J-A25010-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
| Sonya Healy | : |
| (Appellee) | : # 1330 EDA 2013 |
| : | |
| v. | : |
| : | |
| Terance Healy | : |
| (Appellant) | : |
Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County,
Civil Division at No. 2007-12477
BEFORE: DONOHUE, WECHT and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:
FILED OCTOBER 27, 2014
| JURISDICTION for the Defective and Void Order of May 9, 2011 is AGGRESSIVELY IGNORED by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Jurisdiction for the Order of May 9, 2011 has been challenged. The procedural defects which cause a lack of jurisdiction have been presented in every subsequent document, every subsequent proceeding, and every subsequent appeal. - The statement of jurisdiction was NOT PROVIDED by Judge Carluccio. - The statement of jurisdiction was NOT PROVIDED by Judge Page. - The statement of jurisdiction was NOT PROVIDED by Angst & Angst. THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA LAW. WHEN CHALLENGED, JURISDICTION MUST BE PROVEN - NOT IMAGINED... NOT IGNORED. Judge Carluccio, Judge Page, and Angst & Angst have persisted in lawlessness, corruption and unconstitutional actions which have caused the matter before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Collectively, their complete failure to substantiate jurisdiction REQUIRES the Superior Court to expose their corruption OR to join their conspiracy. To assist the Supreme Court Judiciary ... A NOTICE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF SIGNED DOCUMENTS was filed on October 30, 2014. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was filed on October 30, 2014. A NOTICE OF ANNOTATED VERSION OF THE MEMORANDUM FILED OCTOBER 27, 2014 will be filed this week, A NOTICE OF APPEAL will be filed this week. A MOTION FOR EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTION OF THE ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 will be filed this week and served upon The Superior Court, The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio, Judge Garrett Page, Judge Richard Haaz, Mark Levy (Prothonotary), and the Prothonotary's Divorce Clerk. - the Motion will demand service of an additional copy to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania A letter will be sent to the Superior Court President Judge Susan Piekes Gantman, Judge Christine L. Donohoe, Judge David N. Wecht, and Judge William H. Platt, Joseph D. Seletyn (Prothonotary), and Philip Yoon; and filed with the Superior Court Prothonotary with copies to PA Attorney General Kathleen Kane, and the US-Department of Justice. |
| THE FOLLOWING ANNOTATED DOCUMENT DEMONSTRATES THE DELIBERATE, INTENTIONAL, AND AT TIMES AGGRESSIVE AND INSULTING NATURE OF DISINFORMATION IN THE MEMORANDUM BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. THE AUTHOR OF THE UNSIGNED DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTED TO "DONOHOE" HUMILIATES AND EMBARRASSES THE JUDICIARY OF THE SUPERIOR COURT BY DELIBERATE AND INTENTIONAL NEGLECT, DISREGARD OF THE LOWER COURT RECORD, MISAPPLICATION OF LAW, AND GENERAL DISINFORMATION TACTICS. THE DEMONSTRATED INTENTIONAL DISREGARD AND IRREFUTABLE AVOIDANCE OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE BY THE SUPERIOR COURT IN THIS DOCUMENT IS REPREHENSIBLE. THIS DOCUMENT EXAMINES THE DELIBERATE AND CRIMINAL ABUSE OF POWER UNDER COLOR OF LAW WITH INTENT TO INFLICT EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WHILE CONCEALING AND CONSPIRING TO PROTECT AND PERPETUATE JUDICIAL CORRUPTION BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. |
| Appellant, TERANCE HEALY, was NOT NOTIFIED of the scheduling for ARGUMENT in this matter. Appellee was NOTIFIED. ANGST & ANGST acknowledged the scheduling for ARGUMENT in this matter. While the Superior Court staff has acted with purpose to exclude the Appellant, they have provided the Appellee with the opportunity to present information in support of jurisdiction which clearly did not occur. The ex parte ARGUMENT Session permitted the opportunity for the Superior Court Panel to request the evidence of jurisdiction from the Appellee which clearly did not occur. The meeting is an essential element in a criminal conspiracy. |
Terance Healy (“Husband”) appeals pro se from the order entered on April 5, 2013 by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, granting Sonya L. Healy’s (“Wife”) May 18, 2012 petition, which requested that the trial court calculate Husband’s penalty for failing to comply with the trial court’s September 27, 2011 order and offset his remaining share of the marital estate with the fines assessed against him.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
This case presents a procedural quagmire complicated by the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On May 9, 2011, the trial court issued a divorce decree and equitable distribution order which ended Husband and Wife’s marriage and included specific instructions to Husband and Wife for apportioning the marital property.
