The Grand Jury

The Grand Jury was originally a tool which could investigate and address government corruption.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury."

Constitutional framers considered this protection "a bulwark against oppression" due to the grand jury's historic powers to investigate the government and deny government indictments.

The grand jury of the eighteenth century usually consisted of twenty-three people acting in secret who were able to charge both on their own (an accusation known as a "presentment") and upon the recommendations of a prosecutor.

In addition to its traditional role of screening criminal cases for prosecution, common law grand juries had the power to exclude prosecutors from their presence at any time and to investigate public officials without governmental influence.

These fundamental powers allowed grand juries to serve a vital function of oversight upon the government.

The function of a grand jury to ferret out government corruption was a primary purpose of the grand jury system in ages past.

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THE MODERN GRAND JURY IN COMPARISON

Today's grand jury hardly fits the image of a noble and independent body.

As a practical matter, it is little more than an audience for summary government presentations. Grand juries often do little more than listen to "a recitation of charges by a government witness."

Prosecutors, unchecked by a grand jury in its modern misconstruction, can easily obtain whatever result they seek in the grand jury room.

"Today, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor," wrote one Illinois district judge, "who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before any grand jury."

The current popular paraphasing suggests that a prosecutor could get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich. Such is the influence of the prosecutor.

Supreme Court Justice William Douglas wrote in 1973 that it was "common knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive."

At least one scholar has suggested that the problem of grand jury subordination may be so institutionalized that its very structure violates due process. The critics are unanimous in their condemnation of the modern grand jury process as little more than an elaborate ritual used only to justify by ceremony the decisions of the government.

Commentators disagree on whether to describe the grand jury as the prosecutor's "indictment mill," "rubber stamp," "tool," or "playtoy."

The U.S. Justice Department has tacitly conceded that there is almost no such thing as grand jury independence. A 1983 report by DOJ's Office of Development, Testing and Dissemination concluded that the imbalance of power between the courts and prosecutors on one hand and the grand jury on the other "makes grand jury effectiveness largely dependent on the good will and ethics of the courts and prosecutors."

Traditional grand juries embraced secrecy as an inherent power of their own, independent of any other governmental institutions. Modern Grand Jury secrecy is court imposed and aimed at aiding the prosecutor in gaining an indictment.

Based on the argument that those who are accused in grand jury documents are denied due process rights which the courts have a duty to protect, it was argued that allowing the continuance of common law grand jury powers would expose countless persons — many of them government agents — to unanswerable accusations in the public eye.

Protecting public officials from public scorn thus won out over upholding the traditional powers of grand juries.

The effectiveness of early American grand juries in ferreting out the shortcomings of public officials "can be gauged from the long lists of grand jury presentments" of early America.

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APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PENNSYLVANIA RAISES SEVERAL ISSUES WHICH SEEM TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE AUTHORITY WHICH CALLED THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY GRAND JURY OVERSTEPPED THEIR AUTHORITY AND INTERFERED WITH AND USURPED THE AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH - AN OVERREACH OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

The Judicial Branch has ordered the Executive Branch to not enforce the laws of the Legislative Branch.

This was done by two secret orders from two secret courts.

CONCURRENT ACTIONS TO STIFLE/SUPPRESS THE INFORMATION AND PREVENT THE INVESTIGATION BY THE PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL.

The information which has been published in the news media is speculative as the Grand Jury has not released that information. It is a distraction from the actual events which are taking place and are being manipulated and controlled by the Judiciary under the supervision of a Special Prosecutor who is married to a judge. Of course, the Attorney General may not disclose what the Grand Jury is investigating SO SHE MAY NOT CORRECT THE DISINFORMATION.

