Mail Fraud

MAIL FRAUD AND WIRE FRAUD


Prosecution Policy Relating to Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud

Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the scheme employed consists of some isolated transactions between individuals, involving minor loss to the victims, in which case the parties should be left to settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the state courts. Serious consideration, however, should be given to the prosecution of any scheme which in its nature is directed to defrauding a class of persons, or the general public, with a substantial pattern of conduct.
See also USAM 9-85.210 (requires prior consultation with the Public Integrity Section to use the mail or wire fraud statutes in the prosecution of election fraud cases).

Further guidance and legal analysis of issues surrounding the investigation and prosecution of frauds involving use of the mail or wire, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1343 can be found in the Criminal Resource Manual:


Investigative Authority

Primary investigative jurisdiction of possible violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes is vested in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In some cases, complaints involving securities may be investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition, the Postal Inspection Service of the United States Postal Service may initiate mail or wire fraud investigations. In both situations, the investigations are usually continued by the agency initiating the investigation. Reports of investigation are disseminated directly to the appropriate United States Attorney.


18 U.S.C. Section 1341—Elements of Mail Fraud

"There are two elements in mail fraud: (1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent acts)." Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 n. 10 (1989); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) ("The elements of the offense of mail fraud under . . . § 1341 are (1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme."); Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 704 (1994) (cases cited).


The Scheme and Artifice to Defraud

The wire fraud statute was patterned after the mail fraud statutes. United States v. Lemon, 941 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 1198 (1st Cir. 1987). Thus, the same principles apply in defining "scheme to defraud" for mail and wire fraud prosecutions. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n. 6 (1987) ("The mail and wire fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to both sets of offenses here."); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1334-35 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The requisite elements of 'scheme to defraud' under the wire fraud statute [§ 1343] and the mail fraud statute [§ 1341], are identical. Thus, cases construing mail fraud apply to the wire fraud statute as well."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).

The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes do not define the terms "scheme" or "artifice" and the courts have traditionally been reluctant to offer definitions of either term except in the broadest and most general terms. Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1335 ("Congress did not define 'scheme or artifice to defraud' when it first coined that phrase, nor has it since. Instead that expression has taken on its present meaning from 111 years of case law.").

The fraudulent aspect of the scheme to defraud is to be measured by nontechnical standards and is not restricted by any common-law definition of false pretenses. "[T]he words 'to defraud' in the mail fraud statute have the 'common understanding' of '"wrongdoing one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes," and "usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, chicane, or overreaching."'" Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924))). "The concept of 'fraud' includes the act of embezzlement, which is '"the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's own care by another."'" Id. (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902)).


No Loss or Gullible Victims

"It is the scheme to defraud and not actual fraud that is required." United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

"No particular type of victim is required . . . nor need the scheme have succeeded." United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 n. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

No actual loss to the victims is required. See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)

"The fraud statutes speak alternatively of devising or intending to devise a scheme to defraud and do not require that the deception bear fruit for the wrongdoer or cause injury to the intended victim as a prerequisite to successful prosecution. [S]uccess of the scheme and loss by a defrauded person are not essential elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 . . . .", cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); see also United States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

"The amount of money realized as a result of the scheme is not an essential element of mail fraud. It was not even necessary to prove that the scheme succeeded."

For a discussion of fraud loss computation in sentencing see Guidelines Sentencing (Federal Judicial Center, 1997), Section II.D.2. Offense Involving Fraud and Deceit.

"[I]t makes no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright . . . . " United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980)).

"[T]he monumental credulity of the victim is no shield for the accused . . ." Id. (quoting Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d 740, 744-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946)); cf. Pollack, 534 F.2d at 971 (To hold that actual loss to victim is required "would lead to the illogical result that the legality of a defendant's conduct would depend on his fortuitous choice of a gullible victim.") (quoted in Maxwell, 920 F.2d at 1036).


Proof of Scheme and Artifice to Defraud

To sustain a conviction the government must prove the existence of a scheme; it is not required, however, to prove all details or all instances of allegedly illicit conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 442 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1984) ("It is well established that proof of every allegation is not required in order to convict; the government need only prove that the scheme to defraud existed."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he Government need not prove every misrepresentation charged conjunctively in the indictment."); United States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The Government is not required to prove the details of a scheme; it is, however, required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the defendant . . . willfully and knowingly devised a scheme or artifice to defraud . . . .") (quoting with approval the trial court's instruction on § 1341); United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539, 546 (2d Cir. 1977)

("A scheme to defraud may consist of numerous elements, no particular one of which need be proved if there is sufficient overall proof that the scheme exists."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Anderson v. United States, 369 F.2d 11, 15 (8th Cir. 1966) (all instances of illicit conduct need not be proved to sustain a conviction), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976 (1967).

"All that is required is that [the defendant has] knowingly and willingly participated in the scheme; she need not have performed every key act herself." United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The "evidence need only show that defendant was a 'knowing and active participant' in scheme to defraud and that scheme involved interstate wire communications." Id. (quoting United States v. Wiehoff, 748 F.2d 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 1984)).


McNally and Intangible Rights

In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute does not reach "schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government" . . . and that the statute is "limited in scope to the protection of property rights." See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (quoting McNally and extending it to wire fraud statute); see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 292 (1992) ("[I]n McNally . . . we rejected the Government's contention that the federal mail fraud statute . . . protected the citizenry's 'intangible right' to good government . . . . ") (Thomas, J., dissenting).

In response to McNally, Congress passed Section 1346 of Title 18, United States Code, which provides that "For the purposes of this Chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."

Section 1346, which became effective November 18, 1988, seemed to resolve the intangible rights issue. See Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("McNally has been overruled by legislation."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1105 and 498 U.S. 1110 (1991); cf. United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1989) (ex post facto concerns bar the application of section 1346 to pre-1988 conduct). In United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1440 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for rehearing en banc pending, however, the court concluded that the wording of § 1346, "simply does not effect a change in the portion of the McNally opinion which held that the mail fraud statute does not reach 'schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government.'"