| The MEMORANDUM neglects to address the jurisdiction of the Order of May 9, 2011. |
Following this order, Husband filed numerous petitions with the trial court in an effort to, inter alia, vacate the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order and prevent the sale of the marital residence.
| NUMEROUS PETITIONS = 2. #305 MOTION TO VACATE THE ODER OF MAY 9, 2011 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. #311 EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION The MEMORANDUM uses the term 'inter alia' to avoid any reference to the 'procedurally defective and void order of May 9, 2011' or the 'lack of jurisdiction'. A disinformation tactic to avoid any reference to the issue. |
On July 14, 2011, Wife filed a response to these petitions and a counter-petition seeking sanctions based on Husband’s frivolous filings. On July 19, 2011, the trial court entered an order requiring Husband and Wife to exchange certain items of martial property and dismissing any remaining petitions as moot, except for Wife’s July 14, 2011 counter-petition for sanctions. Husband continued filing petitions with the trial court seeking, inter alia, to prevent the sale of the marital residence and the exchange of marital property.
| Wife's response (?) neglected any response. It was a new matter with procedural defects, lack of service, lack of any certificate of service. Judge Carluccio heard it immediately and ordered verbally and without jurisdiction - based on the defective and void order and continuing with abject disregard for jurisdiction in the matter. Lack of jurisdiction to enforce a defective and void order. Lack of jurisdiction for further action after a 'Final' Order. General lawlessness had enveloped every element of the matter. While aware that I was being terrorized, I persevered and petitioned the court to address the lack of jurisdiction. The malice of Judge Carluccio was evident. The Court record documents every attempt to petition the court for resolution and the neglect and disregard by the Court. Documenting the actions and petitioning the court for relief seemed to antagonize Judge Carluccio. There was no alternative method but to file and persevere. It is my belief that Judge Carluccio had self-perceived a sense of UNTOUCHABLE OMNIPOTENCE. Career experience with DOJ / US Attorney prevented any federal investigation. Judicial Immunity. President of the Montgomery Bar Association. Her demonstrated lack of knowledge concerning the law. Conflicts of Interest and Ethics were of no concern to her as reported in the newspapers. Rule 1.6 Confidentiality prevented disclosure of fraud, and prevented disclosure where fraud was concealed or continuing. This matter had already been before 15 judges of the Montgomery County bench. (Current Count is 20.) Judge Carluccio may have wanted to be the LAST JUDGE, but she failed to recognize that Angst & Angst had caused and leveraged the impropriety of every judge in this matter... and they would throw her under the bus whenever they wanted. |
On August 15, 2011, Husband filed a notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order.
| The Notice of Appeal included the timeline of motions and petitions attempting to have the Court address the procedural defect which caused the 'divorce decree and equitable distribution order' to be VOID AB INITIO. A defective and void ab initio order is a nullity. ... even when it is a defective and void divorce decree. A procedurally defective and void order may be challenged for up to five (5) years. ... even when it is a procedurally defective and void divorce decree. The passing of time does not provide the court with jurisdiction where it did not exist. |
On August 22, 2011, the trial court ordered Husband to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. On September 15, 2011, Husband filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement.
