denying any person [citizen] within its jurisdiction the equal protection under the laws. Since a State [or federal] acts only by its legislative, executive or judicial authorities, the constitutional provisions must be addressed to those authorities, including state and federal judges..."

"We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar to relief against a judicial officer acting in her [his] judicial capacity."


Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 at 288 (1991)
A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity; however, even in a case involving a particular attorney not assigned to him, he may reach out into the hallway, having his deputy use "excessive force" to haul the attorney into the courtroom for chastisement or even incarceration. A Superior Court Judge is broadly vested with "general jurisdiction." Provided the judge is not divested of all jurisdiction, he may have his actions excused as per this poor finding.


Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)
Note: By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person). When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the Judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges' orders are not voidable, but VOID, and of no legal force or effect.

The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."


Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349
Some Defendants urge that any act "of a judicial nature" entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing.
A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.


Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity, finding that both necessary immunity prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986), the Ninth Circuit, en banc, criticized the "judicial nature" analysis it had published in Rankin as unnecessarily restrictive. But Rankin's ultimate result was not changed, because Judge Howard had been independently divested of absolute judicial immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction.


U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (State use of), 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697
When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction.


U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."

"It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives."


Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326
When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.


JURISDICTION:


NOTE: It is a fact of law that the person asserting jurisdiction must, when challenged, prove that jurisdiction exists; mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished.

Albrecht v. U.S.
Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)
"The United States District Court is not a true United States Court, established under Article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court."


Basso v. UPL, 495 F. 2d 906
Brook v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633
Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers."


Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)
Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases.
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
Mack v. United States, 07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia
"The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policy making is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."


Mack v. United States, 07-27-97, Justice Antonin Scalia
"Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete and enumerated ones."


Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938)
"The term 'District Courts of the United States' as used in the rules without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are Legislative Courts, properly speaking, and are not district courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the district courts of the United States (98 U.S. 145) does not make it a 'District Court of the United States'.

"Not only did the promulgating order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the omission of provision for the application of the rules the territorial court and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended."

McNutt v. General Motors, 298 U.S. 178
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
"We have held, however, that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction."
Owens v. The City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980)
Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442


JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:


United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I at 16 (1976)
"It is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by extreme and dubious legal argument."


PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY (DEMONSTRATIONS):


Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347; 6 S. Ct. 2673; 49 L. Ed. 2d (1976)
"Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."


Miller v. U.S., 230 F. 2d. 486, 490; 42
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one, because of his exercise of constitutional rights."


Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
"No state shall convert a liberty into a license, and charge a fee therefore."


Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Alabama, 373 U.S. 262
"If the State converts a right (liberty) into a privilege, the citizen can ignore the license and fee and engage in the right (liberty) with impunity."
United States Constitution, First Amendment
Right to Petition; Freedom of Association.


PROBABLE CAUSE:


Brinegar v. U.S., 388 US 160 (1949)
Probable Cause to Arrest - Provides details on how to determine if a crime has been or is being committed.


Carroll v. U.S., 267 US 132 (1925)
Probable Cause to Search - Provides details on the belief that seizable property exists in a particular place or on a particular person.


Draper v. U.S. (1959)
Probable cause is where known facts and circumstances, of a reasonably trustworthy nature, are sufficient to justify a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being committed. Reasonable man definition; common textbook definition; comes from this case.


PRO SE RIGHTS:


Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425

Litigants can be assisted by unlicensed laymen during judicial proceedings.


Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)
"Following the simple guide of rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice"... "The federal rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." The court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice.


Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 449
"The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, are not to be defeated under the name of local practice."


Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905
"... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws."


Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rule 17, 28 USCA "Next Friend"
A next friend is a person who represents someone who is unable to tend to his or her own interest.


Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)
"Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient"... "which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240;

Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.


Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)
"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment."


NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415); United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715; and Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969)
Members of groups who are competent nonlawyers can assist other members of the group achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged with "unauthorized practice of law."

Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals
The plaintiff's civil rights pleading was 150 pages and described by a federal judge as "inept". Nevertheless, it was held "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to technicalities."


Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)
It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).


Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)
"Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for the law."


Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional Rights."