Apply Healy v Healy, Healy v Miller and the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6
- the evidence exists within the Montgomery County Courts and the County offices
- additional information has been concealed, prevented and denied which related to intrusive surveillance authorized by the judiciary in an investigation which existed to harass.
- Surveillance and wiretaps must be authorized and signed by the Superior Court of Pennasylvania.
- When the Constitutional issue became clear to the court - and the litigant was taken seriously - the efforts to conceal the information, interference with the administration of justice, denial of constitutional rights, occurred and can be demonstrated on the record of the Superior Court.
- Secret orders were issued by secret courts to prevent Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane from lawful involvment. Notice was provided pursuant to the law and procedure which indicates that the attorney general must be informed where a matter will be raising the issue of unconstitutional law(s).
- A Grand Jury was called to threaten, intimidate and investigate the Attorney General. The grand jury called NOT by the prosecutor but by the Judiciary- at the direction of Chief Justice Ron Castille.
- Chief Justice Castille had been advised of the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 and the unconstitutional effect on litigants which caused the loss of rights and denied any protection of the law.
- The entire Pennsylvania Legislature had been advised of the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 and the actions which necessitated it.
- The Governor was advised of the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 and personally handed a copy of the documents.
- The Judiciary Committees of the Pennsylvania Legislature were notified and provided documentation.
- Every Sheriff in Pennsylvania was sent copies of the documentation.
- The American Bar Association was sent a cease and desist letter in September 2014 addressing their involvment in the sedition of the judiciary.
- The US Attorney General and EVERY United States Attorney was notified of the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6.
- EVERY state Attorney General was served with the Constitutional Challenge filed in Federal Court in August 2013. The failure of every Attorney General to Answer indicated their default in the matter. By fraud, a document was filed which caused the matter to be subject to acts in the furtherance of fraud which while unsubstantiated incorrectly indicated the matter was dismissed. There is no signature by any judge on any document indicating the matter was dismissed. Signed copies were not provided or available.
- The Third Circuit Court of Appeals handled the Constitutional Challenge similarly, without any proceeding and without any signatures.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania handled three different appeals similarly - neglecting with deliberate intent to address the lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the order upon which was based all three lower court actions - without and proceedings and without any signatures. As there is no evidence of the involvement of the Superior Court Judiciary, and none has been provided when requested, a Complaint was filed indicating the denial of access to the courts, the interference with the administration of justice and the violations of Pennsylvania law by the Central Legal Staff of the court.

Where it was not the Litigant's intention for the Appeals to demonstrate the unconstitutional actions experienced, the actions which occurred violated procedures, the law and the constitutional rights of the litigant. Those actions could only have been executed by the court staff. Where they may attempt to conceal those actions pursuant to Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information, the unconstitutional affect of Rule 1.6 is PROVEN.

Why would the Central Legal Staff not provide the Appeal to the Judiciary? Why would the judiciary allow this to occur? When Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio issued her defective and void order of May 9, 2011, the actions was in the complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction. She then neglected to correct the error when promptly informed. Carluccio then retaliated issuing further orders based on her defective order. Absolute Judicial Immunity is available in all situations EXCEPT ONE. In the Absence of subnect matter jurisdiction, Absolute Judicial Immunity is NOT available to the judge. Any judge who properly indicates the lack of jurisdiction for the defective and void order CONCURRENTLY exposes the liability of Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio. Any judge who enforces the defective and void order is additionally subject to liability without the protection of absolute judicial immunity. So the Central Legal Staff of the Superior Court handles the appeal paperwork, affirms the lower court decisions, ignores the lack of jurisdiction, fails to apply the law, violates the judicial canons in documents forged and attributed to the judiciary - BUT NOTHING IS PROPERLY SIGNED. The Central Legal Staff is protecting the judiciary from liability. BUT, where Rule 1.6 may have permitted their actions to remain confidential, Rule 1.6 is instead demonstrated to be unlawful and unconstitutional. As the Superior Court actions cannot be attributed to any member of the judiciary or panel, the judiciary escapes the liability for their actions. The Superior Court Judiciary has not stepped with signed documents which would indicate responsibility for the decisions and liability for the enforcement of a void order, which would relieve the Central Legal Staff of criminal liability. The Judiciary have painted themselves into a corner where their corruption and the undoing of their authority has been exposed.

Further Grand Jury Information...

To the United States Congress, President, Supreme Court

Rule 1.6 is a state law, enacted by EVERY state judiciary, which collaterally causes a denial of constitutional rights, the rule of law, and protection of the law. All under the guise of lawyer confidentiality. The lawyers keep silent vigil on the corruption and injustice not exposing the massive injustice caused nationwide by
Rule 1.6 – Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct

The state disciplinary board’s aggressive enforcement of Rule 1.6 (which is kept confidential) keeps lawyers silent while purporting to protect an imagined judicial integrity. The rhetoric of the American Bar Association misdirects identification of the problem which they authored and recommended to every state judiciary.