| WRONG. Tolling begins on August 25, date of entry by the Prothonotary. Service to the court and parties was accomplished TIMELY on September 15, 2011. |
On October 19, 2011, the trial court filed its 1925(a) opinion in which it found Husband’s appeal to be untimely and requested that this Court quash the appeal.
| The Court neglected the well-documented issues of the procedurally defective and void order. The Court applied the wrong timeframe to the calculation of time. The Court did not provide any statement of jurisdiction, where the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the procedurally defective and void ab initio order. The Court additionally IGNORED EVERY ISSUE INCLUDED IN THE Concise Statement of Errors. Seriously. ALL OF THEM. Seriously. This may explain why the appeal was not sent to the Superior Court. |
For reasons that are unclear, the record reflects that the trial court never transmitted Husband’s August 15, 2011 notice of appeal to our Court.
| The Appeals Clerk in Norristown made the reason clear in multiple conversations by telephone and in-person. Judge Carluccio had indicated that she was to take no action. |
However, the record does reveal that on September 20, 2011, Husband filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with this Court. On October 14, 2011, our Court denied this motion because we had no record of Husband having an appeal pending before this Court.
| The filing of the Motion with the Superior Court accomplishes the requirements of notice to the Superior Court of an Appeal pursuant to PA R.A.P. The filing had included the background and the Notice of Appeal which was being neglected. Escaping the hold of the Montgomery County Court was obstructed and prevented. |
On September 27, 2011, the trial court granted Wife’s counter-petition for sanctions and denied several of the petitions that Husband had filed subsequent to the July 19, 2011 order.
| Wife's 'counter-petition' had not been filed nor served to Husband. The Court lacked jurisdiction to act on the 'counter-petition'. The Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the procedurally defective and void order. The Court neglected the scheduled petitions which requested the Court to address the lack of jurisdiction. The Court granted everything requested in the 'counter-petition'. Angst & Angst withdrew their 'counter-petition on September 28, 2011. There had been no hearing on the 'counter-petition'. No hearing was ever scheduled. General lawlessness. |
The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorneys’ fees totaling $13,750.00, which it deducted from his share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. Additionally, the trial court decreed that it would begin fining Husband $100.00 per day for each day that he did not execute the forms necessary for Wife to transfer the retirement account funds that she owed him pursuant to the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order. The trial court further decreed that it would begin fining Husband another $500.00 per day ($100.00 per item) for each day he failed to return five enumerated pieces of property to Wife.
| The items had been placed where the judged had verbally ordered at the time and date ordered. The Court was enforcing a procedurally defective and void order while ignoring the challenge to jurisdiction in all court documents and in objections and in testimony. |
| There is no method by which the court can be provided with retroactive jurisdiction. After being terrorized and harassed for every minute of every hour of every day since 2007, being submitted to the wrath of the entire Montgomery County judiciary, facing constant vexatious and false allegations, being harassed and investigated, being denied any access or contact with my children, being evicted from my home and left homeless and destitute on the street, without any personal possessions, compelled under duress and threat of contempt to endorse all checks presented without explanations, the courts lack of jurisdiction which had been directly caused by Angst & Angst can only be described by one word. KARMA. Every malicious, spiteful, disrespectful, threatening and intimidating action which occurred on September 23, 2011 while I was surrounded by six (6) county deputies was intended to annihilate my spirit and bring about my suicide. Every attempt to secure the transcript of that day has been prevented by Judge Carluccio whose behavior that day was disgraceful. |
On May 18, 2012, Wife filed a petition seeking the enforcement of the September 27, 2011 order, which included a request for the trial court to calculate Husband’s penalties for failing to comply with that order and to reduce Husband’s share of the marital estate in accordance with those penalties. [Wife filed a duplicate petition on May 23, 2012 petition]
| Yet, neither Petition nor Duplicate was served on Husband. This is confirmed as NO Certificate of Service appears on the court record. Angst & Angst had sent a copy of their petition to Judge Carluccio with ex parte letters to have the case reassigned. The duplicate resulted where that document was forwarded to the Prothonotary. Angst & Angst's deceptive filing tactics are documented and demonstrated on the court record. |
Following this petition, Husband filed numerous additional petitions, including a response and counter-petition to Wife’s May 18, 2012 that, inter alia, sought to prevent the enforcement of the May 9, 2011, July 19, 2011, and September 27, 2011 orders.