Schware v. Board of Examiners, United State Reports 353 U.S. pages 238, 239.
"The practice of law cannot be licensed by any state/State."


Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925)
"The practice of law is an occupation of common right."
Nowhere can be found a competent attorney that is able to execute the proper remedy without embarrassing the Court, Corpus Juris Secundum 2d Vol. 7 section 25.


Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 that, “No accused may be deprived of, his liberty as the result of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied assistance of counsel.”


At the present time, Bar Attorneys (Public Vessels) are not Assistance of Counsel and defense is severely limited by being represented by an attorney since the Texas Code of Professional Conduct permits a defendant to have only four choices of input in his defense, 1) what plea to enter, 2) whether to testify, 3) whether to appeal, and 4) whether to opt for a jury trial. Best said a “trial by jury”.

Saturday, October 19, 2013

Filed October 18, 2013 in US District Court

Filed on October 18, 2013 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
(PDF version)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

(PDF Version)

REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS UNDER RULE 36
(PDF version)

Certificate of Service (PDF version)



The Federal Docket



300px-US_Eastern_Pennsylvania_District_Court

There seems to be NUMEROUS issues relating to the Federal Court Docket for Case# 13-4614.

Not only where items have been docketed improperly in paragraph form, but where they have been entered incorrectly resulting in necessary documents being concealed from view.

There is also the issue of the entire case docket being concealed from view in the PACER system.

The Federal Docket should read as follows:
































08/08/20131COMPLAINT - CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE filed by Terance Healy, Todd M. Krautheim;
and
Filing Fee $400 receipt number PPE0086455;
and
Civil Cover Sheet;
and
Case Management Track Designation Form;
08/08/2013SUMMONS ISSUED TO GREG ABBOTT, American Samoa Attorney General, LUIS SÁNCHEZ BETANCES, JOSEPH R. “BEAU” BIDEN, III, PAM BONDI, JON BRUNING, JAMES D. “BUDDY” CALDWELL, MARTHA COAKLEY, JACK CONWAY, ROBERT E. COOPER, JR., ROY COOPER, KEN CUCCINELLI, MIKE DEWINE, BOB FERGUSON, JOSEPH A. FOSTER, TIM FOX, VINCENT FRAZER, DOUGLAS F. GANSLER, MICHAEL GERAGHTY, KAMALA HARRIS, JOHN JAY HOFFMAN, JIM HOOD, TOM HORNE, MARTY J. JACKLEY, GEORGE JEPSEN, KATHLEEN KANE, PETER KILMARTIN, GARY KING, CHRIS KOSTER, DAVID LOUIE, LISA MADIGAN, CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, DUSTIN MCDANIEL, PETER K. MICHAEL, TOM MILLER, JANET T. MILLS, PATRICK MORRISEY, IRVIN NATHAN, SAM OLENS, SCOTT PRUITT, LENNY RAPADAS, ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM, JOEY PATRICK SAN NICOLAS, DEREK SCHMIDT, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, BILL SCHUETTE, WILLIAM H. SORRELL, WAYNE STENEHJEM, LUTHER STRANGE, JOHN SUTHERS, JOHN SWALLOW, LORI SWANSON, J.B. VAN HOLLEN, LAWRENCE WASDEN, ALAN WILSON, GREG ZOELLER.
Forwarded to Pro Se on 8/9/13
08/08/2013Special Case Management Track
09/06/20132PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE'S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING DEADLINE AND FOR WAIVER OF PRO HAC VICE REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-PENNSYLVANIA DEFENDANTS;
and
PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING DEADLINE AND WAIVER OF PRO HAC VICE REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-PENNSYLVANIA DEFENDANTS;
and
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.
Modified on 9/9/2013
09/06/20133
NOTICE of request for ECF filing;
and
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE FOR INITIAL FILING.
Entered on 9/9/2013
09/09/20134Letter dated 9/6/2013 from Terance Healy, Todd M. Krautheim re: Request for ECF Filing.
Entered on 09/09/2013
09/11/20135PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE'S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING DEADLINE AND FOR WAIVER OF PRO HAC VICE REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-PENNSYLVANIA DEFENDANTS;
and
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.
Entered 09/11/2013
09/16/20136ORDER
"AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 2013, upon consideration of Attorney General Kathleen G. Kane's request for extension of the responsive pleading deadline and waiver of the pro hac vice requirements for non-Pennsylvania defendants, and plaintiffs' response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the request is GRANTED. The non-Pennsylvania defendants shall not be required to file a responsive pleading to plaintiff's pro se complaint until thirty days after the Court rules on Attorney General Kathleen Kanes's notion to dismiss the complaint. It is further ORDERED that if the non-Pennsylvania defendants are required to file a responsive pleading, the pro hac vice requirements for the non-Pennsylvania defendants are waived. Plaintiffs do not oppose this waiver." Signed by Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr on 09/16/2013.
Entered on 09/17/2013
09/27/20137ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE's MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT;
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT;
and
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .
Entered on 09/27/2013
10/18/20138PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT;
and
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT;
and
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS UNDER RULE 36;
and
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE;
and
MOTION FOR ECF FILING
and
AFFIDAVIT FOR ENTRY OF CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPTS PREVIOUSLY FILED AND DOCKETED on September 6, 2013 as CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Response to Attorney General Kathleen Kane's Request for Extension/Pro Hac Vice Waiver

