Superior Court: Expose the Corruption or Join the Conspiracy

Superior Court Memorandum by Donohue (Annotated) PDF Version

J-A25010-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

Sonya Healy	:
(Appellee)	: # 1330 EDA 2013
	:
v.	:
	:
Terance Healy	:
(Appellant)	:

Appeal from the Order entered April 5, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County,
Civil Division at No. 2007-12477

BEFORE: DONOHUE, WECHT and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:
FILED OCTOBER 27, 2014

JURISDICTION for the Defective and Void Order of May 9, 2011 is AGGRESSIVELY IGNORED by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Jurisdiction for the Order of May 9, 2011 has been challenged. The procedural defects which cause a lack of jurisdiction have been presented in every subsequent document, every subsequent proceeding, and every subsequent appeal. - The statement of jurisdiction was NOT PROVIDED by Judge Carluccio. - The statement of jurisdiction was NOT PROVIDED by Judge Page. - The statement of jurisdiction was NOT PROVIDED by Angst & Angst. THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA LAW. WHEN CHALLENGED, JURISDICTION MUST BE PROVEN - NOT IMAGINED... NOT IGNORED. Judge Carluccio, Judge Page, and Angst & Angst have persisted in lawlessness, corruption and unconstitutional actions which have caused the matter before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Collectively, their complete failure to substantiate jurisdiction REQUIRES the Superior Court to expose their corruption OR to join their conspiracy. To assist the Supreme Court Judiciary ... A NOTICE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF SIGNED DOCUMENTS was filed on October 30, 2014. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was filed on October 30, 2014. A NOTICE OF ANNOTATED VERSION OF THE MEMORANDUM FILED OCTOBER 27, 2014 will be filed this week, A NOTICE OF APPEAL will be filed this week. A MOTION FOR EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTION OF THE ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 will be filed this week and served upon The Superior Court, The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio, Judge Garrett Page, Judge Richard Haaz, Mark Levy (Prothonotary), and the Prothonotary's Divorce Clerk. - the Motion will demand service of an additional copy to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania A letter will be sent to the Superior Court President Judge Susan Piekes Gantman, Judge Christine L. Donohoe, Judge David N. Wecht, and Judge William H. Platt, Joseph D. Seletyn (Prothonotary), and Philip Yoon; and filed with the Superior Court Prothonotary with copies to PA Attorney General Kathleen Kane, and the US-Department of Justice.

THE FOLLOWING ANNOTATED DOCUMENT DEMONSTRATES THE DELIBERATE, INTENTIONAL, AND AT TIMES AGGRESSIVE AND INSULTING NATURE OF DISINFORMATION IN THE MEMORANDUM BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. THE AUTHOR OF THE UNSIGNED DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTED TO "DONOHOE" HUMILIATES AND EMBARRASSES THE JUDICIARY OF THE SUPERIOR COURT BY DELIBERATE AND INTENTIONAL NEGLECT, DISREGARD OF THE LOWER COURT RECORD, MISAPPLICATION OF LAW, AND GENERAL DISINFORMATION TACTICS. THE DEMONSTRATED INTENTIONAL DISREGARD AND IRREFUTABLE AVOIDANCE OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE BY THE SUPERIOR COURT IN THIS DOCUMENT IS REPREHENSIBLE. THIS DOCUMENT EXAMINES THE DELIBERATE AND CRIMINAL ABUSE OF POWER UNDER COLOR OF LAW WITH INTENT TO INFLICT EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WHILE CONCEALING AND CONSPIRING TO PROTECT AND PERPETUATE JUDICIAL CORRUPTION BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Appellant, TERANCE HEALY, was NOT NOTIFIED of the scheduling for ARGUMENT in this matter. Appellee was NOTIFIED. ANGST & ANGST acknowledged the scheduling for ARGUMENT in this matter. While the Superior Court staff has acted with purpose to exclude the Appellant, they have provided the Appellee with the opportunity to present information in support of jurisdiction which clearly did not occur. The ex parte ARGUMENT Session permitted the opportunity for the Superior Court Panel to request the evidence of jurisdiction from the Appellee which clearly did not occur. The meeting is an essential element in a criminal conspiracy.

Terance Healy (“Husband”) appeals pro se from the order entered on April 5, 2013 by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, granting Sonya L. Healy’s (“Wife”) May 18, 2012 petition, which requested that the trial court calculate Husband’s penalty for failing to comply with the trial court’s September 27, 2011 order and offset his remaining share of the marital estate with the fines assessed against him.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

This case presents a procedural quagmire complicated by the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On May 9, 2011, the trial court issued a divorce decree and equitable distribution order which ended Husband and Wife’s marriage and included specific instructions to Husband and Wife for apportioning the marital property.

The MEMORANDUM neglects to address the jurisdiction of the Order of May 9, 2011.

Following this order, Husband filed numerous petitions with the trial court in an effort to, inter alia, vacate the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order and prevent the sale of the marital residence.

NUMEROUS PETITIONS = 2. #305 MOTION TO VACATE THE ODER OF MAY 9, 2011 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. #311 EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION The MEMORANDUM uses the term 'inter alia' to avoid any reference to the 'procedurally defective and void order of May 9, 2011' or the 'lack of jurisdiction'. A disinformation tactic to avoid any reference to the issue.

On July 14, 2011, Wife filed a response to these petitions and a counter-petition seeking sanctions based on Husband’s frivolous filings. On July 19, 2011, the trial court entered an order requiring Husband and Wife to exchange certain items of martial property and dismissing any remaining petitions as moot, except for Wife’s July 14, 2011 counter-petition for sanctions. Husband continued filing petitions with the trial court seeking, inter alia, to prevent the sale of the marital residence and the exchange of marital property.

Wife's response (?) neglected any response. It was a new matter with procedural defects, lack of service, lack of any certificate of service. Judge Carluccio heard it immediately and ordered verbally and without jurisdiction - based on the defective and void order and continuing with abject disregard for jurisdiction in the matter. Lack of jurisdiction to enforce a defective and void order. Lack of jurisdiction for further action after a 'Final' Order. General lawlessness had enveloped every element of the matter. While aware that I was being terrorized, I persevered and petitioned the court to address the lack of jurisdiction. The malice of Judge Carluccio was evident. The Court record documents every attempt to petition the court for resolution and the neglect and disregard by the Court. Documenting the actions and petitioning the court for relief seemed to antagonize Judge Carluccio. There was no alternative method but to file and persevere. It is my belief that Judge Carluccio had self-perceived a sense of UNTOUCHABLE OMNIPOTENCE. Career experience with DOJ / US Attorney prevented any federal investigation. Judicial Immunity. President of the Montgomery Bar Association. Her demonstrated lack of knowledge concerning the law. Conflicts of Interest and Ethics were of no concern to her as reported in the newspapers. Rule 1.6 Confidentiality prevented disclosure of fraud, and prevented disclosure where fraud was concealed or continuing. This matter had already been before 15 judges of the Montgomery County bench. (Current Count is 20.) Judge Carluccio may have wanted to be the LAST JUDGE, but she failed to recognize that Angst & Angst had caused and leveraged the impropriety of every judge in this matter... and they would throw her under the bus whenever they wanted.

On August 15, 2011, Husband filed a notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order.

The Notice of Appeal included the timeline of motions and petitions attempting to have the Court address the procedural defect which caused the 'divorce decree and equitable distribution order' to be VOID AB INITIO. A defective and void ab initio order is a nullity. ... even when it is a defective and void divorce decree. A procedurally defective and void order may be challenged for up to five (5) years. ... even when it is a procedurally defective and void divorce decree. The passing of time does not provide the court with jurisdiction where it did not exist.

On August 22, 2011, the trial court ordered Husband to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. On September 15, 2011, Husband filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement.

WRONG. Tolling begins on August 25, date of entry by the Prothonotary. Service to the court and parties was accomplished TIMELY on September 15, 2011.

On October 19, 2011, the trial court filed its 1925(a) opinion in which it found Husband’s appeal to be untimely and requested that this Court quash the appeal.

The Court neglected the well-documented issues of the procedurally defective and void order. The Court applied the wrong timeframe to the calculation of time. The Court did not provide any statement of jurisdiction, where the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the procedurally defective and void ab initio order. The Court additionally IGNORED EVERY ISSUE INCLUDED IN THE Concise Statement of Errors. Seriously. ALL OF THEM. Seriously. This may explain why the appeal was not sent to the Superior Court.