One Rule. Made Law. Each State. Every State.
Undermining Justice. Usurping Authority.
(1984 – 2009)
Lawyers mandated to silence… in Congress, the White House, in Government.
Cash for Kids. Foreclosures through fraud. Injustice.
In 2013, non-Lawyers finally found it and filed a Constitutional Challenge.

The state supreme court has a conflict of interest because they enacted it, so we took it to federal court.

The federal district court improperly dismissed (and neglected to mention they were required to follow the PA version of Rule 1.6). #13-4614

The third circuit court affirmed and denied en banc review (while also neglecting to mention they were required to follow the PA version of Rule 1.6). #13-4591
________________________________________

We hereby present
the Supreme Court of the United States,

the United States Congress, and

the President of the United States

a Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct

An unconstitutional law in every state which causes inescapable injustice and excuses and ignores judicial misconduct and corruption.

Rule 1.6 requires that Rule 1.6 be kept confidential.

Rule 1.6 requires the courts to conceal their corruption and injustice caused by Rule 1.6 – the same unconstitutional law being challenged.

Rule 1.6 is exposed; yet, the problem law still permits fraud, corruption and injustice to conceal itself.

Rule 1.6, an invalid and void unconstitutional law, is relentless.


PREEMPTION

Befitting a constitutional law, doctrine or statute, federal preemption continues to draw the interest and resources of the highest court in the land.

The U.S. Supreme Court accepts petitions for certiori and decides preemption cases.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE

The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution, and the laws and treaties stemming from it, are the supreme law of the land.

U.S. CONSTITUTION. Article VI, clause 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.


The Supreme Court has held that when there is a conflict between a state and federal law, the state law is invalidated because the federal law is supreme.

Even a state regulation designed to protect the state’s vital interest must yield because
“under the Supremacy Clause, from which our preemption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”

The Supreme Court defined preemption to “be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”


PREEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE

The Constitution itself has already clearly made and announced the fundamental judgment regarding the relation of federal and state power: so long as the federal government has the constitutional power to enact the law, then the federal law is granted supremacy over conflicting state actions.

There are numerous instances of the Supreme Court, and lower courts, stating that the process of determining appropriate preemption is an inquiry into congressional intent; however, the intent of the Constitution is clearly to preempt every state law which would abridge, diminish, subvert or deny rights and privileges which were secured for the People.

But the roots of the doctrine are most clearly seen in Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall stated: “The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.”


CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW

The legitimacy of construction by an unelected entity in a republican or democratic system becomes an issue whenever the construction is controversial, as it frequently is.


RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

Conceding, in 1934, the limited competence of legislative bodies to establish a comprehensive system of court procedure, and acknowledging the inherent power of courts to regulate the conduct of their business, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the lower federal courts not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes.

Their operation being restricted, in conformity with the proviso attached to the congressional authorization, to matters of pleading and practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus judicially promulgated neither affect the substantive rights of litigants nor alter the jurisdiction of federal courts and the venue of actions therein and, thus circumscribed, have been upheld as valid.

Under the Rules Enabling Act, procedural rules may not modify “any substantive right” but laws in conflict with the rules are “of no further force or effect.”

While Challenging Rule 1.6 of the Rules Of Professional Conduct, the Federal Court was obligated under Rule 1.6 to dismiss the matter but neglected to indicate the reason. Rule 1.6 mandates they conceal that Rule 1.6 is the reason. Instead, like a child caught by surprise, they just made stuff up…


THE CONSTITUTION IS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND

The Judiciary may make rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Federal Courts may make rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Federal Courts may make local rules, unless they violate substantive rights.

States may enact laws, unless they violate substantive rights.
State Judiciary may enact rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
Local state courts may make local rules, unless they violate substantive rights.
The Rules of Professional Conduct have been enacted into law, unless they violate substantive rights.