Tangible Versus Intangible Property Rights

In Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987), the Court confirmed that "McNally did not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible as distinguished from intangible property rights." The Court held that the intangible nature of "confidential business information" does not make it any less "property" protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes. Id. Carpenter accordingly distinguished intangible property rights, which were still protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes, and intangible non-property rights, which were not protected. Cf. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[A]lthough the scheme to defraud must threaten some cognizable harm to its target, that harm need not be a deprivation of tangible property or money; criminal fraud encompasses schemes to defraud persons of significant intangibles as well."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).

QUERY: Whether interests such as contract rights, licenses, permits, trade secrets, franchises, government grants, goodwill, market share, etc., are intangible or tangible property rights that can be the subject of a mail or wire fraud violation. See, e.g., Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25 (suggesting that contractual right to honest and faithful services is too ethereal in itself to fall within the protection of the mail fraud statute); United States v. DeFries, 43 F.3d 707, 709-11 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (union ballots are tangible property); United States v. Henry, 29 F.3d 112, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1994) (fair bidding opportunity is not a property right); United States v. F.J. Vollmer & Co., 1 F.3d 1511, 1521 (7th Cir. 1993) ("It is well established that the government's regulatory interests are not protected by the mail fraud statute.") (citing cases concerning licenses and permits), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 688 (1994); United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1992) (flight award coupons are property); United States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (a FHA insurance commitment, by which the Government promises to pay the lender if the borrower defaults on the loan, is a "property interest," not an "intangible right" because it involves the Government's "control over how its money [is] spent."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1105 and 498 U.S. 1110 (1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's decision in DeFries provides a brief survey of cases finding property interests in permits, city liquor licenses, medical licenses and other items. See generally, 43 F.3d at 709-10 and n. 2; see also Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 706-11 (1994) (discussing "traditional frauds" and "frauds involving intangible rights").

QUERY: How to determine whether an interest is property? See, e.g., United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir. 1994) (shareholder's property rights to information are defined by state law and the law of fraud); cf. Henry, 29 F.3d at 115 ("[T]o determine whether a particular interest is property for purposes of the fraud statutes, we look to whether the law traditionally has recognized and enforced it as a property right."); see also Eilers & Silikovitz, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 706 n. 19 (case cited).


Fiduciary Duty

QUERY: Whether a fiduciary duty or relationship is a necessary ingredient to frauds relating to intangible property rights. See generally Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 706 n. 19 (1994) ("Unlike traditional frauds which may arise regardless of the relationship between the defendant and the victim, frauds related to intangible rights stem from a fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the defrauded party or entity."). "At the core of the judicially defined 'scheme to defraud' is the notion of a trust owed to another and a subsequent breach of that trust." United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("But '[n]ot every breach of a fiduciary duty works a criminal fraud.'") (quoting United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973)), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984). But cf. United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 279, 288-90 (D. Mass. 1995) (mail fraud statutes do not require that a public fiduciary be a participant in the scheme). It may follow that to defraud one of the "right to honest services" would generally require a fiduciary relationship that creates the right to provide or protect honest services. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the existence or protection of an intangible property right must depend upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship or duty. Nonfiduciaries can steal, embezzle and defraud others of property interests, regardless of whether the property interest is tangible or intangible. Cf. United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 410 (10th Cir.) ("While the existence of a fiduciary duty is relevant and an ingredient in some mail fraud prosecutions, . . . it is not an essential in all such cases.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977); Eilers & Silikovitz, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 711 ("There is some debate in the Circuit Courts about whether intangible rights can be violated if they are not premised upon fiduciary duty.").

Courts have held nonfiduciaries criminally liable for frauds related to intangible rights when a co-schemer or co-conspirator was a fiduciary. See United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1984) (an intangible rights scheme is cognizable when at least one of the schemers has a fiduciary relationship with the defrauded person or entity), overruled on other grounds by, United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); see also Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. at 289 (describing situation of nonfiduciary) (citing United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121-23 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983), and Alexander, 741 F.2d at 964).


Intent to Defraud

The government must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to defraud. See United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Because only 'a scheme to defraud' and not actual fraud is required, proof of fraudulent intent is critical."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); see also United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 664 (8th Cir. 1993) (intent is an essential element, inquiry is whether defendants intended to defraud); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1358 (2d Cir.) (specific intent requires intent to defraud, not intent to violate the statute), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989); cf. United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Proof that someone was actually defrauded is unnecessary simply because the critical element in a 'scheme to defraud' is 'fraudulent intent,' Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 . . . (1896), and therefore the accused need not have succeeded in his scheme to be guilty of the crime."); United States v. Bailey, 859 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1988) (court held that there must be sufficient evidence that the defendant acted with intent to defraud, that is, "willful participation in [the] scheme with knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with intent that these illicit objectives be achieved." (quoting United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980), overruled on other grounds by, United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984)), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989).


Proof of Fraudulent Intent

"The requisite intent under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence." United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980). Thus, intent can be inferred from statements and conduct. United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983). Impression testimony, that is, testimony of victims as to how they had been misled by defendants, is admissible to show an intent to defraud. See Phillips v. United States, 356 F.2d 297, 307 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952 (1966). Also consider complaint letters received by defendants as relevant to the issue of intent to defraud. The inference might be drawn that, since the defendant knew victims were being misled by solicitation literature and other representations, the continued operation of the business despite this knowledge showed the existence of a scheme to defraud.