For reasons that are unclear, the record reflects that the trial court never transmitted Husband’s August 15, 2011 notice of appeal to our Court.

The Appeals Clerk in Norristown made the reason clear in multiple conversations by telephone and in-person. Judge Carluccio had indicated that she was to take no action.

However, the record does reveal that on September 20, 2011, Husband filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with this Court. On October 14, 2011, our Court denied this motion because we had no record of Husband having an appeal pending before this Court.

The filing of the Motion with the Superior Court accomplishes the requirements of notice to the Superior Court of an Appeal pursuant to PA R.A.P. The filing had included the background and the Notice of Appeal which was being neglected. Escaping the hold of the Montgomery County Court was obstructed and prevented.

On September 27, 2011, the trial court granted Wife’s counter-petition for sanctions and denied several of the petitions that Husband had filed subsequent to the July 19, 2011 order.

Wife's 'counter-petition' had not been filed nor served to Husband. The Court lacked jurisdiction to act on the 'counter-petition'. The Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the procedurally defective and void order. The Court neglected the scheduled petitions which requested the Court to address the lack of jurisdiction. The Court granted everything requested in the 'counter-petition'. Angst & Angst withdrew their 'counter-petition on September 28, 2011. There had been no hearing on the 'counter-petition'. No hearing was ever scheduled. General lawlessness.

The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorneys’ fees totaling $13,750.00, which it deducted from his share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. Additionally, the trial court decreed that it would begin fining Husband $100.00 per day for each day that he did not execute the forms necessary for Wife to transfer the retirement account funds that she owed him pursuant to the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order. The trial court further decreed that it would begin fining Husband another $500.00 per day ($100.00 per item) for each day he failed to return five enumerated pieces of property to Wife.

The items had been placed where the judged had verbally ordered at the time and date ordered. The Court was enforcing a procedurally defective and void order while ignoring the challenge to jurisdiction in all court documents and in objections and in testimony.

There is no method by which the court can be provided with retroactive jurisdiction. After being terrorized and harassed for every minute of every hour of every day since 2007, being submitted to the wrath of the entire Montgomery County judiciary, facing constant vexatious and false allegations, being harassed and investigated, being denied any access or contact with my children, being evicted from my home and left homeless and destitute on the street, without any personal possessions, compelled under duress and threat of contempt to endorse all checks presented without explanations, the courts lack of jurisdiction which had been directly caused by Angst & Angst can only be described by one word. KARMA. Every malicious, spiteful, disrespectful, threatening and intimidating action which occurred on September 23, 2011 while I was surrounded by six (6) county deputies was intended to annihilate my spirit and bring about my suicide. Every attempt to secure the transcript of that day has been prevented by Judge Carluccio whose behavior that day was disgraceful.

On May 18, 2012, Wife filed a petition seeking the enforcement of the September 27, 2011 order, which included a request for the trial court to calculate Husband’s penalties for failing to comply with that order and to reduce Husband’s share of the marital estate in accordance with those penalties. [Wife filed a duplicate petition on May 23, 2012 petition]

Yet, neither Petition nor Duplicate was served on Husband. This is confirmed as NO Certificate of Service appears on the court record. Angst & Angst had sent a copy of their petition to Judge Carluccio with ex parte letters to have the case reassigned. The duplicate resulted where that document was forwarded to the Prothonotary. Angst & Angst's deceptive filing tactics are documented and demonstrated on the court record.

Following this petition, Husband filed numerous additional petitions, including a response and counter-petition to Wife’s May 18, 2012 that, inter alia, sought to prevent the enforcement of the May 9, 2011, July 19, 2011, and September 27, 2011 orders.

This Honorable Court is using the term 'inter alia' to avoid any direct usage of the words - defective, void, jurisdiction, etc. A Disinformation tactic. Husband had filed one (1) response to their petition. The response included 11 sentences. 1. DEFENDANT DOES NOT WAIVE DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS 2. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SERVE THIS PETITION UPON DEFENDANT 3. DEFENDANT RESPONDS TO PLAINTIFF’S ‘PETITION’ TO REASSIGN THE MATTER ( No Petition - two (2) letters unknown to Judge Haaz.) 4. DEFENDANT REQUESTS CORRECTION OF THE DOCKET FOR DUPLICATE ENTRY 5. DEFENDANT REQUESTS REMOVAL OF ANGST & ANGST FROM THE MATTER – EX PARTE COMMUNICATION – DELIBERATE AND MANIPULATIVE FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURE – FRAUD UPON THE COURT – EXTORTION – FORGERY 6. DEFENDANT RESPONSE TO ISSUES LISTED IN THE DOCUMENT REFERENCED IN THE SCHEDULING ORDER 7. VOID – PETITION TO STRIKE JUDGEMENT / ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 23, 2011 8. VOID – PETITION TO STRIKE JUDGEMENT / ORDER OF JULY 18, 2011 9. VOID – PETITION TO STRIKE JUDGEMENT / ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 10. DEFENDANT REQUESTS THE COURT SCHEDULE HEARINGS ON OUTSTANDING PETITIONS 11. DEFENDANT REQUESTS THE COURT PREPARE AND DELIVER THE APPEAL FILED AUGUST 15, 2011 TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Husband has raised the challenge to court's jurisdiction which remains DELIBERATELY AND INTENTIONALLY IGNORED WHILE THE COURT PERSISTS IN IMPROPER ACTIONS. If the court has proper Jurisdiction, then let it be presented for review. If the Court is lacking in proper jurisdiction, then an explanation of why the judiciary is acting in violation of the law, the state constitution and the Constitution of the United States is long overdue. It is not within my power to correct the perversion of law and corruption which the courts have engaged. I have done everything within my power and ability and the law to permit the resolution of these matters. It is NOT my wish to adversely affect the integrity of so many members of the judiciary. I have watched as every member of the Montgomery County Bench sacrificed their integrity to continue a conspiracy of corruption in spite of the truth and justice. Please remember, it is the disinformation by the court and the stubborn refusal to apply the law which has brought this matter to the place where it is currently. The extra-jurisdictional actions of Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio present the opportunity to challenge judicial immunity, and the immunity of the entire Montgomery County bench. I understand why another judge would throw their integrity on the judicial barbecue to conceal the extreme judicial corruption ion this case. BUT, I have no respect for anyone who would do so.

On April 5, 2013, the trial court issued an order granting Wife’s petition and denying Husband’s petitions. The trial court awarded Wife another $5,016.50 in attorneys’ fees. Based on the September 27, 2011 order, the trial court determined that Husband owed fines under that order of $311,726.50. The trial court offset this amount by $180,710.58, which represented Husband’s remaining share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence and his share of Wife’s retirement account. The trial court found Husband’s total remaining penalty to be $131,005.92.

The trial court neglected the procedurally defective and void order upon which the orders it sought to enforce were based. Neglect does not provide jurisdiction. Retroactively or foregoing.

On April 29, 2013, Husband filed a notice appeal from the April 5, 2013 order. On May 2, 2013, the trial court ordered Husband to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). On May 17, 2013, Husband filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement.
This appeal is presently before our Court.

We begin by pointing out that Husband’s brief is mostly incomprehensible.

The Superior Court has indicated an inability to read the Appellant Brief. The MEMORANDUM descends into a new level of rhetorical foolishness. (THAT is incomprehensible.) WOW... guess which words the Court cannot comprehend. The Court has no knowledge that it is reviewing a 'procedurally defective and void order issued without jurisdiction'. According to the MEMORANDUM rhetoric, a "procedurally defective and void order issued without jurisdiction' is called an 'inter alia'. If there has been no review of the Appellant Brief, the Court should indicate without use of a indirect rhetoric and/or unsubstantiated unsupported insult. Insults will not provide jurisdiction where jurisdiction has never existed.

INCOMPREHENSIBLE: Impossible to comprehend, Impossible to understand, Not able to be understood. EXAMPLE: A thirteen page MEMORANDUM by Judge Donohoe which neglects to address a well-documented lack of jurisdiction, where no evidence of jurisdiction has been provided by the attorney or judges demonstrates an incomprehensible level of rhetoric and effort to conceal and continue injustice under color of law in the Superio Court. EXAMPLE: The level of judicial corruption was incomprehensible.