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA













Terance Healy)
Todd M. Krautheim)
In the name of THE UNITED STATES) Civil Action# 13-4614
)
v.)
)
Kathleen Kane)
Pennsylvania Attorney General;)
and)
The Attorneys General of the United States)
)


PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO
PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE’S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING DEADLINE AND FOR WAIVER OF PRO HAC VICE
REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-PENNSYLVANIA DEFENDANTS


1. Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane fails to indicate upon whose authority, or necessity, she is requesting an order extending the responsive pleading deadline for the ‘non-Pennsylvania Defendants’.

2. Attorney General Kane anticipates filing a Motion to Dismiss citing standard procedural defenses which suggest that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim; lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process and/or insufficient service of process; and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

3. The Plaintiffs affirm and reassert the information provided in the initial pleading on August 8, 2013 with regard to jurisdiction invoked under 28 USC 1331, 1343 and 1345; Venue; Service pursuant to Rule 5.1(a)(2); and their claim to which relief can be granted – the restoration of constitutionally protected rights.

4. Attorney General Kane is mistaken that the ‘non-Pennsylvania Defendants’ have not been served, or have been insufficiently served with the documents.

5. A Certificate of Service filed September 6, 2013 with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicates proof of service to each of the Attorneys General was accomplished and further provides evidence indicating
- the (1) mailing on August 13, 2013;
- the (2) Certified Mail Receipts indicating acceptance by the United States Postal Service of the documents for delivery to each defendant; and
- the (3) return receipt signature cards confirming delivery of the initial pleading to each defendant.

6. Plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct as the rule causes the complete denial of constitutionally protected rights while subverting justice and corrupting the judiciary.

7. ‘Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information’ has been enacted into law in Pennsylvania and the forty nine other states, the District of Columbia, and the US Virgin Islands. Rule 1.6 has not yet been enacted into law in American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico.

8. The Attorneys General have been served with the Civil Action/Challenge pursuant to Rule 5.1(a)(2) as a state statute is being challenged.

9. The Plaintiff’s acknowledge Attorney General Kane’s statement that the Attorneys General are not responsible for enacting or enforcing rules such as Rule 1.6 and that “the Pennsylvania Attorney General does not enact and has no authority to enforce the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.”

10. The dismissive and deliberate lack of authority is by design. The subsequent lack of any enforcement is intentional. The inability of the legislature to address such matters is evident. These are the symptoms which predict and indicate the loss of constitutionally protected rights to litigants.

11. The Attorneys General are requested and encouraged to provide the identity of the person(s), author(s), contractor(s), or organization(s) responsible for enacting and enforcing Rule 1.6 in their respective state as their action, or inaction, has resulted in the loss of constitutionally protected rights for litigants without recourse.

12. Rule 1.6 does not directly apply to the Pro Se Plaintiffs, but it indirectly results in their loss of constitutionally protected rights.

13. Rule 1.6 does apply to lawyers, the judiciary, the court administrators, the disciplinary boards, the judicial conduct boards, many levels of law enforcement, the state legislature, the Attorneys General and the Governors.