Fraudulent intent is shown if a representation is made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity. Cusino, 694 F.2d at 187. In addition, "[f]raudulent intent may be inferred from the modus operandi of the scheme." United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[T]he purpose of the scheme 'must be to injure, which doubtless may be inferred when the scheme has such effect as a necessary result of carrying it out.") (quoting United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350, 352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902))). "Of course proof that someone was actually victimized by the fraud is good evidence of the schemer's intent." Id. (quoting Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d at 1180-81). In United States v. D'Amato, the court explained the government's burden of proving fraudulent intent as follows:

The scheme to defraud need not have been successful or complete. Therefore, the victims of the scheme need not have been injured. However, the government must show "that some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the schemer." Because the defendant must intend to harm the fraud's victims, "[m]isrepresentations amounting only to a deceit are insufficient to maintain a mail or wire fraud prosecution." "Instead, the deceit must be coupled with a contemplated harm to the victim." In many cases, this requirement poses no additional obstacle for the government. When the "necessary result" of the actor's scheme is to injure others, fraudulent intent may be inferred from the scheme itself. Where the scheme does not cause injury to the alleged victim as its necessary result, the government must produce evidence independent of the alleged scheme to show the defendant's fraudulent intent.
39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations and footnote omitted) (holding that the government failed to produce legally sufficient evidence of criminal intent).



Use of Mailings and Wires in Furtherance of the Execution of the Scheme

"The federal mail fraud statute does not purport to reach all frauds, but only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud, leaving all other cases to be dealt with by appropriate state law." United States v. Schmuck, 489 U.S. 705, 710 (1989) (quoting Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944)); accord United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302 n. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The offense of mail fraud demands proof of a scheme to defraud which, at some point, is intentionally furthered by use of the mails.").

"It is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the use of the mails as an essential element." Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (proof of specific intent to use the mails on the part of defendants need not be proven). "It is sufficient for the mailing to be 'incident to an essential part of the scheme,' . . . or 'a step in [the] plot' . . . . " Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710-11 (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 998 (D.C. Cir.) ("[A]lthough the schemer need not 'contemplate the use of the mails as an essential element,' the mailings must be sufficiently closely related to [the] scheme to bring his conduct within the statute.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("For conviction under the mail fraud statute, the mails must be used 'for the purpose of executing' the fraudulent scheme, and not merely 'as a result of' such scheme.") (quoting Kann, 323 U.S. 88), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980).

As in the case of mail fraud, a wire transmission may be considered to be for the purpose of furthering a scheme to defraud if the transmission is incident to the accomplishment of an essential part of the scheme. United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 536 (10th Cir. 1984). Moreover, it is not necessary to show that the defendant directly participated in the transmission, where it is established that the defendant caused the transmission, and that such use was the foreseeable result of his acts. United States v. Gill, 909 F.2d 274, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866 (1977) (cases cited); United States v. Wise, 553 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1977).

The gist of the offenses is not the scheme to defraud, but the use of the mails or interstate wire communication. See United States v. Garland, 337 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ill. 1971); see also United States v. Gardner, 65 F.3d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The use of the post office establishment in the execution of the alleged scheme to obtain money by false pretenses is the gist of the offense which the statute denounces, and not the scheme to defraud.") (quoting Cochran v. United States, 41 F.2d 193, 197 (8th Cir. 1930)), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 748 and 116 S.Ct. 1044 (1996); United States v. Lebovitz, 669 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir.) ("The gist of the offense of mail fraud is the use of mails by someone to carry out some essential element of the fraudulent scheme or artifice."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982). Accordingly, each use of the mails (in the case of mail fraud) and each separate wire communication (in the case of wire fraud) constitutes a separate offense, i.e., each mailing and/or wire transmission can constitute a separate count in the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Pazos, 24 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994) (mail fraud); United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1514 (10th Cir.) (each use of mails is separate offense), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1035 (1992); United States v. Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 1199 (1st Cir. 1987) (wire fraud).


Proof of Mailings and Transmissions

The mailing or wire communication may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 149 (1994); United States v. Bowman, 783 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986) (mailings performed in the course of the bank's customary practices) (citing United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 675 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998 (1980)); United States v. Brooks, 748 F.2d 1199, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1984) (introduction of envelope). But see United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 895 (3d Cir. 1994) (defendant's statement that he received check was insufficient to prove check was sent through the mails).

"To constitute a violation of [§ 1341] . . ., it is not necessary to show that [defendants] actually mailed . . . anything themselves; it is sufficient if they caused it to be done. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (citing 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 2(b)); United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443 (1917) ("Cause" is used "in its well-known sense of bringing about . . . ."); accord United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 998 (D.C. Cir.) ("One must 'cause' the mails to be used" to satisfy the element of "use of the United States mails 'for the purpose of executing the scheme.'") (quoting United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 400 (1974) (quoting Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). The government need show only that the defendant "caused" the mailing by acting "with knowledge that the use of the mails follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended." Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9.


"'[I]nnocent' mailings - ones that contain no false information - may supply the mailing element." United States v. Schmuck, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989) (citing Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 390 (1960)). Moreover, the elements of mail fraud may be satisfied where the mailings have been routine. Mailings that may lead to the uncovering of the fraudulent scheme may also supply the mailing element of the mail fraud offense. Id. ("The relevant question at all times is whether the mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time, regardless of whether the mailing later, through hindsight, may prove to have been counterproductive and return to haunt the perpetrator of the fraud.").


Conspiracy to Violate the Mail Fraud or Wire Fraud Statutes

Where a scheme and artifice to defraud is shared by two or more, it becomes a conspiracy to defraud. The essential elements of conspiracy to commit mail fraud or wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, are (1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to commit mail fraud or wire fraud; and (3) an overt act committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1442 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Hatch, 926 F.2d 387, 393 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 943 (1991)); United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1170 (5th Cir. 1986)). "Conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense." Massey, 827 F.2d at 1001 (quoting Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959)).

As in any conspiracy, it is sufficient that the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy in which wire fraud or mail fraud was a foreseeable act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 997 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that once a defendant's knowing participation in a conspiracy has been established, "the defendant is deemed guilty of substantive acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy by any of his criminal partners")).


Venue in Mail Fraud

Generally, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) provides that in cases where the offense was begun in one district and completed in another, venue may be laid in any district through which the offense was continued.