This Honorable Court's MEMORANDUM is INTENTIONALLY AND DELIBERATELY NEGLIGENT. I am sincerely embarassed and humiliated for Judge Donohoe who has been credited as author. The words 'defective and void order of May 9, 2011' appear throughout the filed Brief and SOMEHOW Judge Donohoe failed to see that she is writing thirteen pages of pure horseshit while avoiding and neglecting the central issue. I pity her for permitting my continued terror without cause or reason. We have not ever met, I was not notified for 'argument' before the panel.

Had it not been for the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, it would have been impossible to discern what issues Husband is raising on appeal.

The Opinion filed by Judge Page fails to address the issues included in the Concise Statement provided and served to him. He is likely more embarrassed at his scheduling screw ups, his actions around my father's death, his inability for compassion and failure to see the truth, that embarrassing church contractor fraud fiasco where he cost the county millions and shamed the District Attorney, the disrespect shown by Valerie Angst who indicated that the judge was not supposed to have permitted me to testify. Yet, somehow Judge Page also COMPLETELY IGNORED AND NEGLECTED the challenge to jurisdiction.

Additionally, Husband’s brief fails to comply with several of the briefing requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, including, inter alia, the following violations. Husband’s brief is wholly missing the following required sections in his brief: Statement of Jurisdiction, Pa.R.A.P. 2114; Order or Other Determination in Question, Pa.R.A.P. 2115; Statement of Questions Involved, Pa.R.A.P. 2116; Statement of the Case, Pa.R.A.P. 2117; and Summary of the Argument, Pa.R.A.P. 2118. See Husband’s Brief at 3-23. Likewise, Husband has failed to append to his brief the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion and his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(b), (d). Furthermore, the argument section of Husband’s brief violates several subsections of Rule 2119. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119, Husband’s Brief at 3-23. For example, the argument section of Husband’s brief violates subsection (a) of Rule 2119 because he did not divide it into as many parts as there are questions argued. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), Husband’s Brief at 3-23. Based on the incomprehensible nature of Husband’s brief and the several briefing infractions that he has committed, we would be well within our authority to quash or dismiss this appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Booher v. Olczak, 797 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“This Court may quash an appeal pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 2101 if defects in the brief or reproduced record are substantial.”).

We conclude that based upon the substantial defects in Husband’s brief, effective appellate review is impossible and the bulk of his arguments have not been preserved. However, we find that Husband has preserved one issue for review.

WAIT FOR IT.

From what we are able to discern from Husband’s Brief and Rule 1925(b) statement, he consistently complains that the trial court did not have the authority to act on the instant matter following his August 15, 2011 notice of appeal because that appeal was pending before this Court. See Husband’s Brief at 3-4; 1925(b) Statement at 3. Thus, Husband contends that the trial court did not have the jurisdiction to issue the September 27, 2011 order, in which the trial court granted Wife’s counter-petition for sanctions. See id. Husband likewise asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the April 5, 2013 order, in which the trial court fined him $311,726.50 and offset that amount with his remaining share of the marital estate. See id.

LOL - Prepare for a full and irrelevant extrapolation of statement being attributed to Appellant though actually representative and documented as part of the irrelevant information provided by Appellee - who neglected any information in support of jurisdiction regarding the procedurally defective and void order of May 9, 2011, (aka "inter alia". A Disinformation tactic. This MEMORANDUM could have been three sentences. THE LOWER COURT, ANGST & ANGST, and WIFE HAVE CLEARLY NEGLECTED THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE COURT's JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER. ALL ORDERS ENTERED IN THIS MATTER SUBSEQUENT TO, AND INCLUDING, THE ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 ARE VOID. Jurisdiction returned to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Instead, the MEMORANDUM will 'focus' on an extraneous issue for several pages.

In support of this claim, Husband relies on Rule 1701(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides: “Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). However, Rule 1701(b)(2) states that “[a]fter an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may ... [e]nforce any order entered in the matter, unless the effect of the order has been superseded as prescribed in this chapter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(2). Moreover, our Court has held that “trial court[s] possess inherent power to enforce their orders and decrees by imposing sanctions for failure to comply with their orders. This power is retained even after an appeal is filed, absent supersedeas.” Tanglwood Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Laskowski, 616 A.2d 37, 39 (Pa. Super. 1992) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (quoting Travitzky v. Travitzky, 534 A.2d 1081, 1084 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1987)). In regards to a supersedeas, Rule 1731 provides:

(a) General rule. Except as provided by subdivision (b), an appeal from an order involving solely the payment of money shall, unless otherwise ordered pursuant to this chapter, operate as a supersedeas
upon the filing with the clerk of the lower court of appropriate security in the amount of 120% of the
amount found due by the lower court and remaining unpaid. Where the amount is payable over a period
of time, the amount found due for the purposes of this rule shall be the aggregate amount payable
within 18 months after entry of the order.

(b) Domestic relations matters. An appeal from an order of child support, spousal support, alimony,
alimony pendente lite, equitable distribution or counsel fees and costs shall operate as a
supersedeas only upon application to and order of the trial court and the filing of security as required
by subdivision (a). The amount and terms of security shall be within the discretion of the trial court.
Pa.R.A.P. 1731.

We conclude that the trial court did not err by issuing the September 27, 2011 and the April 5, 2013 orders. Husband’s reliance on Rule 1701(a) is misguided. Even though Husband had filed a notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order, Rule 1701(b)(2) permitted the trial court to enforce that order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(2). One of the purposes of the September 27, 2011 order was the trial court’s continued attempt to enforce the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order by requiring Husband to execute documents necessary for a retirement account rollover pursuant to the May 9, 2011 order.
See Trial Court Order, 9/27/11, at 1. Rule 1701(b)(2) likewise permitted the trial court to issue the April 5, 2013 order because the purpose of that order was the enforcement of both the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order and the September 27, 2011 order. See Trial Court Order, 4/5/13, at 1-3.

Additionally, the trial court did not grant Husband a supersedeas pursuant to Rule 1731(b), which would have stayed the matter before the trial court. Although Husband filed numerous petitions seeking a stay or injunction in the case, the record does not reflect that Husband ever sought, or that the trial court ever granted, a supersedeas pursuant to Rule 1731(b). Therefore, the trial court properly enforced its orders by imposing financial penalties against Husband for his lack of compliance with those orders.

Although Rule 1701(b)(2) permitted the trial court to enforce its orders, we cannot overlook the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 905(b) requires a Clerk of Courts to “immediately transmit to the prothonotary of the appellate court named in the notice of appeal a copy of the notice of appeal showing the date of receipt, the related proof of service and a receipt showing collection of any docketing fee in the appellate court required under Subdivision (c).” Pa.R.A.P. 905(b). On August 15, 2011, Husband filed a notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order. Pursuant to Rule 905(b), the Clerk of Courts should have immediately transmitted the notice of appeal to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(b). As stated above, however, this did not occur. Accordingly, the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts failed to comply with Rule 905(b).

The Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b) occurred even in the face of several events that should have put the Clerk on notice that Husband filed a notice of appeal that he or she needed to transmit to the Superior Court. For example, the trial court was clearly aware that Husband had filed a notice of appeal. Following the filing of the August 15, 2011 notice of appeal, the trial court ordered Husband to file a Rule 1925(b) statement and issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
The Clerk of Courts also should have known there was an issue with Husband’s appeal when this Court denied Husband’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis because our Court had no record of Husband having an appeal pending before the Court. The Clerk of Courts received the order denying Husband’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis as it is part of the certified record on appeal. 2

[In a related matter, Husband also should have realized at this point that the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts did not transmit his appeal to our Court, or, at the very least, that there was a problem with his appeal.]

ANOTHER INSULT? Yea, Husband should have called them every day, every other day for weeks and asked every time Husband filed at the Courthouse. HUSBAND DID. The Superior Court record indicates the deliberate neglect this matter has received. Husband had definitely realized (Did they really just say "should have realized") that there was a problem. Perhaps the Court needs to accept responsibility instead of casting blame improperly. In this regard, HUSBAND will file with this court the realization of this document. Additionally it will be filed in numerous othjer places and the internet.