| This Honorable Court is using the term 'inter alia' to avoid any direct usage of the words - defective, void, jurisdiction, etc. A Disinformation tactic. Husband had filed one (1) response to their petition. The response included 11 sentences. 1. DEFENDANT DOES NOT WAIVE DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS 2. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SERVE THIS PETITION UPON DEFENDANT 3. DEFENDANT RESPONDS TO PLAINTIFF’S ‘PETITION’ TO REASSIGN THE MATTER ( No Petition - two (2) letters unknown to Judge Haaz.) 4. DEFENDANT REQUESTS CORRECTION OF THE DOCKET FOR DUPLICATE ENTRY 5. DEFENDANT REQUESTS REMOVAL OF ANGST & ANGST FROM THE MATTER – EX PARTE COMMUNICATION – DELIBERATE AND MANIPULATIVE FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURE – FRAUD UPON THE COURT – EXTORTION – FORGERY 6. DEFENDANT RESPONSE TO ISSUES LISTED IN THE DOCUMENT REFERENCED IN THE SCHEDULING ORDER 7. VOID – PETITION TO STRIKE JUDGEMENT / ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 23, 2011 8. VOID – PETITION TO STRIKE JUDGEMENT / ORDER OF JULY 18, 2011 9. VOID – PETITION TO STRIKE JUDGEMENT / ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 10. DEFENDANT REQUESTS THE COURT SCHEDULE HEARINGS ON OUTSTANDING PETITIONS 11. DEFENDANT REQUESTS THE COURT PREPARE AND DELIVER THE APPEAL FILED AUGUST 15, 2011 TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Husband has raised the challenge to court's jurisdiction which remains DELIBERATELY AND INTENTIONALLY IGNORED WHILE THE COURT PERSISTS IN IMPROPER ACTIONS. If the court has proper Jurisdiction, then let it be presented for review. If the Court is lacking in proper jurisdiction, then an explanation of why the judiciary is acting in violation of the law, the state constitution and the Constitution of the United States is long overdue. It is not within my power to correct the perversion of law and corruption which the courts have engaged. I have done everything within my power and ability and the law to permit the resolution of these matters. It is NOT my wish to adversely affect the integrity of so many members of the judiciary. I have watched as every member of the Montgomery County Bench sacrificed their integrity to continue a conspiracy of corruption in spite of the truth and justice. Please remember, it is the disinformation by the court and the stubborn refusal to apply the law which has brought this matter to the place where it is currently. The extra-jurisdictional actions of Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio present the opportunity to challenge judicial immunity, and the immunity of the entire Montgomery County bench. I understand why another judge would throw their integrity on the judicial barbecue to conceal the extreme judicial corruption ion this case. BUT, I have no respect for anyone who would do so. |
On April 5, 2013, the trial court issued an order granting Wife’s petition and denying Husband’s petitions. The trial court awarded Wife another $5,016.50 in attorneys’ fees. Based on the September 27, 2011 order, the trial court determined that Husband owed fines under that order of $311,726.50. The trial court offset this amount by $180,710.58, which represented Husband’s remaining share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence and his share of Wife’s retirement account. The trial court found Husband’s total remaining penalty to be $131,005.92.
| The trial court neglected the procedurally defective and void order upon which the orders it sought to enforce were based. Neglect does not provide jurisdiction. Retroactively or foregoing. |
On April 29, 2013, Husband filed a notice appeal from the April 5, 2013 order. On May 2, 2013, the trial court ordered Husband to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). On May 17, 2013, Husband filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement.