Section 1341, however, has its own "built-in" venue provisions. The locus of the offense under section 1341 has been carefully specified; and only the acts of "placing", "taking" and "causing to be delivered" at a specified place have been penalized. Venue should therefore be placed according to the specific prohibitions of section 1341, irrespective of section 3237(a). See Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 636-37 (1961) ("[V]enue should not be made to depend upon the chance use of the mails, when Congress has so carefully indicated the locus of the crimes."). The locus for mail fraud prosecutions is specifically set forth in section 1341; since Congress has "otherwise expressly provided," section 3237 is inapplicable to mail fraud.

Accordingly, venue must be charged in either (1) the district in which the letter was placed in the mail by the defendant; (2) the district in which the defendant took or received the letter from the mails; or (3) the district in which the defendant knowingly caused a letter to be delivered according to the direction thereon. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932)); see also United States v. Turley, 891 F.2d 57, 60 (3d Cir. 1989) (government conceded that section 3237 is not applicable to mail fraud).

Several decisions, citing as authority the provisions of section 3237(a), have held that venue for mail fraud prosecutions also lies in any district through which the count letter passed. Section 3237(a) must, however, be read in light of the constitutional requirements and the explicit provisions of section 1341.


Defenses—Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for mail fraud and wire fraud prosecutions is five years (18 U.S.C. § 3282), except for mail and wire fraud schemes that affect a financial institution, in which case the statute is ten years (18 U.S.C. § 3293).

COMMENT: Consider that a scheme may extend back beyond the limitations period; the gist of the offense is the use of the mails, and if the prohibited use of the mails was within the period, the prosecution is timely. See O. Obermaier and R. Morvillo, White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offenses, § 9.04[5], at 9-67 (Rel. 2, 1991) (citing cases); cf. United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 1253, 1259 (8th Cir. 1994) (mail fraud scheme may continue after mailing). That a scheme may extend back beyond the limitation period does not preclude prosecution of an offense committed in furtherance of the scheme within the period.


Defenses—Good Faith

Good faith is recognized as a defense to a charge of mail or wire fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 223 (8th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the defense of good faith and the entitlement of jury instructions on this issue, see Green v. United States, 474 U.S. 925 (1985); see also Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 719 (1994) (and cases cited).

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Drafting a Mail Fraud and/or Wire Fraud Indictment

The Criminal Division has published a collection of indictment forms, Drafting Indictments most recently updated in March, 1995. These forms can be conveniently accessed and saved as word processing documents using USABook:
Mail Fraud
Mail Fraud Scheme/Artifice


Sufficiency of Indictment—Generally

Generally, Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires an indictment to provide "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The Supreme Court has instructed that an indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged, fairly informs the defendant of the charges against which he must defend, and enables him to enter a plea without fear of double jeopardy.") (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)); see also Collins v. Markley, 346 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir.) (en banc) ("The sufficiency of an indictment is to be measured by certain guide lines. First, the indictment standing alone must contain the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and it must be sufficient to apprise the accused of the nature of the offense. Second, after conviction, the record of the case must be sufficient so that the accused can plead the judgment in bar of any subsequent prosecution for the same offense."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1965).

Accordingly, a mail fraud or wire fraud indictment should contain a reasonably detailed description of the particular scheme the defendant is charged with devising to ensure that the defendant has sufficient notice of the nature of the offense. See Yefsky, 994 F.2d at 893 ("The indictment may incorporate the words of the statute to set forth the offense, but the statutory language '"must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged."'") (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117-18 (quoting United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888))); cf. United States v. Nance, 533 F.2d 699, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting with approval mail fraud count that specifies misrepresentations); United States v. Curtis, 506 F.2d 985, 990 (10th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted) (dismissing mail fraud indictment that excludes false pretenses).

In Yefsky, the court held that the indictment was defective in that it did not provide the defendant with adequate notice of the charge (conspiracy to commit mail fraud) against him. 994 F.2d at 993 ("Where guilt depends so crucially upon . . . a specific identification of fact, . . . cases have uniformly held that an indictment must do more than simply repeat the language of the criminal statute.") (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 118).

In Curtis, the court stated the following in considering the sufficiency of the allegations contained in an indictment charging mail fraud:

Mere evidential matters or detail more appropriate in bills of particular need not be pleaded in an indictment based upon 1341. [citations omitted] But as these cases demonstrate, some substantial indication of the nature or character of any scheme or artifice to defraud, or to obtain money or property by means of false pretenses, representations or promises is requisite. And it is not sufficient in this regard to merely plead the statutory language. [citations omitted] A reference to the cases cited first above will disclose that in each instance the nature of the schemes or artifices is identified or described, including the particular pretenses, representations or promises claimed to have been false.

506 F.2d at 989-90 (holding that the indictment, which pleaded little more than the statutory language without any fair indication of the nature or character of the scheme or artifice relied upon, or the false pretenses, misrepresentations or promises forming a part of it, was fatally defective); see also United States v. Crummer, 151 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1945) ("While the particulars of the scheme are matters of substance and therefore must be described with a degree of certainty sufficient to show its existence of character, and fairly to acquaint the defendant with the particular fraudulent scheme charged against him, still the scheme itself need not be pleaded with all the certainty in respect of time, place, and circumstance requisite in charging the mailing of the letter or other matter.") (allegations of the scheme held to be sufficient), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 785 (1946); cf. United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1986) ("What distinguishes this indictment from the indictment found defective in [Curtis], . . . is the clear and specific description of the fraudulent scheme found in the present indictment. The indictment before us does provide some 'substantial indication of the nature or character' of the scheme involved, and 'the scheme itself need not be pleaded with all the certainty in respect of time, place, and circumstance requisite in charging the mailing of the letter or other matter.'" ) (quoting Curtis, 506 F.2d at 990), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987); United States v. Adamo, 534 F.2d 31, 35 (3d Cir.) ("The Curtis indictment was so vague that trial might have proceeded upon an entirely different concept of the scheme than that contemplated by the grand jury when it returned the indictment. By contrast, the indictment in this case explicitly outlines the elements of the fraudulent plan."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841 (1976).