Therefore, we must determine whether Husband’s rights were adversely affected by the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b). This Court encountered a somewhat similar scenario in Commonwealth v. Seay, 814 A.2d 1240 (Pa. Super. 2003). Seay involved an appellant’s appeal from the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. Id. at 1240-41. The appellant, following his conviction and sentencing, filed a timely notice of appeal, which the Delaware County Clerk of Courts never transmitted to our Court. Id. at 1240. A panel of this Court quashed the appellant’s appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition holding that it was premature because he already had an appeal pending and the PCRA was not applicable until a judgment of sentence became final. Id. at 1241. Accordingly, the panel remanded the case to the trial court with instructions for the Delaware County Clerk of Courts to transmit the appellant’s original notice of appeal to this Court for resolution of his direct appeal. Id.

Here, however, Husband filed his notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order on August 15, 2011. Husband’s notice of appeal was clearly untimely.

Wow, they forget that 5-Year-Rule again. Already.

See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“[T]he notice of appeal required by Rule 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”).

There is no indication that the Notice Of Appeal was filed pursuant to Rule 902.

Husband contends that the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order was not a final order, and that the trial court did not affirm it as final until the July 19, 2011 order.

A PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND VOID AB INITIO ORDER IS A NULLITY AND CANNOT BE A FINAL ORDER. It was necessary to have the Court indicate that it was a "Final Order". On July 18, 2011, Judge Carolyn Carluccio indicated that the procedurally defective and VOID AB INITIO Order of May 9, 2011 was a final order. TRANSCRIPT: Page 20 THE COURT: My order is a final order. MR HEALY: And m,y request for your reconsideration then confirms that, and we'll move with the appeal from that point, then, your Honor. THE COURT: I think you're a little late for an appeal, Mr Healy. Judge Carluccio had delayed scheduling hearings running out an imaginary clock in her head, COMPLETELY FAILING TO REALIZE THAT THE DEFECT PERMITTED 5 YEARS TO FILE FOR RESOLUTION. That hearing continued for another few hours and 80 pages to address the petition filed by Angst & Angst immediately before the hearing. No Service. No Process. They were piling on their corruption and lawlessness in an effort to intimidate and attack their victim all demonstrated in the transcript of that proceeding.

Husband’s argument is meritless because this Court has held that a divorce decree is a final, appealable order. Wilson v. Wilson, 828 A.2d 376, 378 (Pa. Super. 2003).

The procedurally defective and void ab initio divorce decree is still procedurally defective and void.

Our Court explained:
Unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule, an appeal will lie only from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341.

A final order has been defined as one which ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case. Pa.R.A.P.
341. Therefore, a pre-divorce decree distributing marital property is interlocutory. It cannot be reviewed until it has been rendered final by the entry of a decree in divorce.

Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order was a final, immediately appealable order from which Husband had 30 days to file a notice of appeal. See id.; Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

YET, at the same time it is a procedurally defective and void order, a nullity, making it an invalid divorce decree and invalid equitable distribution order.

Although we admonish the Clerk of Courts of Montgomery County for failing to transmit Husband’s August 15, 2011 notice of appeal to our Court, the fact remains that Husband’s August 15, 2011 appeal was clearly untimely, and if we had received that appeal, we would have dismissed it, affording him no relief. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

The lack of jurisdiction would have been a relevant issue. The order would still be void ab initio. There is no way to provide the procedurally defective and void order with proper jurisdiction. Ignoring a lack of jurisdiction does not provide jurisdiction.

Moreover, our analysis of Rule 1701(b)(2) shows that the trial court did have the jurisdiction to enter the September 27, 2011 and April 5, 2013 orders, which Husband now claims are void because he had filed a notice of appeal with the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts.

Nope. A procedurally defective and void order cannot attain spontaneous retroactive jurisdiction by willful ignorance and failure of the court.

Therefore, the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b) had no effect on Husband’s rights or the outcome of the case. Accordingly, we now quash the August 15, 2011 appeal as untimely.

The Court is being silly at this point.

We emphasize that we do not intend for this decision to serve as a means for a Clerk of Courts to sua sponte dismiss untimely notices of appeal. Rule 905(b) mandates that Clerks, upon the filing of a notice of appeal, “immediately transmit to the prothonotary of the appellate court named in the notice of appeal a copy of the notice of appeal[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 905(b). Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated:

[T]o afford the clerk of courts a broad discretionary power to reject defective notices of appeal or to otherwise enforce the rules of appellate procedure would be inconsistent with the nature of the office of the clerk of courts. As this Court has recognized, the powers wielded by the clerk of courts, like those of the prothonotary, are purely ministerial in nature.

Commonwealth v. Williams, __ A.3d __, 2014 WL 3672870 at *4 (Pa.2014). It is the unique factual scenario present in this case that allows us to overcome the Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b).
Accordingly, Husband is not entitled to any relief.

WRONG. Jurisdiction is NOT DISCRETIONARY. Where jurisdiction is challenged, jurisdiction must be proven. Perhaps the Court should have read all of the citations in the MOTION TO STRIKE A DEFECTIVE AND VOID ORDER.... or some of them.

Finally, on August 4, 2014, Husband filed a motion for reconsideration of the order this Court entered on July 14, 2014 denying his motion to strike a defective and void order wherein he complains about the orders discussed above. As we have determined, the trial court was well within its authority to issue these orders. Therefore, we deny the motion for reconsideration.

CLEARLY, THE COURT DOES NOT WISH TO ADDRESS THE LACK OF JURISDICTION AND THE IRREPARABLE HARM COMMITTED UNDER COLOR OF LAW WITH INTENT TO CAUSE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

The Order of April 5, 2013 is affirmed. Motion for reconsideration denied. August 15, 2011 appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

This demonstrates why the judges do not sign their documents. This cannot be excused as obstinence. It is harassment by deliberate intentiona chaotic vexatious frivilous litigation.

Now we proceed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2014

Filed in The Superior Court of Pennsylvania

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

Terance Healy	: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
(Appellant/Defendant)	: #1330 EDA 2013
	:
v.	:
	:
Sonya Healy	:
(Appellee/Plaintiff)	:

APPELLANT BRIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS LACKED JURISDICTION	3
THE PENDING APPEAL FILED AUGUST 15, 2011	3
PETITION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS – IGNORED	3
THE APPEAL FILED AUGUST 15, 2011 IS PENDING	4
PETITION FILED MAY 18, 2012	4
REASSIGNMENT TO JUDGE PAGE	5
THE ORDER OF APRIL 3, 2013	6
SEPTEMBER 23, 2011	7
A NESTED LACK OF JURISDICTION	8
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND VOID ORDER OF May 9, 2011	9
NO EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS JURISDICTION	9
EVIDENCE IN THE COURT RECORD	10
FAILURE TO FOLLOW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE	10
THE OPINION FILED IN THE AUGUST 15, 2011 APPEAL TO SUPERIOR COURT	12
TREASON	19
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY	20
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE	21
FEDERALLY	21
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE	21
OPINION DATED JUNE 28, 2013	22
SIGNATURE	23

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS LACKED JURISDICTION

1. The Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter while an appeal was pending.


THE PENDING APPEAL FILED AUGUST 15, 2011

2. A NOTICE OF APPEAL had been filed in this matter on August 15, 2011 as is evidenced on the Court Docket at Sequence #326

3. The Notice of Appeal, Request for Transcripts and Certificate of Service were filed concurrently with a Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Court Docket at Sequence #326 through 330

4. On August 25, 2011, The Appeal was acknowledged by Judge Carolyn Carluccio by ordering a Concise Statement Of Errors Complained of On Appeal per PA Rules of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Court Docket at Sequence #333

5. On September 15, 2011, Appellant filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal and served it upon the parties and Judge Carolyn Carluccio. Court Docket at Sequence #345


PETITION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - IGNORED

6. Failing to act in accordance with Rules of Appellate Procedure 210 Rule 552(e) the Court of Common Pleas neglected to consider or take any action on the Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

7. The Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis was IGNORED – neither approved nor denied. The court did not indicate any reason.

8. Appellant petitioned the Court to schedule the Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on August 19, 2011. Court Docket at Sequence #332

9. Appellant petitioned the Court to schedule the Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on September 1, 2011. Court Docket at Sequence #341

10. Appellant refiled a duplicate Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on September 19, 2011. Court Docket at Sequence #350

11. Failing to act in accordance with Rules of Appellate Procedure 210 Rule 554(b), the Montgomery County clerk neglected to transmit a copy of the application under Rule 552; NOR did the clerk transmit notice to the appellate prothonotary of the pendancy thereof for the purposes of this rule.