This appeal is presently before our Court.
We begin by pointing out that Husband’s brief is mostly incomprehensible.
| The Superior Court has indicated an inability to read the Appellant Brief. The MEMORANDUM descends into a new level of rhetorical foolishness. (THAT is incomprehensible.) WOW... guess which words the Court cannot comprehend. The Court has no knowledge that it is reviewing a 'procedurally defective and void order issued without jurisdiction'. According to the MEMORANDUM rhetoric, a "procedurally defective and void order issued without jurisdiction' is called an 'inter alia'. If there has been no review of the Appellant Brief, the Court should indicate without use of a indirect rhetoric and/or unsubstantiated unsupported insult. Insults will not provide jurisdiction where jurisdiction has never existed. |
| INCOMPREHENSIBLE: Impossible to comprehend, Impossible to understand, Not able to be understood. EXAMPLE: A thirteen page MEMORANDUM by Judge Donohoe which neglects to address a well-documented lack of jurisdiction, where no evidence of jurisdiction has been provided by the attorney or judges demonstrates an incomprehensible level of rhetoric and effort to conceal and continue injustice under color of law in the Superio Court. EXAMPLE: The level of judicial corruption was incomprehensible. |
| This Honorable Court's MEMORANDUM is INTENTIONALLY AND DELIBERATELY NEGLIGENT. I am sincerely embarassed and humiliated for Judge Donohoe who has been credited as author. The words 'defective and void order of May 9, 2011' appear throughout the filed Brief and SOMEHOW Judge Donohoe failed to see that she is writing thirteen pages of pure horseshit while avoiding and neglecting the central issue. I pity her for permitting my continued terror without cause or reason. We have not ever met, I was not notified for 'argument' before the panel. |
Had it not been for the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, it would have been impossible to discern what issues Husband is raising on appeal.
| The Opinion filed by Judge Page fails to address the issues included in the Concise Statement provided and served to him. He is likely more embarrassed at his scheduling screw ups, his actions around my father's death, his inability for compassion and failure to see the truth, that embarrassing church contractor fraud fiasco where he cost the county millions and shamed the District Attorney, the disrespect shown by Valerie Angst who indicated that the judge was not supposed to have permitted me to testify. Yet, somehow Judge Page also COMPLETELY IGNORED AND NEGLECTED the challenge to jurisdiction. |
Additionally, Husband’s brief fails to comply with several of the briefing requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, including, inter alia, the following violations. Husband’s brief is wholly missing the following required sections in his brief: Statement of Jurisdiction, Pa.R.A.P. 2114; Order or Other Determination in Question, Pa.R.A.P. 2115; Statement of Questions Involved, Pa.R.A.P. 2116; Statement of the Case, Pa.R.A.P. 2117; and Summary of the Argument, Pa.R.A.P. 2118. See Husband’s Brief at 3-23. Likewise, Husband has failed to append to his brief the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion and his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(b), (d). Furthermore, the argument section of Husband’s brief violates several subsections of Rule 2119. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119, Husband’s Brief at 3-23. For example, the argument section of Husband’s brief violates subsection (a) of Rule 2119 because he did not divide it into as many parts as there are questions argued. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), Husband’s Brief at 3-23. Based on the incomprehensible nature of Husband’s brief and the several briefing infractions that he has committed, we would be well within our authority to quash or dismiss this appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Booher v. Olczak, 797 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“This Court may quash an appeal pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 2101 if defects in the brief or reproduced record are substantial.”).