Sufficiency of Indictment—Victims and Loss

Victims of the fraud do not have to be identified by name in the indictment. United States v. Mizyed, 927 F.2d 979 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 937 (1991). Moreover, actual monetary loss need not be alleged. United States v. Barber, 881 F.2d 345, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1989) ("It is true that the indictment does not allege an actual monetary or economic loss to any insurance company. However, it is not necessary that an indictment charging mail fraud contain such an allegation."), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 922 (1990); see also United States v. Ginsburg, 909 F.2d 982, 988 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1990) ("McNally does not require that actual loss of money or property be alleged in the indictment."); United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1311 (7th Cir.) ("[S]ince the mail fraud statute punishes the scheme to defraud, this court has reiterated on numerous occasions that the ultimate success of the fraud and the actual defrauding of a victim are not necessary prerequisites to a successful mail fraud prosecution."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 (1989).


Sufficiency of Indictment—Mailings or Transmissions in Furtherance of Scheme

"The Government need not allege the subordinate evidentiary facts by which it intends to prove the 'in furtherance' element of the crime charged, and an indictment setting out the mailings charged and alleging that they were in furtherance of the scheme should not be dismissed as insufficient on its face unless there is no conceivable evidence that the Government could produce at trial to substantiate its 'in furtherance' allegation." United States v. Castor, 558 F.2d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978). In Castor, the court observed the following concerning the requirement of alleging that the mailings were in furtherance of the scheme:

The question is not whether the indictment particularly alleges sufficient facts from which a jury could find that the mailings charged were in furtherance of the scheme, but rather whether the Government conceivably could produce evidence at trial showing that the designated mailings were for the purposes of executing the scheme. United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76, 83 S.Ct. 173, 9 L.Ed.2d 136 (1962). The resolution of the question of whether the mailings alleged were in furtherance of the scheme must await trial "unless it so convincingly appears on the face of the indictment that as a matter of law there need be no necessity for such delay." United States v. Feinberg, 50 F. Supp. 976, 977 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726, 64 S.Ct. 943, 88 L.Ed. 1562 (1944).
Id. at 384-85.


Sufficiency of Indictment—Separate Offenses

Each mailing or transmission in furtherance of the scheme and artifice to defraud is a separate offense. See, e.g., United States v. Pazos, 24 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994)(mail fraud); United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1514 (10th Cir.)(each use of mails is separate offense), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1035 (1992); United States v. Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 1199 (1st Cir. 1987)(wire fraud). Accordingly, proper draftsmanship requires that only one mailing or transmission should be alleged in each count. Otherwise, the count may be duplicitous.

Because descriptions of the scheme are frequently quite lengthy, it is suggested that those descriptive paragraphs set out in full in one count be adopted and incorporated into another count by suitable reference pursuant to the provision of Rule 7(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.


Sufficiency of the Indictment—Special Considerations

Take care to charge the proper method of violation of the statute! For example, if the letter is mailed to the district of indictment from another district, be sure to charge a taking from the mails, or delivery according to the direction thereon, rather than a placing in the mail. Conversely, charge a placing in the mail in the district of indictment of a letter addressed to someone outside that district. See Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932) (indictment loosely and inartfully drawn).


Statement of Policy concerning Venue in Mail Fraud Prosecutions

Department of Justice policy opposes mail fraud venue based solely on the mail matter passing through a jurisdiction.


18 U.S.C. Section 1341—Elements of Mail Fraud

"There are two elements in mail fraud: (1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent acts)." Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 n. 10 (1989); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) ("The elements of the offense of mail fraud under . . . § 1341 are (1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme."); Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 704 (1994) (cases cited).



Knowingly and Willfully

The prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires that the false statement, concealment or cover up be "knowingly and willfully" done, which means that "The statement must have been made with an intent to deceive, a design to induce belief in the falsity or to mislead, but § 1001 does not require an intent to defraud -- that is, the intent to deprive someone of something by means of deceit." United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). The government may prove that a false statement was made "knowingly and willfully" by offering evidence that defendants acted deliberately and with knowledge that the representation was false. See United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990). The jury may conclude from a plan of elaborate lies and half-truths that defendants deliberately conveyed information they knew to be false to the government. Id. at 214-15.

As used in the statute, the term "knowingly" requires only that the defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity. See United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287-89 (5th Cir. 1976). As in other situations, to commit an act "knowingly" is to do so with knowledge or awareness of the facts or situation, and not because of mistake, accident or some other innocent reason. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, § 1.35 (1990). Knowledge of the criminal statute governing the conduct is not required.

The false statement need not be made with an intent to defraud if there is an intent to mislead or to induce belief in its falsity. Reckless disregard of whether a statement is true, or a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth, can be construed as acting "knowingly." United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978).

A defendant is not relieved of the consequences of a material misrepresentation by lack of knowledge when the means of ascertaining truthfulness are available. In appropriate circumstances, the government may establish the defendant's knowledge of falsity by proving that the defendant either knew the statement was false or acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. See United States v. West, 666 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1981); Lange, 528 F.2d at 1288; United States v. Clearfield, 358 F. Supp. 564, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Proof that the defendant acted with reckless disregard or reckless indifference may therefore satisfy the knowledge requirement, when the defendant makes a false material statement and consciously avoids learning the facts or intends to deceive the government. See United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir. 1979).

The term "willfully" means no more than that the forbidden act was done deliberately and with knowledge, and does not require proof of evil intent. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956). An act is done "willfully" if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids. There is no requirement that the government show evil intent on the part of a defendant in order to prove that the act was done "willfully." See generally United States v. Gregg, 612 F.2d 43, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1979); American Surety Company v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925)(Hand, J.); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (involving 15 U.S.C. § 32(a). See also 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff & K. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 17.05 (1992).