14. The effect of the mandate to follow Rule 1.6 results in a lawful failure to address misconduct.

15. The lawful misconduct evolves into crime and corruption which is not addressed, acknowledged or prosecuted creating the unconstitutional loss of rights, while adversely affecting the integrity of the judiciary, negatively impacting the legal profession, and subverts the legislature who is powerless to take any action to address the rule.

16. Attorney General Kane recently stated that she is responsible to enforce the law, and that she is a lawyer who is responsible to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct.

17. Rules 1.6 makes it lawful, and mandatory, for Attorney General Kane to ignore criminal actions and organizations within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania when they relate to lawyers, the judiciary, the court administrators, the disciplinary boards, the judicial conduct boards, many levels of law enforcement, the state legislature, herself and the Governor.

18. Criminal activity is incorrectly dismissed by the Attorney General and all levels of law enforcement as a lack of jurisdiction where they have jurisdiction, but they lack ability to take lawful action to address the crimes protected by Rule 1.6.

19. Plaintiffs concur with Attorney General Kane’s request for a courtesy waiver of pro hac vice requirements for ‘non-Pennsylvania Defendants’ as it indeed promotes their goal of a ‘just, speedy and inexpensive determination’ of this action.


The Plaintiffs look forward to working with the Attorneys General to address this challenge as our goals are not in opposition and the task before us is great.

The Plaintiffs view the Attorneys General not as adversaries, but fellow patriots, who can see and respect a sincere interest in returning the integrity and reputation of the judiciary and the judicial system, delivering to the legislature the ability to perform the duties of their position to manage the law, and restore the rights of all citizens in the United States.

Respectfully,



/s/ Terance Healy/s/ Todd Krautheim
Warrington, PA 18976Doylestown, PA 18901





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA













Terance Healy)
Todd M. Krautheim)
In the name of THE UNITED STATES) Civil Action# 13-4614
)
v.)
)
Kathleen Kane)
Pennsylvania Attorney General;)
and)
The Attorneys General of the United States)
)



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


Plaintiffs hereby certify that on September 10, 2013, a copy of the

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KANE’S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING DEADLINE AND FOR WAIVER OF PRO HAC VICE REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-PENNSYLVANIA DEFENDANTS

was filed in person by the Plaintiffs at

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

and is available for viewing and downloading from the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.

Respectfully,




/s/ Terance Healy/s/ Todd Krautheim
Warrington, PA 18976Doylestown, PA 18901


PDF Version:
[gview file="http://work2bdone.com/live/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/CCF09112013_0001.pdf"]

Saturday, August 3, 2013

American Bar Association

I am a Pro Se Litigant who under your Rule 1.6 which undermines and prevents any Pennsylvania resolution has effectively beren denied my constitutional rights. This has resulted in a volume of judicial disciplinary actions (which they cannot address because of 1.6).

Your 1.6 Rule has stolen my US Civil Rights. I will be coming for them.

If you would like to review the disaster your 1.6 has created in my life.
If you would like to review the 18 judges who have been on my simple divorce.
If you would like to review the 8 years and over 450 docket entries of litigation...

You may take this as NOTICE. YOU HAVE STOLEN MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
YOU HAVE PREVENTED ANY RESOLUTION AND CAUSED EXTREME CORRUPTION AND DESTRUCTION IN MANY PEOPLES LIVES.

How were you able to fool the States into destroying your only competition, Pro Se litigants - individual destitute people involved in litigation and going through the worst moments in their lives.

RULE 1.6 which prevents any corrective action because it would expose the liability you caused for the judiciary. The liability which grows while it terrorizes litigant.

You undermined the Constitution of the United States. You caused the TREASON of every Government which has adopted YOUR TWISTED JOKE AGAINST PRO SE LITIGANTS.

WHILE NO ONE CAN FIGURE OUT THAT YOUR ACTIONS HAVE DESTROYED THE UNITED STATES
I HAVE HAD TO LIVE AN ANNIHILATED EXISTENCE DESTITUTE.

I see what you have done... and have done to Pro Se victims all over the United States...

Read On My web site....
http://work2bdone.com/live/2013/08/complete-corruption-of-the-judiciary/