The Federal Court Local Rules for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopt the Rules of Professional Conduct enacted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which includes Rule 1.6 which violates substantive rights provided in the Constitution of the United States.

Where substantive rights are violated, directly or collaterally, the law is repugnant to the Constitution and a nullity.

No matter how deeply the mandate of Rule 1.6 is buried and concealed, THE LAW MAY NOT VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.


The judiciary have buried an unconstitutional law so deep in the law books that they never expected any non-lawyer to find it, and survive to prove it while being denied their constitutional rights and the protection of the law.


Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 83(a) allows for Local Rules under 28 USC § 2072 and 2074.

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”

28 U.S. Code § 2072 – Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.

28 U.S. Code § 2074 – Rules of procedure and evidence; submission to Congress; effective date
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law. The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to proceedings then pending, except that the Supreme Court shall not require the application of such rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, in the opinion of the court in which such proceedings are pending, the application of such rule in such proceedings would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former rule applies.
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Local Rule 83.6(IV)(b)(para 2)
“The Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by this court are the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania…”


THE RULE-MAKING POWER AND POWERS OVER PROCESS

Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct of their business. However, this power too is derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them.


LIMITATIONS TO THE RULE MAKING POWER.

The principal function of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as regards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state in convenient form principles of substantive law previously established by statutes or decisions.

But no such rule “can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.”

This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity, and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the guidance of lower courts, and to rules “which lower courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred.”

As incident to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, witnesses, counsel, and jurors by self-preserving rules for the protection of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of justice.

The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable powers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice, and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in the custody of law.

Such powers are said to be essential to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.

The courts of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence exists.


JURISDICTION – CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY

Congress’s authority is limited by provisions of the Constitution such as the Due Process Clause, so that a limitation on jurisdiction that denied a litigant access to any remedy might be unconstitutional.

Congress is also free to legislate away prudential restraints and confer standing to
the extent permitted by Article III.

“Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III’s requirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). That is, the actual or threatened injury required may exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974). Examples include United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Gladstone Realtors v. Village ofBellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 n.4, 11–12 (1976). For a good example of the congressionally created interest and the injury to it, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–75 (1982) (Fair Housing Act created right to truthful information on availability of housing; black tester’s right injured through false information, but white tester not injured because he received truthful information). It is clear, however, that the Court will impose separation-of-powers restraints on the power of Congress to create interests to which injury would give standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–78 (1992). Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion in Lujan, reiterated the separation-of-powers objection to congressional conferral of standing in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 29, 36 (1998) (alleged infringement of President’s “take care” obligation), but this time in dissent; the Court did not advert to this objection in finding that Congress had provided for standing based on denial of information to which the plaintiffs, as voters, were entitled.


NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE – Scope and Operation

Clause 18.
The Congress shall have Power * * * To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

The Necessary and Proper Clause, sometimes called the “coefficient” or “elastic” clause, is an enlargement, not a constriction, of the powers expressly granted to Congress. Chief Justice Marshall’s classic opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 1818 set the standard in words that reverberate to this day. “Let the end be legitimate,” he wrote, “let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end.


JURISDICTION – SUPREME COURT

Implicit in the argument of Marbury v. Madison is the thought that the Court is obligated
to take and decide cases meeting jurisdictional standards.

“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, (1821).


DECLARATORY OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

But one who challenges a statute or possible administrative action need demonstrate only a realistic danger of sustaining an injury to his rights as a result of the statute’s operation and enforcement and need not await the consummation of the threatened injury in order to obtain preventive relief, such as exposing himself to actual arrest or prosecution. When one alleges an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest but proscribed by statute and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he may bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Similarly, the reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.


JURISDICTION - EXECUTIVE ORDER

The Constitution was clearly intended to preempt state law.

Where state constitutions may not delegate statutory authority which exceeds the limits of authority and infringes upon the substantial rights protected by the Constitution of the United States law, Executive departments and agencies shall construe, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only when the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute….


Respectfully,

We petition the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Congress and the President of the United States to take immediate action to repeal the rule, legislate a constitutional amendment or issue an executive order which indicates that Rule 1.6 which causes a collateral loss of constitutional rights and protection of the law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL and a nullity.


Terance Healy
Todd M. Krautheim