12. In Accordance with Rules of Appellate Procedure 210 Rule 553, on September 20, 2011, Appellant notified the Superior Court of the Appeal and the failure of the lower court to consider a hearing on the Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Superior Court Docket 104 EDM 2011

13. Where the lower court failed to transmit any notice of the appeal to the Superior Court, on October 14, 2011, The Superior Court denied the petition indicating a lack of jurisdiction to act where no appeal was pending. Superior Court Docket 104 EDM 2011


THE APPEAL FILED AUGUST 15, 2011 IS PENDING

14. On October 19, 2011, Judge Carolyn Carluccio filed an Opinion relating to the Appeal. Court Docket at Sequence #355

15. As the Notice of Appeal has been filed and the Superior Court had been notified of the Appeal by the direct filing in Superior Court (# 104 EDM 2011), the Appellant/Defendant had met all of the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for filing an Appeal.

16. Pursuant to 210 Rule 1701(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
“Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after a appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.”

17. Jurisdiction for the matter was transferred to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania pending their review and instructions.


PETITION FILED May 18, 2012

18. Appellee/Plaintiff, represented by Angst & Angst, filed a Petition on May 18, 2012. Court Docket at Sequence #356

19. Appellee/Plaintiff, represented by Angst & Angst, failed to serve the Petition to Appellant/Defendant. The court docket confirms this as no certificate of service is filed relating to the petition until after the Short List Conference on July 10, 2012. Court Docket at Sequence 363

20. Appellant Defendant filed an eleven (11) sentence response to the petition on July 10, 2011 and served it upon Angst & Angst. Court Docket at Seq #360, 361

21. During a Short List Conference on July 10, 2012, Judge Richard Haaz corrected the Appellee/Plaintiff's procedural error and had the petition served upon the Appellant/ Defendant.

22. During the Short List Conference, Judge Richard Haaz addressed the actions of Angst & Angst who had written to Court Administration requesting to have him removed from the matter.

23. During the Short List Conference, Judge Richard Haaz addressed the actions of Angst & Angst who had written to Judge Carolyn Carluccio requesting to have him removed from the matter.

24. During the Short List Conference, Judge Richard Haaz upon learning of the pending appeal recognized his lack of jurisdiction to conduct any proceeding in the matter and deferred to court administration regarding the scheduling of a hearing. Court Docket at Sequence #362

25. The hearing was never scheduled before Judge Haaz.

26. The Pending Appeal was never transmitted to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

27. Appellant/Defendant contacted by phone and wrote to Court Administration questioning the failure to transmit the appeal and the failure to schedule a hearing.

28. Court Administration did not respond..


REASSIGNMENT TO JUDGE PAGE

29. December 13, 2012, the matter was reassigned to Judge Garrett Page and a hearing date scheduled. Court Docket at Sequence 364

30. Appellant/Defendant filed Objections to the Reassignment of the Matter on December 28, 2012. Court Docket at Seq #365

31. Appellant/Defendant filed Objections to the Reassignment of the Matter on January 2, 2013. Court Docket at Seq #366

32. The hearing was scheduled on January 3, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #368

33. The hearing was rescheduled on January 18, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #369

32. The hearing was rescheduled on January 17, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #370

33. The hearing was rescheduled on January 18, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #371

34. The hearing was rescheduled on January 24, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #372

35. The hearing was rescheduled on January 29, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #373

36. The hearing was rescheduled on January 30, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #374

37. The hearing was rescheduled on February 1, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #375

38. During a hearing held on February 11, 2013 Judge Page failed to address the lack of jurisdiction to proceed during the pending appeal. The half day scheduled did not allow enough time for the Defendant to present and the matter was continued.

"Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time." and "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F 2d 906, 910.

"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist."
Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.

"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction."
Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Maine v Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 250.

When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory.
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).

38. The continued hearing was rescheduled on February 12, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #376

39. The continued hearing was rescheduled on February 13, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #377

40. The continued hearing was rescheduled on February 19, 2013. Court Docket at Sequence #378

41. During a hearing held on February 20, 2013, Judge Page failed to address the challenge to jurisdiction to proceed during the pending appeal.


THE ORDER OF APRIL 3, 2013

42. On April 3, 2013, Judge Page issued an order which neglects to indicate any elements of proper jurisdiction during the pending appeal.

"Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time." and "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F 2d 906, 910.

"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist."
Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.

"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction."
Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Maine v Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 250.

When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory.
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).

43. The Order of April 3, 2013, seeks to assign a penalty to the Appellant/Defendant for a contempt which did not occur. Appellant/Defendant followed the Order of September 23, 2013 and the verbal order of the court and left the possessions in the exact location on the dates specified.

44. Appellant/Defendant has a history of following every order issued by the court and promptly documenting with the court any issues or exceptions.

45. Appellee/Plaintiff has NOT followed ANY order of this court at any time, with the exception of scheduling orders. EVERY petition to the court to enforce compliance by the Appellee/Plaintiff was dismissed.

46. The penalty in excess of $300,000 represents an amount which the Appellant/Defendant would have no capability to pay. Appellent/Defendant has been unemployed since March 2007.

47. The penalty is a contempt penalty. A contempt penalty could result in incarceration for non-payment.

48. The penalty multiplied by a daily count fails to address the courts not scheduling a timely hearing.

49. The penalty is based on an Order of September 23, 2013, for a petition filed on September 22, 2013, never served upon the Appellant/Defendant; and then withdrawn on September 28, 2013.

50. On September 23, 2013, the petitions scheduled to be heard which were filed by the Appellant/Defendant were intended to prevent irreparable harm and damage to marital assets and individual property.

51. The parties were in court on September 23, 2013 as multiple petitions had been scheduled, continued and rescheduled before Judge Carluccio. The Appellant/Defendants scheduled petitions were all summarily dismissed and the new matter filed September 22, 2013 was heard... ORDERED... And then withdrawn. Court Docket at Sequence 351, 352, 353


SEPTEMBER 23, 2011

On September 23, 2011, in the court of Judge Carolyn Carluccio, who had deliberately and intentionally issued a defective and void order with the knowledge that everyone would follow the order without regard for proper jurisdiction, I was surrounded by 5 deputies in the courtroom.

I was informed that my home had been illegally sold and all of my possessions had been thrown away. I had persevered through 5 years of constant litigation, threats, harassment and false allegations and terror. I had represented myself through a divorce which had been before 15 judges of the Montgomery County Judiciary. The defective and void divorce decree had left me homeless and destitute. It was clear that Carolyn Carluccio wanted my suicide.

The July 18, 2011 order authorized the destruction of my property if not removed from the residence by the closing date of the sale. I had been prevented from learning the closing date and had filed numerous documents with the court to learn the information

Judge Carluccio then ordered me under penalty of contempt to endorse multiple insurance checks for claims I had not made.

Judge Carluccio then ordered me under penalty of contempt to endorse the checks exchanged during the closing on the home.

Closing had occurred on September 20, 2011. Proceedings originally scheduled for September 20, 2011 had been rescheduled to September 23, 2011 included petitions to address the failure of the Appellee/Plaintiff to provide any information on the sale of the home.


A NESTED LACK OF JURISDICTION

52. The courts jurisdiction was challenged on September 23, 2011 and not addressed by the Court. Jurisdiction was not only procedurally defective, but the Court was basing its orders on a previous order which lacked proper jurisdiction issued on July 18, 2011.

"Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time." and "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F 2d 906, 910.

"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist."
Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.

"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction."
Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Maine v Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 250.

When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory.
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).

53. The Order of July 18, 2011 was based on new matters filed on July 14, 2011 and not served upon the Appellant/Defendant. Jurisdiction was not only procedurally defective, but the Court was basing it's order on a previous order which lacked proper jurisdiction issued on May 9, 2011.

54. Jurisdiction was challenged on July 18, 2011 and not addressed by the Court. The procedural failure to follow due process and procedure was presented and ignored by the Court. Transcript at Sequence #323

"Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time." and "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F 2d 906, 910.

"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist."
Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.

"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction."
Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Maine v Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 250.

When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory.
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).

55. The Court neglected to address the procedurally defective and void order EVERY time it was presented. Each challenge of proper jurisdiction was ignored. Testimony and evidence was presented at every opportunity, yet the issue was never addressed in any order or opinions.


PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND VOID ORDER OF May 9, 2011

56. The Opinion filed by Judge Carluccio neglects to indicate address the challenge of proper jurisdiction to issue the Order of May 9, 2011.

57. The Court has been notified that the order was procedurally defective and the court lacked jurisdiction on June 6, 2011. Court Docket at Sequence #305

58. The Court has been notified that the order was procedurally defective and the court lacked jurisdiction on June 9, 2011. Court Docket at Sequence #311

59. The Court has been notified that the order was procedurally defective and the court lacked jurisdiction on July 18, 2011. Court Docket at Sequence #323

60. The Court neglected to take any action to address or correct the defect in the order.

61. The Appellee/Plaintiff, represented by Angst & Angst, neglected to take any action to address of correct the defect in the order.


NO EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS JURISDICTION

62. It is undisputed that the requirements of procedural due process have not been met and that the court was without jurisdiction to issue the order of May 9, 2011.

63. There has been no evidence presented or testimony provided which addresses the challenge to the court's jurisdiction to issue the order of May 9, 2011.

“The burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it.”
Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist 1991)

64. The court has failed to demonstrate the court's jurisdiction and ignored the question of jurisdiction to issue the order of May 9, 2011..

“Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted.”
Lantana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 Fsupp. 150

“The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction.”
Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416


“...However late this objection [to jurisdiction] has been made, or may be made in any cause, in an inferior or appellate court of the United States, it must be considered and decided, BEFORE any court can move ONE FURTHER STEP IN THE CAUSE; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 718, 9 L.Ed. 1233 (1838).


EVIDENCE IN THE COURT RECORD

65. The evidence of the procedural defect of the order of May 9, 2011 is part of the court record and is clearly visible on the court docket.

“If the record does not show upon its face the facts necessary to give jurisdiction, they will be presumed not to have existed.”
Norman v. Zieber, 3 Or at 202-03


FAILURE TO FOLLOW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

66. The Order of May 9, 2011 is docketed at sequence number #2007-12477-304.

Rule 1920.42(a)
(a) If a complaint has been filed requesting a divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown and
(1) both parties have filed an affidavit under 3301(c) of the Divorce Code substantially in the form prescribed by Rule 1920.72(b), or
(2) either party has filed a 3301(d) affidavit under 3301(d) of the Divorce Code substantially in the form prescribed by Rule 1920.72(d) the averments of which the other party has admitted or failed to deny,
the prothonotary on praecipe in the form prescribed by Rule 1920.73(b) shall transmit the record to the court, which shall review the record and enter an appropriate decree. No Master shall be appointed.

67. Neither party filed any affidavit under 3301(c) of the Divorce Code substantially in the form prescribed by Rule 1920.72(b).

68. Neither party filed any affidavit under 3301(d) of the Divorce Code substantially in the form prescribed by Rule 1920.72(d).

Rule 1920.42(b)
(b) The affidavit required by 3301(c) of the Divorce Code must have been executed
(1) ninety days or more after both filing and service of the complaint.
(2) within thirty days of the date the affidavit was filed.

69. Rule 1920.42(b) clearly indicates the REQUIREMENT of the affidavit.

70. Neither party filed any affidavit under 3301(c) at any time in the matter.

Rule 1920.42(c)
(c) An affidavit of consent may be withdrawn only with leave of court.

71. Neither party filed any affidavit of consent at any time in the matter.

72. Neither party requested leave of court to withdraw any affidavit of consent at any time in the matter.

Rule 1920.42(d)
(d)(1) Except as provided in (e), no decree shall be entered by the court under 3301(c) or 3301(d)(1)(i) of the Divorce Code unless a notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree, substantially in the form prescribed by Rule 1920.73(a) was mailed or delivered to the attorney of record of the party against whom the decree is to be entered or, if there is no attorney of record, to the party, at least twenty days prior to the date of the filing of the praecipe to transmit the record. The praecipe which shall state the date and manner of service of the notice, a copy of which shall be attached.

(d)(2) If the party against whom the decree is to be entered has no attorney of record, the notice required by subdivision (d)(1) shall be accompanied by a form counter-affidavit substantially in the form prescribed by Rule 1920.72(e).

73. A Notice of Intention to Request Entry of Divorce Decree in the matter was not mailed, delivered, filed or served at least twenty days prior to the date of the filing of the praecipe to transmit the record.

74. A Notice of Intention to Request Entry of Divorce Decree in the matter was not mailed, delivered, filed or served at any time prior to the date of the issuance of the order of May 9, 2011.

75. A Praecipe to Transmit the Record in the matter was not written, mailed, delivered, filed or served.

Rule 1920.42(e)
(e) Notice of intention to request entry of divorce decree shall not be required prior to entry of a divorce decree
(1) where the parties have executed and filed with the prothonotary a waiver of notice substantially in the form set forth in rule 1920.72(c); or
(2) under 3301(d) where the court finds that no appearance has been entered on defendant's behalf and that the defendant cannot be located after diligent search.

76. No Waiver or Affidavit of Consent pursuant to Rule 1920.42(e) was filed by any party at any time during the course of the matter.


THE OPINION FILED IN THE AUGUST 15, 2011 APPEAL TO SUPERIOR COURT

77. The Opinion filed on October 19, 2011 by Judge Carolyn Carluccio after receiving the Concise Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal neglects to address any of the issues presented in the concise statement.

78. The Opinion filed on October 19, 2011 by Judge Carolyn Carluccio presents a single argument misrepresenting that the appeal is untimely.

79. The Opinion filed on October 19, 2011 by Judge Carolyn Carluccio fails to recognize that the Rules of Civil Procedure have not been followed; the order is procedurally defective and void ab initio.

80. The Court is only authorized by statute to enter a divorce decree after one of the parties requests the entry of a divorce decree. Neither party requested the entry of the divorce decree pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure – The Divorce Code.

A court may not render a judgment which transcends the limits of its authority, and a judgment is void if it is beyond the powers granted to the court by the law of its organization, even where the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Thus, if a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make particular order or a judgment is akin to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is subject to collateral attack.
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 25, pp. 388-89.

81. The Order of May 9, 2011 was issued without proper authorization by statute and is therefore procedurally defective and void.

Void judgments are those rendered by a court which lacked jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or the parties.
Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955 (1931); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203 (1914); and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1940).

Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Klugh v. U.S., 20 F.Supp. 892(D.S.C. 1985).

Void judgment is one where court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of order violated due process.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

A void judgment has no effect whatsoever and is incapable of confirmation or ratification, Lucas v. Estate of Stavos, 609 N. E. 2d 1114, rehearing denied, and transfer denied (Ind. App. 1 dist. 1993).

Void judgment is one that from its inception is a complete nullity and without legal effect Stidham V. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 1998).

Void judgment may be defined as one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked personal jurisdiction or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law.
Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E. 2d 741 (Ill. App. Dist. 1993).

Relief form void judgment is available when trial court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction, Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E. 2d 458 (Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1993).

Void judgment is one rendered by court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in manner inconsistent with due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14 Matter of Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 ( Kan. 1997).

Judgment is void if court that rendered it lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction; void judgment is nullity and may be vacated at any time,.
Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994).

A void judgment is one rendered by a court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.
In re Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, (Kan. App. 1999).

Void judgment is one rendered in absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties.
310 N.W. 2d 502, (Minn. 1981).

A void judgment is one rendered in absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties.
Lange v. Johnson, 204 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1973).

A void judgment is one which has a mere semblance, but is lacking in some of the essential elements which would authorize the court to proceed to judgment.
Henderson v. Henderson, 59 S.E. 2d 227, (N.C. 1950).

Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction to enter such judgment.
State v. Blankenship 675 N.E. 2d 1303, (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996).

A void judgment is one which shows upon face of record a want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render the judgment.
Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W. 2d 168 (Tenn. 1951).

A Void judgment is one which shows upon face of record want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render judgment, and want of jurisdiction may be either of person, subject matter generally, particular question to be decided or relief assumed to be given.
State ex rel. Dawson v. Bomar, 354 S.W. 2d 763, certiorari denied, (Tenn. 1962).

A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment.
State v. Richie, 20 S.W.3d 624 (Tenn. 2000).