Obstructing or Impairing Legitimate Government Activity

Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the fraud or impairment of legitimate government activity may take any of several forms:

Bribery of a government employee, kickbacks to government employees or extortion of money or favors by government employees, misrepresentations of financial capability, alteration or falsification of official records, submission of false documents; and

Obstructing, in any manner, a legitimate governmental function.


18 U.S. Code § 1342 - Fictitious name or address

Whoever, for the purpose of conducting, promoting, or carrying on by means of the Postal Service, any scheme or device mentioned in section 1341 of this title or any other unlawful business, uses or assumes, or requests to be addressed by, any fictitious, false, or assumed title, name, or address or name other than his own proper name, or takes or receives from any post office or authorized depository of mail matter, any letter, postal card, package, or other mail matter addressed to any such fictitious, false, or assumed title, name, or address, or name other than his own proper name, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Fake Documents Provide No Protection and Create Peril

The repeated filing of fraudulent documents by Genuine Title Company does not change anything about the fraudulent conveyance of MY PROPERTY.

The improper ruling by the Miller's friend GAIL WEILHIEMER fails to indicate that they own the house. It only says that the issue is dismissed. Improperly done and with no basis in law. Keeping me homeless and their family in a perilous situation.

PERIL: ... because they may attempt to set me up for their murders. We are dealing with twisted law enforcement so clearly bent on perverting truths based on their poorly thought out fiction. The Miller family is at risk from the known sociopaths in the County.

There's is no safety or security in fraud. There is great peril in exposure and massive county efforts to conceal a crime.

There is no lawfulness attained by repeated filing of fraudulent documents with the Recorder of Deeds. Certainly not when the ROD knows that the fraudulent conveyance crime occurred... ROD referred the case to the FBI... ROD referred the case to the County Detectives... ROD knows the county corruption which creates the 'madman' and pushes him to act. ROD doesn't validate or verify. ROD records even when they know the documents are fraud.

Over 40 Million Foreclosures

Over 40 million foreclosures nationwide were based on forged and robosigned fraudulent documents presented by lawyers and title companies and upheld in courts mandated to confidentiality under Rule 1.6 - permitting fraud in the furtherance of fraud - mandating non-disclosure. - preventing efforts to rectify. Those 'fraud provisions' removed from the minimum ethical standard - Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Written and promoted by the American Bar Association whose members profited as they stole people's homes.

"Career lawmen think strategically. They don’t go for the immediate gratification of a personal attack, instead preferring to set the board up just right and striking at the precise moment where the object of the attack cannot recover." - Bruce Castor
 

The lawyers from Zarwin, Baum, DeVito, Kaplan, Schaer & Toddy presented no rights to ownership and had no defense - a situation which would result in sanctions - yet, the matter was dismissed. On Appeal is became even more evident and involved more 'judges' who covered for the lawyers who acted without any basis and could face sanctions and damages. BUT the judges took no part in it.

The forged documents filed by the court staff without judicial review showed the interference with the administration of justice and other constitutional offenses. Reported to multiple law enforcement agencies -county, state and federal levels. The issue is pending. The silence grows louder and louder.

These are the corrupt acts which place people and their family in peril and at risk. The efforts to cover up the crimes is often greater than the initial crime and continues until someone is dead.

A person protecting their own property is a stand your ground situation... only if they own the property. Trespassers have no property rights and may be dealt with accordingly.

Bear in mind, the corrupt law enforcement folks don't give a damn about the lives of the people they use to manipulate their corruption. Those they cause to be killed only serve to provide a false grandstand decked out in red white and blue with a District Attorney at the microphone spouting rhetoric without facts... attacking and assassinating the character of the puppet they created.

A dead family gives them the headlines they crave and the audience who falls for their theater of self-righteousness. The six people who were murdered by Bradley Stone are not available to tell you about their success in court and the great efforts of the county personnel who caused their deaths... and who went home from work and celebrated their holidays with their families.

With everyone dead, the County never even have to prove that Bradley Stone did it. Case closed.

"Career lawmen think strategically. They don’t go for the immediate gratification of a personal attack, instead preferring to set the board up just right and striking at the precise moment where the object of the attack cannot recover." Former District Attorney Bruce Castor. In his New Years Eve manifesto written days before he announced he was running for the position of District Attorney again. The same position he held when Healy v Healy began in 2007.

The efforts to undermine me continue... I am sane. I have the paperwork to prove that. The continued efforts to attempt to have someone assigned power of attorney to conceal the crimes is not unnoticed. It's not even cleverly calculated and executed. The local Warrington police seem to have had enough of being improperly used and manipulated into the corrupt games of Montgomery County. They know what is happening. They have been informed of every development. Every false report involving them has been addressed without hesitation or delay. The lengths that corrupt Montgomery County officials and officers will go to has no limit.

I am capable of perseverence.
They are capable of far more heinous acts.

Who are the people in your neighborhood?

The use of confidential informants, their handlers and private investigators to set up people targeted for destruction by the county is pervasive.

For their safety, I have not posted the names pictures and stories of those used in the actions which FAILED to result in my prosecution. THEY FAILED. They failed to create the criminal to prosecute.

BUT, where I get punished because of their failure to make me a criminal. Where I have continued to be denied Life and liberty, protection of the law and my constitutional rights. Why should I be the responsible protective citizen? Let them deal with the bloodbath when their 'personnel' are exposed. Courtesy of those capable of hurting people. The ones they 'tricked' and jailed. Their lives and futures destroyed.

The only way to end a war "with a person who spends his/her professional life figuring how to [screw] others…” is to expose them for the corrupt criminal frauds that they are. Former District Attorney Bruce Castor summed up his methods concisely on NYE. Then when not appointed Attorney General decided to return to the DA's position of twisted and perverted power.

Their informants handlers and investigators are about to become VERY exposed. Every single one who planted the devices cleared out by the sheriffs department on the day I was thrown out of my home by a corrupt court order. Every one who hit that shelf in the bathroom while setting their devices. Names and pictures... including the cities where they relocated. Bios, pictures, addresses and videos.

