Friday, July 11, 2014

Marbury, Madison and Rule 1.6

Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the court in Marbury vs Madison. Chief Justice Marshall did not foresee or imagine the judiciary would themselves enact an unconstitutional law and would further act to conceal their corruption.

Where Rule 1.6 has been enacted into law in each state by the state judiciary... I adapt and annotate (with credit to Chief Justice John Marshall and notes by Warren Michelson).

The challenge to the constitutionality of a law
(1) improperly enacted by the state judiciary
(2) where a review by the state supreme court would be biased and show conflict of interest
(3) the district court has refused to review the constitutional challenge
(4) the district court has prevented a default by the Executive branch of EVERY state
(5) the district court has dismissed the matter without substantiation in fact, law or doctrine
(6) the circuit court has affirmed that improper dismissal
(7) the circuit court has denied reconsideration en banc
NOW, (8) the plaintiffs present the case to the Supreme Court of the United States concurrently presenting to the United States Congress and the President.

The question, whether a law enacted by the judiciary, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a revision to the question still deeply interesting to the United States. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.

The question is whether or not unconstitutional laws when enacted by the judiciary can become "the law of the land," which they certainly can not.

That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.

This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.

The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the judiciary are defined, and limited; as are those of the executive and legislative and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.

To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?

The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation.

It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any law repugnant to it even where enacted by the judiciary; and, that the legislature must alter the constitution when necessity requires action.

Between these alternatives there is a middle ground. The constitution is a superior, paramount law, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall have necessity to alter it.

Where a law enacted by the judiciary contrary to the constitution is not law and has been prevented from any review by the self-appointed sole arbitor of all things constitutional: the authority of the legislature is mandated to action unless written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to undermine and ignore a power without limits.

The problem is that laws enacted by the judiciary "contrary to the constitution" can be enforced just like the constitutional ones to the detriment of the entire country.

Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that a law enacted by the judiciary, repugnant to the constitution, is void.

If a law enacted by the judiciary, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law?

This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It must, however, receive a more attentive consideration.

Here we challenge a law enacted by the Judicial branch. Under the current paradigm, the only avenue available for resolution is to bring suit in a federal court. Can the judiciary be unbiased in such a matter? No. The judiciary has emphatically demonstrated bias with determined and deliberate intent.

So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the very essence of judicial duty while having been carelessly neglected, unlawfully denied, and improperly dismissed without substantiation in law or doctrine by the court and that negligence affirmed by the judges of the court without reconsideration or review en banc; even after the Executive Branch in each state by and through the state Attorney General had demonstrated the intent and lawfully acted to default in the matter.

It is the unlawful actions of the Judicial which have caused the necessity which require the matter to be brought to the Legislative and Executive.

If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature or the judiciary; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law.

This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the judiciary shall do what is expressly forbidden, such law, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the judiciary a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.

Given the manner in which the current system operates, and where the challenged unconstitutional law has been concealed from public view while unconstitutional results have undermined the authority and integrity of the government, constitutional "limits may be passed at pleasure" where the ease of enacting law under the guise of authority, without review during construction of unconstitutional aspects, encounter the extreme difficulty of challenging unconstitutional laws.

That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions -- a written constitution -- would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of its rejection.

The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained.

In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey? There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject. It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law. The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."

If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve?

Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!

The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on the subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution, and laws of the United States."

Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?

If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.

Unconstitutional laws are void and that the courts must adhere to the Constitution. The Constitution is, after all, the supreme Law of the Land. Of course courts must adhere to and enforce Constitutional limits. This is not the same as saying that the courts are the sole arbiters for determining what the Constitution means and when a law is "repugnant" to it. Most certainly where the courts have acted irresponsibly with intent attempting to conceal their own undoing and failure from view.

For one to believe that the founders intended the federal government to police itself, one would have to believe that the founders expected the Judiciary to be infallible. While one might expect the Judicial branch to hold the Executive and Legislative to their Constitutional limits, who is to do the same for the Judicial?

If the Supreme Court is the sole and final arbiter of what is and isn't constitutional, then Constitutional "limits may be passed at pleasure" — at the pleasure of the Supreme Court, and there are no effective limits on the government created by the Constitution.

We hereby petition the United States Congress and the President of the United States on behalf of the People to address with haste this calamity as the corruption of the judicial branch threatens the country at it's very foundation. The Law is for the protection of the people. The Constitution does not exist to be usurped and improperly wielded to conceal the manipulated and the corrupt.

Respectfully,

Terance Healy
Todd M. Krautheim

Where a law enacted by the judiciary contrary to the constitution is not law and has been prevented from any review by the self-appointed sole arbitor of all things constitutional: the authority of the legislature is mandated to action unless written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to undermine and ignore a power without limits.
scotus

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