A void judgment is one which shows on face of record the want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be either of the person, or of the subject matter generally, or of the particular question attempted to decided or relief assumed to be given.
Richardson v. Mitchell, 237 S.W. 2d 577, (Tenn.Ct. App. 1950).

Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed.
City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973).

A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud or entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties.
Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987)

A void judgment is a judgment, decree, or order entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved.
State ex rel. Turner v. Briggs, 971 P.2d 581 (Wash. App. Div. 1999).

Void judgments generally fall into two classifications, that is, judgments where there is want of jurisdiction of person or subject matter, and judgments procured through fraud, and such judgments may be attacked directly or collaterally.
Irving v. Rodriquez, 169 N.E.2d 145, (Ill.app. 2 Dist. 1960).

Invalidity need to appear on face of judgment alone that judgment or order may be said to be intrinsically void or void on its face, if lack of jurisdiction appears from the record.
Crockett Oil Co. v. Effie, 374 S.W.2d 154 ( Mo.App. 1964).

In order for a judgment to be void, there must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 306, 669 P.2d 191, 195 (1983); Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho at 647, 991 P.2d at 379.

Decision is void on the face of the judgment roll when from four corners of that roll, it may be determined that at least one of three elements of jurisdiction was absent: (1) jurisdiction over parties, (2) jurisdiction over subject matter, or (3) jurisdictional power to pronounce particular judgment hat was rendered.
B & C Investments, Inc. v. F & M Nat. Bank & Trust, 903 P.2d 339 (Okla. App. Div. 3, 1995).

Void order may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time, In re Estate of Steinfield, 630 N.E.2d 801, certiorari denied, See also Steinfeld v. Hoddick, 513 U.S. 809, (Ill. 1994).

A void judgment or order is one that is entered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacking the inherent power to enter the particular order or judgment, or where the order was procured by fraud, In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2000).

Void judgments are those rendered by court which lacked jurisdiction, either of subject matter or parties.
Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1980).

“If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn't the authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.”
Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.

“The judgments were based on orders which were void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering them. Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of a subject matter, as here, transcends the limits of the jurisdiction conferred, its judgment is void.”
Flake v. Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943)

Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court.
People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).

While voidable orders are readily appealable and must be attacked directly, void order may be circumvented by collateral attack or remedied by mandamus.
Sanchez v. Hester, 911 S.W.2d 173, (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 1995).

Arizona courts give great weight to federal courts’ interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing motion for relief from judgment in interpreting identical text of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure.
Estate of Page v. Litzenburg, 852 P.2d 128, review denied (Ariz.App. Div. 1, 1998).

A judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void. It is a nullity. [A judgment shown to be void for lack of personal service on the defendant is a nullity.]
Sramek v. Sramek, 17 Kan. App. 2d 573, 576-77, 840 P.2d 553 (1992), rev. denied 252 Kan. 1093 (1993).

"A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property."
Norwood Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732.

"Jurisdiction is fundamental and a judgment rendered by a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear is void ab initio."
In Re Application of Wyatt, 300 P. 132; Re Cavitt, 118 P2d 846.

"Thus, where a judicial tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes to act, its proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense of the term."
Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P 27.

82. The Order of May 9, 2011 is void, it is no judgment at all and can have no effect.

A void judgment is one which from the beginning was complete nullity and without any legal effect.
Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980).

Void judgment is one that, from its inception, is complete nullity and without legal effect, Holstein v. City of Chicago, 803 F.Supp. 205, reconsideration denied 149 F.R.D. 147, affirmed 29 F.3d 1145 (N.D. Ill 1992).

A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was, was a complete nullity and without legal effect.
Rubin v. Johns, 109 F.R.D. 174 (D. Virgin Islands 1985).

A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect,
Lubben v. Selevtive Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972).

A void judgment is a simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects only, in the court rendering it and defect of jurisdiction may relate to a party or parties, the subject matter, the cause of action, the question to be determined, or relief to be granted, Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958).

A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of enforcement in any manner or to any degree.
Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).

A void judgment is one which has merely semblance, without some essential element, as when court purporting to render is has no jurisdiction.
Mills v. Richardson, 81 S.E. 2d 409, (N.C. 1954).

Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one which, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect.
Allcock v. Allcock 437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982).

“A void judgment is no judgment at all and is without legal effect.”
Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974)

A void judgment, insofar as it purports to be pronouncement of court, is an absolute nullity, Thompson v. Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. – Waco 1951).

Void judgment is one which, from its inception is complete nullity and without legal effect In re Marriage of Parks, 630 N.E. 2d 509 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1994).

Void judgment is one entered by court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, and it may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally; such a judgment would be a nullity.
People v. Rolland 581 N.E.2d 907, (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1991).

83. There is no time limit when a judgment is void. The Judgment may be challenged at any time.

A “void” judgment as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by ).

Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks inherent power to make or enter particular order involved and such a judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally,
People v. Wade, 506 N.W.2d 954 (Ill. 1987).

Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks inherent power to make or enter particular order involved; such judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally
People v. Sales, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1990).

No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen the old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. 10/13/58 FRITTS v. KRUGH. SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97.


"A judgment is void if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. A void judgment is a nullity and may be vacated at any time."
261 Kan. at 862.

A motion to set aside a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction is not subject to the time limitations of Rule 60(b).
Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986).

Party can attack subject matter jurisdiction at anytime in the proceeding, even raising jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.
State v. Begay, 734 P.2d 278.

There is no time limit when a judgment is void:
Precision Eng. V. LPG, C.A. 1st (1992) 953 F.2d 21 at page 22, Meadows v. Dominican Republic CA 9th (1987) 817 F.2d at page 521, In re: Center Wholesale, Inc. C.A. 10th (1985) 759 F.2d 1440 at page 1448, Misco Leasing v. Vaughn CA 10th (1971) 450 F.2d 257, Taft v. Donellen C.A. 7th (1969) 407 F.2d 807, and Bookout v. Beck CA 9th (1965) 354 F.2d 823. See also, Hawkeye Security Ins. V. Porter, D.C. Ind. 1982, 95 F.R.D. 417, at page 419, Saggers v. Yellow Freight D.C. Ga. (1975) 68 F.R.D. 686 at page 690, J.S. v. Melichar D.C. Wis. (1972) 56 F.R.D. 49, Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug. 261 F. Supp. 648, Garcia v. Garcia, Utah 1986 712 P.2d 288 at page 290, and Calasa v. Greenwell, (1981) 633 P.2d 555 at page 585, 2 Hawaii 395. “Judgment was vacated as void after 30 years in entry,” Crosby. V. Bradstreet, CA 2nd (1963) 312 F.2d 483 cert. denied 83 S.Ct. 1300, 373 US 911, 10 L. Ed. 2.d 412. “Delay of 22 years did not bar relief,” U.S. v. Williams, D.C. Ark. (1952) 109 F.Supp. 456.

Although Rule 60(b)(4) is ostensibly subject to the "reasonable" time limit of Rule 60(b), at least one court has held that no time limit applies to a motion under the Rule 60(b)(4) because a void judgment can never acquire validity through laches. See Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911, 83 S.Ct. 1300, 10 L.Ed.2d 412 (1963) where the court vacated a judgment as void 30 years after entry.
Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F.Supp. 799 (E.D.S.C.1964) where the court expressly held that clause Rule 60(b)(4) carries no real time limit.

84. Each attempt to have the Court address current and prior jurisdiction was ignored.

"Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time." and "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F 2d 906, 910.

"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist."
Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.

"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction."
Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
Maine v Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 250.

When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory.
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).

85. Once brought to the attention of the court., the court must vacate the judgment entered in excess of it's jurisdiction.

“A court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction.”
Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972)

Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside.
Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278.

86. A void judgment is devoid of any potency or authority.

A judgment shown by evidence to be invalid for want of jurisdiction is a void judgment or at all events has all attributes of a void judgment.
City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951).

Void judgment which is subject to collateral attack, is simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects.
Ward v. Terriere, 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).

87. A judgment made without proper jurisdiction can never be a valid judgment.

"A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court".
OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).


TREASON

88. “... When a judge acts where he or she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act of treason”.
Cohens v Virginia 19 U.S. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821)


JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

89. Whereas, officials and even judges have no immunity (See, Owen vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials ansd judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C Sec 1983.