And the effort to conceal all of the failed investigative information by using a grand jury, doesn't require me to not IDENTIFY each person and the tactics utilized as they terrorized my life, spied and recorded every interaction, and paralyzed me with fear while they met within earshot.

When they informed and threatened my children who now fear any interaction because of what you will do to them if they 'slip up'.

The twisted monsters in law enforcement who are above the law running the drug trade and creating their new stories. The people who lie so often to everyone and themselves cannot recognize the truth and have no sense of honor and responsibility. Their crimes are justified by lies. Concealed by further lies... and injustice, and grand juries, and secret court orders.

Without the secrecy and protection of Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information, law enforcement would not be able to conceal their investigation and false litigation and manipulations which denied constitutional rights and the protection of the law. That lawlessness continues because otherwise this target will survive to expose that law enforcement committed major crimes and constitutional violations which were concealed by a corrupted judiciary.

WHAT IF: Sorry Mr. Healy, but your wife's attorneys leveraged a massive investigation into you. It failed to produce the desired results BUT it did terrorize you for several years. They then leveraged that to coerce Carolyn Carluccio to go FULL FORCE TO SUICIDE. That failed too. The grand jury is concealing it, BUT every judge in Montgomery and the Superior Court has been manuipulated into approving the actions to terrorize you for years. Your suicide was a necessity and your survival makes things difficult. Your survival was not expected AND PLACES OUR CAREERS AT RISK because we wasted millions trying to destroy you.

The lawyers who tricked the county into becoming their tools in a divorce would turn on them and leverage the extensive county efforts which failed to set-up the target. Sociopath lawyers who will stop at nothing. And the law enforcement and judiciary which will capitulate. A sickening disgraceful twisted plot.

Enough is enough.

Handlers never tell the informants that they will end up dead OR be prosecuted anyway. Even in Hollywood, there's always have that scene where the handler is sad because they lost ANOTHER informant. They are consoled by being reminded they lost others by another handler who lost others. The joke - Handlers that care even when they lose EVERY informant.

Confidential Informants are always one degree away from lawyers and law enforcement. This is useful to leverage their participation and threaten them to do ANYTHING requested no matter how wrong or immoral.

Insurance Policies on Targets pushed to Suicide

Where the calculated actions of Angst & Angst and Zarwin, Baum, DeVito, Kaplan, Schaer & Toddy occurred with the lawless endorsements of the court... and the forged and fraudulent documents on appeal...

How does one go about finding out who had insurance policies on the target of their litigation who they were strategically guiding towards suicide by injustice"?

How many were gambling on that death?

How many were coerced into participation by the pay-off?

How many worked for Montgomery county?

How many worked for Liberty Mutual? or Golden Eagle?

How many worked for Genuine Title?

I don't know who you are. I don't know what you want.
If you're looking for ransom, I can tell you I don't have money but what I do have are a very particular set of skills.
Skills I have acquired over a very long career.
Skills that make me a nightmare for people like you.

The Terror of a Constant Threat

The recipient of Rule 1.6 injustice has no protection of the law. Their constitutional rights are ignored by the courts and law enforcement. All legal professionals are prevented from helping or doing anything to resolve ANY situation. Triggered by an act of judicial misconduct, Rule 1.6 secretly and silently undermines a litigant while attempting to conceal the injustice of a judge and protect the integrity of the judiciary.

There is no opportunity to succeed in a court. Without the rule of law and while constitutional rights are being ignored, survival is the best possible outcome - - BUT the victim does not know that and arrives in court... Prepared. Researched. Documented. Properly executed. Procedures followed. Yet, the victim leaves court battered and further threatened and terrified by the experience of the inexplicable actions of a corrupted court. The court provides no explanations for their injustice. Rule 1.6 Confidentiality applies.

The ONLY person in the courtroom who believes in 'the justice system' is the unwitting target who trusts it. Everyone else knows that there will be no justice. The lawyers, the judges, the court staff, the deputies observe the corruption and injustice. They witness justice. Intimidated by corruption, THEY RECOGNIZE WHEN A PROCEEDING IS A FARCE.

A FARCE. Every proceeding. For years.

In hindsight, it is clear and undeniable. Procedures are not followed. Protocol is abandoned. The law is ignored. Rights protected by the US Constitution are unavailable. Court Orders are not enforced. Only their victim is swiftly held to a stringent adherence to every procedure, protocol, law, and order. The victim must respond to and address and disprove each and every false allegation against them to survive it.

Robert Angst and Valerie Angst, the lawyers with education and a staff are excused from every failure. Their failures are deliberate. They serve to create an undercurrent of deliberate chaos. An ever increasing volume of issues to be presented. A cacophony of injustice which will 'annoy the living shit' out of the judge who knows that the entire thing is a complete farce. Angst & Angst made certain that they were protected from any backlash by a judge who ignored their every failure.

In the end, it is the document filed by Robert Angst to prevent any divorce decree from being issued 'pre-maturely' which exacerbates the procedural defect and a law deliberately constructed and enacted to assure litigants had the opportunity to be heard. Where neither party requested the entry of the divorce decree the court lacks authority and jurisdiction to enter an order. Robert Angst had filed a document indicating that a divorce decree should NOT be entered. Where neither party requested the entry of the Divorce Decree, and the Plaintiff through her lawyers indicated they did NOT want the entry of a divorce decree, Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio acted in the clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction.

The calculated actions of Angst & Angst neglected due process, procedure and law with intent. Those actions would appear to create a form of leverage whereby the judge might be lenient on their next failure. While every proceeding was pre-determined to deny any success to the hopeful victim, they were daring the judge to follow procedure and law. Sociopaths throwing the judge under the bus. By creating a 'clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction' for the judiciary, Angst & Angst were able to leverage judicial immunity for further injustice.

Absolute Judicial Immunity is provided to the judiciary even where the judicial actions of the judge…
… exceed their jurisdiction,
… are done maliciously or corruptly, or
… are flawed by grave procedural error.