We conclude that based upon the substantial defects in Husband’s brief, effective appellate review is impossible and the bulk of his arguments have not been preserved. However, we find that Husband has preserved one issue for review.
| WAIT FOR IT. |
From what we are able to discern from Husband’s Brief and Rule 1925(b) statement, he consistently complains that the trial court did not have the authority to act on the instant matter following his August 15, 2011 notice of appeal because that appeal was pending before this Court. See Husband’s Brief at 3-4; 1925(b) Statement at 3. Thus, Husband contends that the trial court did not have the jurisdiction to issue the September 27, 2011 order, in which the trial court granted Wife’s counter-petition for sanctions. See id. Husband likewise asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the April 5, 2013 order, in which the trial court fined him $311,726.50 and offset that amount with his remaining share of the marital estate. See id.
| LOL - Prepare for a full and irrelevant extrapolation of statement being attributed to Appellant though actually representative and documented as part of the irrelevant information provided by Appellee - who neglected any information in support of jurisdiction regarding the procedurally defective and void order of May 9, 2011, (aka "inter alia". A Disinformation tactic. This MEMORANDUM could have been three sentences. THE LOWER COURT, ANGST & ANGST, and WIFE HAVE CLEARLY NEGLECTED THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE COURT's JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER. ALL ORDERS ENTERED IN THIS MATTER SUBSEQUENT TO, AND INCLUDING, THE ORDER OF MAY 9, 2011 ARE VOID. Jurisdiction returned to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Instead, the MEMORANDUM will 'focus' on an extraneous issue for several pages. |
In support of this claim, Husband relies on Rule 1701(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides: “Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). However, Rule 1701(b)(2) states that “[a]fter an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may ... [e]nforce any order entered in the matter, unless the effect of the order has been superseded as prescribed in this chapter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(2). Moreover, our Court has held that “trial court[s] possess inherent power to enforce their orders and decrees by imposing sanctions for failure to comply with their orders. This power is retained even after an appeal is filed, absent supersedeas.” Tanglwood Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Laskowski, 616 A.2d 37, 39 (Pa. Super. 1992) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (quoting Travitzky v. Travitzky, 534 A.2d 1081, 1084 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1987)). In regards to a supersedeas, Rule 1731 provides:
(a) General rule. Except as provided by subdivision (b), an appeal from an order involving solely the payment of money shall, unless otherwise ordered pursuant to this chapter, operate as a supersedeas
upon the filing with the clerk of the lower court of appropriate security in the amount of 120% of the
amount found due by the lower court and remaining unpaid. Where the amount is payable over a period
of time, the amount found due for the purposes of this rule shall be the aggregate amount payable
within 18 months after entry of the order.
(b) Domestic relations matters. An appeal from an order of child support, spousal support, alimony,
alimony pendente lite, equitable distribution or counsel fees and costs shall operate as a
supersedeas only upon application to and order of the trial court and the filing of security as required
by subdivision (a). The amount and terms of security shall be within the discretion of the trial court.
Pa.R.A.P. 1731.
We conclude that the trial court did not err by issuing the September 27, 2011 and the April 5, 2013 orders. Husband’s reliance on Rule 1701(a) is misguided. Even though Husband had filed a notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order, Rule 1701(b)(2) permitted the trial court to enforce that order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(2). One of the purposes of the September 27, 2011 order was the trial court’s continued attempt to enforce the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order by requiring Husband to execute documents necessary for a retirement account rollover pursuant to the May 9, 2011 order.
See Trial Court Order, 9/27/11, at 1. Rule 1701(b)(2) likewise permitted the trial court to issue the April 5, 2013 order because the purpose of that order was the enforcement of both the May 9, 2011 equitable distribution order and the September 27, 2011 order. See Trial Court Order, 4/5/13, at 1-3.
Additionally, the trial court did not grant Husband a supersedeas pursuant to Rule 1731(b), which would have stayed the matter before the trial court. Although Husband filed numerous petitions seeking a stay or injunction in the case, the record does not reflect that Husband ever sought, or that the trial court ever granted, a supersedeas pursuant to Rule 1731(b). Therefore, the trial court properly enforced its orders by imposing financial penalties against Husband for his lack of compliance with those orders.