90. “Personal involvement in deprivation of constitutional rights is prerequisite to award of damages, but defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.”
Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988)

91. “A prejudiced, biased judge who tries a case deprives a party adversely affected of due process.” See Nelson v. Cox, 66 N.M. 397.

92. The right to a tribunal free from bias and prejudice is based on the Due Process Clause. Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his/her property, then the judge has engaged in the crime of interference with interstate commerce; the judge has acted in his/her personal capacity and not in the judge’s judicial capacity. See U.S. v. Scinto, 521 F.2d 842 at page 845, 7th circuit, 1996.

93. In Edwards v. Wiley, 374 P.2d 284, the court ruled and determined that, “Judicial officers are not liable for erroneous exercise of judicial powers vested in them, but they are not immune from liability when they act wholly in excess of jurisdiction.” See also, Vickery v. Dunnivan, 279 P.2d 853, (1955).

94. In Beall v. Reidy, 457 P.2d 376, the court ruled and determined, “Except by consent of all parties a judge is disqualified to sit in trial of a case if he comes within any of the grounds of disqualification named in the Constitution. In Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 7th Cir. (1989), the circuit ruled, “Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify, even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification.” Also, when a lower court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment, the question of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. See DeBaca v. Wilcox, 68 P. 922.

95. In Sparks v. Duval County Ranch, 604 F.2d 976 (1979), the court ruled and determined that, “No immunity exists for co-conspirators of judge. There is no derivative immunity for extra-judicial actions of fraud, deceit and collusion.”

96. "A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction." Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937.

97. "Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris." Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.


CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

98. Appellant respectfully informs this court of a related Constitutional Challenge currently in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (#13-4591) in the Federal Court challenging the constitutionality of Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct as a situation can occur in the court which results in the denial of rights and privileges guaranteed by the United States Constitution and prevents any lawful ability to address or resolve the subsequent injustice.

“The Constitution of these United States is the supreme law of the land. Any law that is repugnant to the Constitution is null and void of law.”
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, (1803)

“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, (1966)

99. Pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure 210 Rules 521, Appellant has notified Attorney General Kathleen Kane of the unaddressable denial of rights in this matter which is attributable to Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

100. The Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 is currently before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. A Motion for Rehearing En Banc with a request for Certiori to the US Supreme Court if the Third Cicruit Court is prohibited by law from addressing the constitutionality of Rule 1.6.


FEDERALLY

101. Where Rule 60(b)(4) is properly invoked on the basis that the underlying judgment is void, "'relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory.'"
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 n.8 (10th Cir. 1979)).

102. A judgment is void, and therefore subject to relief under Rule 60(b)(4), only if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction or in circumstances in which the court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process.
United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)

103. Void judgment under federal law is one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over dispute or jurisdiction over parties, or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted unconstitutionally in entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983).


OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

104. The actions of Judge Carolyn Carluccio to prevent the Appeal from being transmitted represents a conspiracy to obstruct justice in this matter.

105. Upon receiving the Concise Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal for the Order of April 3, 2013, Judge Garrett Page rescinded the Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis without holding any proceeding or offering any explanation.

106. Upon recieving the Concise Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal for the Order of April 3, 2013, Judge Garrett Page contacted the Court Reporters who had been served with a REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS and instructed them not to provide the transcripts of hearings as he was rescinding his In Forma Pauperis Order.

107. A Petition for the Production of Evidence regarding the revocation of the In Forma Pauperis Status was filed on May 28, 2013. This petition was ignored. Court Docket at Sequence #400

108. A Petition to Schedule a Hearing on the Ex Parte Order of May 21, 2013 was filed on May 28, 2013. This petition was ignored. Court Docket at Sequence #401

109. A Petition Requesting an Explanation and Reason for the Prothonotary's Failure To Act on the Appeal Filed August 15, 2011 was filed on May 28, 2013. This Petition was ignored. Court Docket at Sequence# 402

110. When attempting to file a Notice Of Appeal regarding the Order of May 21, 2013, the Prothonotary refused to accept the appeal. Court Docket at Sequence #406

111. The Prothonotary indicated I would need In Forma Pauperis Status to file an appeal of the order which rescinded In Forma Pauperis status. This represents undo hardship and denial of access to the courts.

112. When the Court Record was transmitted to the Superior Court, the exhibits for the hearing in this specific matter were not included.

113. Appellant filed a Motion to Compel Production of the Complete Record with the Superior Court. The Motion was denied.

114. All Petitions filed with the Montgomery County Court were being ignored.

115. The Failure of the Court Report to provide the Exhibits in this case to the Superior Court prevents the proper review of the case by the Superior Court.


OPINION DATED JUNE 28, 2013

116. The Opinion filed by Judge Page relevant to this appeal is based on the refusal to address the lack of jurisdiction caused by the Appeal of the defective and void Order of May 9, 2011.

117. Judge Page's Opinion deliberately neglects and failure to include any reference to the evidence and testimony regarding the defective and void orders in this matter. A review of this matter for the number of times the courrt has been asked to address these jurisdictional failures demonstrates a conspiracy to deny justice, to obstruct and prevent constitutionally protected rights and to involve county agencies and personnel in the actions.

118. The defective and void Order of May 9, 2011 causes a continuing loss of rights as the void and defective document can be presented to undermine any judicial proceedings and adversely affect the integrity of a judge who acts to conceal the injustice.

119. The District Attorney has failed to act to address this corruption within the Montgomery County Judiciary, and the collateral crimes which are enabled by the judges misdeeds.

120. The Attorney General of Pennsylvania has failed to act to address this corruption within the Montgomery County Judiciary, and the collateral crimes which are enabled by the judges misdeeds.

121. Local, state and federal law enforcement refused to act to address the injustice and corruption caused and concealed by the Montgomery County Judiciary.

122. It is the overall failure of the judiciary, law enforcement and legal professionals to address the injustice caused in cases like this that lead to the realization that all were observing Rule 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the result was the denial of rights and privileges protected by the United States Constitution.


Appellant respectfully submits this document in this matter and requests the Superior Court take the following actions on review of the case.

A. STRIKE the defective and void order of May 9, 2011.

B. STRIKE all subsequent orders based on or related to the defective and void Order of May 9, 2011.

C. STRIKE the Order of April 3, 2013 [the subject of this appeal] as this Order places the Appellants freedom in jeopardy.

D. ORDER the production of the transcripts in this matter by the Court Reporters.


RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Terance Healy
Warrington, PA 18976

How to include the Challenge in your filings with the Court

Politely and respectfully use the following paragraphs as a guideline to alerting the court of your knowledge of the loss of constitutionally protected rights in your case.

If there is silence... and it goes without any discussion or mention. Then, you have been clearly heard and understood.

The courts corruption and injustice is occurring in full view of knowledgeable litigants.

---

As a section before you close your legal filing....

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COMPLAINT – CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

12. Plaintiff provides this Honorable Court with a copy of a document filed on August 8, 2013 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which challenges the constitutionality of Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and has been served upon Kathleen Kane, Pennsylvania Attorney General and the Attorneys General of the United States. [ Exhibit D ]

13. “The Rules of Professional Conduct set out the minimum ethical standards for the practice of law and constitute a set of rules which all lawyers must follows.” – The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

14. Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information causes a denial of the constitutionally protected rights to petition the Government for redress of grievances (First Amendment); causes a denial of the constitutionally protected right not to be denied of life, liberty or property without duie process of law (Fifth Amendment); which causes the denial of the constitutionally protected right not to be denied of life, liberty or property without due process of law by a State (Fourteenth Amendment).

15. Plaintiff believes that Defendant is a currently practicing legal professional who ‘must follow’ the Rules of Professional Conduct, and as such Plaintiff asserts that any misrepresentation made by Defendant will be lawfully ignored by this Honorable Court resulting in the denial of Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights.

16. The potential of a represented party intentionally introducing an act of fraud or misconduct which triggers the loss of constitutionally protected rights when facing a Pro Se litigant creates a situation which would demand strict actions regarding misconduct.

17. Those lawful practices endorsed and enabled by the Rules of Professional Conduct are unconstitutional and as such are a nullity.

18. Plaintiff does NOT ALLEGE knowledge of any prior misconduct by the Defendants, and is respectfully not acting with the intent to disparage, undermine or disrespect the Defendants or adversely affect the integrity of this Honorable Court.

Challenge13-4614