Although Rule 1701(b)(2) permitted the trial court to enforce its orders, we cannot overlook the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 905(b) requires a Clerk of Courts to “immediately transmit to the prothonotary of the appellate court named in the notice of appeal a copy of the notice of appeal showing the date of receipt, the related proof of service and a receipt showing collection of any docketing fee in the appellate court required under Subdivision (c).” Pa.R.A.P. 905(b). On August 15, 2011, Husband filed a notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order. Pursuant to Rule 905(b), the Clerk of Courts should have immediately transmitted the notice of appeal to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(b). As stated above, however, this did not occur. Accordingly, the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts failed to comply with Rule 905(b).
The Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b) occurred even in the face of several events that should have put the Clerk on notice that Husband filed a notice of appeal that he or she needed to transmit to the Superior Court. For example, the trial court was clearly aware that Husband had filed a notice of appeal. Following the filing of the August 15, 2011 notice of appeal, the trial court ordered Husband to file a Rule 1925(b) statement and issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
The Clerk of Courts also should have known there was an issue with Husband’s appeal when this Court denied Husband’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis because our Court had no record of Husband having an appeal pending before the Court. The Clerk of Courts received the order denying Husband’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis as it is part of the certified record on appeal. 2
[In a related matter, Husband also should have realized at this point that the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts did not transmit his appeal to our Court, or, at the very least, that there was a problem with his appeal.]
| ANOTHER INSULT? Yea, Husband should have called them every day, every other day for weeks and asked every time Husband filed at the Courthouse. HUSBAND DID. The Superior Court record indicates the deliberate neglect this matter has received. Husband had definitely realized (Did they really just say "should have realized") that there was a problem. Perhaps the Court needs to accept responsibility instead of casting blame improperly. In this regard, HUSBAND will file with this court the realization of this document. Additionally it will be filed in numerous othjer places and the internet. |
Therefore, we must determine whether Husband’s rights were adversely affected by the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b). This Court encountered a somewhat similar scenario in Commonwealth v. Seay, 814 A.2d 1240 (Pa. Super. 2003). Seay involved an appellant’s appeal from the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. Id. at 1240-41. The appellant, following his conviction and sentencing, filed a timely notice of appeal, which the Delaware County Clerk of Courts never transmitted to our Court. Id. at 1240. A panel of this Court quashed the appellant’s appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition holding that it was premature because he already had an appeal pending and the PCRA was not applicable until a judgment of sentence became final. Id. at 1241. Accordingly, the panel remanded the case to the trial court with instructions for the Delaware County Clerk of Courts to transmit the appellant’s original notice of appeal to this Court for resolution of his direct appeal. Id.
Here, however, Husband filed his notice of appeal from the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order on August 15, 2011. Husband’s notice of appeal was clearly untimely.
| Wow, they forget that 5-Year-Rule again. Already. |
See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“[T]he notice of appeal required by Rule 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”).
| There is no indication that the Notice Of Appeal was filed pursuant to Rule 902. |
Husband contends that the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order was not a final order, and that the trial court did not affirm it as final until the July 19, 2011 order.
| A PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND VOID AB INITIO ORDER IS A NULLITY AND CANNOT BE A FINAL ORDER. It was necessary to have the Court indicate that it was a "Final Order". On July 18, 2011, Judge Carolyn Carluccio indicated that the procedurally defective and VOID AB INITIO Order of May 9, 2011 was a final order. TRANSCRIPT: Page 20 THE COURT: My order is a final order. MR HEALY: And m,y request for your reconsideration then confirms that, and we'll move with the appeal from that point, then, your Honor. THE COURT: I think you're a little late for an appeal, Mr Healy. Judge Carluccio had delayed scheduling hearings running out an imaginary clock in her head, COMPLETELY FAILING TO REALIZE THAT THE DEFECT PERMITTED 5 YEARS TO FILE FOR RESOLUTION. That hearing continued for another few hours and 80 pages to address the petition filed by Angst & Angst immediately before the hearing. No Service. No Process. They were piling on their corruption and lawlessness in an effort to intimidate and attack their victim all demonstrated in the transcript of that proceeding. |
Husband’s argument is meritless because this Court has held that a divorce decree is a final, appealable order. Wilson v. Wilson, 828 A.2d 376, 378 (Pa. Super. 2003).
| The procedurally defective and void ab initio divorce decree is still procedurally defective and void. |
Our Court explained:
Unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule, an appeal will lie only from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341.
A final order has been defined as one which ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case. Pa.R.A.P.
341. Therefore, a pre-divorce decree distributing marital property is interlocutory. It cannot be reviewed until it has been rendered final by the entry of a decree in divorce.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, the May 9, 2011 divorce decree and equitable distribution order was a final, immediately appealable order from which Husband had 30 days to file a notice of appeal. See id.; Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
| YET, at the same time it is a procedurally defective and void order, a nullity, making it an invalid divorce decree and invalid equitable distribution order. |
Although we admonish the Clerk of Courts of Montgomery County for failing to transmit Husband’s August 15, 2011 notice of appeal to our Court, the fact remains that Husband’s August 15, 2011 appeal was clearly untimely, and if we had received that appeal, we would have dismissed it, affording him no relief. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
| The lack of jurisdiction would have been a relevant issue. The order would still be void ab initio. There is no way to provide the procedurally defective and void order with proper jurisdiction. Ignoring a lack of jurisdiction does not provide jurisdiction. |
Moreover, our analysis of Rule 1701(b)(2) shows that the trial court did have the jurisdiction to enter the September 27, 2011 and April 5, 2013 orders, which Husband now claims are void because he had filed a notice of appeal with the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts.
| Nope. A procedurally defective and void order cannot attain spontaneous retroactive jurisdiction by willful ignorance and failure of the court. |
Therefore, the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b) had no effect on Husband’s rights or the outcome of the case. Accordingly, we now quash the August 15, 2011 appeal as untimely.
| The Court is being silly at this point. |
We emphasize that we do not intend for this decision to serve as a means for a Clerk of Courts to sua sponte dismiss untimely notices of appeal. Rule 905(b) mandates that Clerks, upon the filing of a notice of appeal, “immediately transmit to the prothonotary of the appellate court named in the notice of appeal a copy of the notice of appeal[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 905(b). Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated:
[T]o afford the clerk of courts a broad discretionary power to reject defective notices of appeal or to otherwise enforce the rules of appellate procedure would be inconsistent with the nature of the office of the clerk of courts. As this Court has recognized, the powers wielded by the clerk of courts, like those of the prothonotary, are purely ministerial in nature.
Commonwealth v. Williams, __ A.3d __, 2014 WL 3672870 at *4 (Pa.2014). It is the unique factual scenario present in this case that allows us to overcome the Clerk of Courts’ failure to comply with Rule 905(b).
Accordingly, Husband is not entitled to any relief.
| WRONG. Jurisdiction is NOT DISCRETIONARY. Where jurisdiction is challenged, jurisdiction must be proven. Perhaps the Court should have read all of the citations in the MOTION TO STRIKE A DEFECTIVE AND VOID ORDER.... or some of them. |
Finally, on August 4, 2014, Husband filed a motion for reconsideration of the order this Court entered on July 14, 2014 denying his motion to strike a defective and void order wherein he complains about the orders discussed above. As we have determined, the trial court was well within its authority to issue these orders. Therefore, we deny the motion for reconsideration.
| CLEARLY, THE COURT DOES NOT WISH TO ADDRESS THE LACK OF JURISDICTION AND THE IRREPARABLE HARM COMMITTED UNDER COLOR OF LAW WITH INTENT TO CAUSE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. |
The Order of April 5, 2013 is affirmed. Motion for reconsideration denied. August 15, 2011 appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
| This demonstrates why the judges do not sign their documents. This cannot be excused as obstinence. It is harassment by deliberate intentiona chaotic vexatious frivilous litigation. |
| Now we proceed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. |
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2014
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