THERE IS A SINGLE EXCEPTION. In order to lose immunity, there must be a clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction.

Where any judge strikes the defective and void order, they would be expose the liability of their benchmates. Angst & Angst again leverage the corruption of the judiciary and attempt to enforce a defective and void order. The Court complies with their extortion by COMPLETELY IGNORING THAT THE ORDER IS VOID AND COMPLETELY NEGLECTING THE CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION. The terror of an 'unappealable order' which defies the attention of the court and threatens the life and liberty of the victim.

Why would there be twenty (20) judges involved in the matter of Healy v Healy? Imagine the shame and self-loathing which would occur when you are participating in a deliberate injustice, violating the trust of a litigant, a rouse to harass and terrify. Angst & Angst were doing everything possible to ensure that the judge excused and ignored enough of their wrong-doing to be identified as an active and involved participant. Those actions were being subsequently documented on the court record and were building a considerable volume of evidence.

Evidence of the procedural failures and the breach of protocol and violation of law are being presented in proceedings to enforce compliance with court orders - yet, the judge dismisses every matter without explanation. The judge can't tell the litigant that THE ENTIRE THING IS JUST A SHAM TO TERRORIZE A MAN. The judge is disgusted and just wants out. The judge's integrity is being sacrificed while Rule 1.6 prevents explanation or resolution or escape.

Where every judicial proceeding and action has been a complete sham. A performance whereby the victim is attacked again and again... because the victim survives, there will be further actions. NO ONE WILL STOP THEIR DESTRUCTIVE FARCE... Rule 1.6 allows fraud in the furtherance of fraud. Rule 1.6 does not permit disclosure to rectify the fraud. Rule 1.6 prevents every legal professional from helping.

Their 'FARCE' has denied life and liberty. Destroyed Financially. Isolated and divided family. Prevented custody and visitation. Left you unemployed, homeless and threatened with jail. Attached supporters bank accounts. Infiltrated all technology - your friends tech also. False friendships by Investigators and Informants. Required additional litigation, additional parties. Undermined an entire judiciary. Nine (9) years of my life. Prevented and denied any future relief or escape. THIS IS A DIVORCE. This is not a criminal case.

Only in the family courts can someone who has committed no crime lose everything.

WTF? I asked that in a letter to the Montgomery County Judiciary two months before I realized Rule 1.6 was the problem. There was no response.

The available resources, actions and efforts to terrorize their victim to being 1) homeless/destitute 2) incarcerated or 3) suicide are not as arbitrary as you might think. A review of documents which relate to good mental health practices when going through a stressful period demonstrates a disturbing strategy. Their litigation has been designed to undermine the target psychologically by removing or obstructing support and coping methods while isolating the victim. They are undermining emotional and mental health by directly inhibiting efforts which provide resilience.

Acting above the law without any sense of moral responsibility or social conscience they wrote a law which permitted every act against the target and prevented any escape. As long as the target is not going to be murdered, Rule 1.6 confidentiality mandates non-disclosure. Driving a target to suicide is an acceptable 'loophole'. Only a sociopath would design a system by which criminals were not permitted to kill, but permitted to bring about a suicide. Kutek would be horrified.

Lawyers rejected the 'fraud provisions' of Rule 1.6 against the prolonged debate and strong lobbying efforts of Robert Kutek while writing the code of ethical conduct for lawyers. Weeks after Kutek's sudden death in 1983, the fraud provisions were removed from Rule 1.6 and promoted by the American Bar Association to each state as an ethical standard while it's lack of ethics was inconsequential. In a clear contradiction to his legacy, the ABA refers to the committee responsible for the Rules of Professional Conduct as The Kutek Commission.

Rule 1.6 Confidentiality undermines the judiciary and every proceeding. The injustice grows while Rule 1.6 prevents resolution or escape from further actions. I would hope that my case is an extreme. My case demonstrates the broad affect of Rule 1.6 Confidentiality which prevents any remedy. It is the volume of information and experiences which lead to the discovery of the needle in the haystack of injustice. Where no explanation was offered... and no question answered... EVER. Rule 1.6 could be applied to 'justify' the silence.

Rule 1.6 non-disclosure is permitted to conceal Rule 1.6 non-disclosure. They won't say anything and won't tell you why... Rule 1.6 is permitted to be invoked without invoking it. Rule 1.6 makes it possible to break the law, commit acts in the furtherance of that fraud, undermine the integrity and independence of the judiciary, prevent exposure through further fraud AND NOT EVER INDICATE THAT RULE 1.6 is involved. Ex parte communications, letters and meetings which arrange the injustice and corruption are also Rule 1.6 Confidential.

Prevented from information and denied rights and the protection of the law, my experience may be extreme but it is not isolated or unique... Rule 1.6 is law in every state. A violation of the public trust by the Judicial branch. The judiciary are accorded respect and honor BY LAW because it is necessary for the People to trust in JUSTICE.

The American Bar Association's Rule 1.6 has leveraged the public trust to undermine the judiciary. The only folks who profit from injustice are the members of the ABA and its affiliated organizations.

THE SCANDAL OF RULE 1.6 IS BIG. VERY BIG. HUGE.

JUSTICE IS COMING.

WWKKD? What Would Kathleen Kane Do?

QUESTION: If Attorney General Kathleen Kane recognizes the unconstitutional aspects of Rule 1.6, confidentiality and non-disclosure would not be obligated. ... WHAT WOULD KATHLEEN KANE DO? WHAT WOULD KATHLEEN KANE SAY?


Fact: Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane is required to follow the US Constitution, the PA Constitution and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Fact: An unconstitutional law is a nullity. No Law. It has no effect. (Judicial Branch has claimed exclusive rights to deciding constitutionality.)

Fact: Kathleen Kane did not defend a law which she believed to be unconstitutional. Similar laws had already been recognized as unconstitutional in many other states. Her actions were in accordance with the law. The Pennsylvania law was eventually recognized as unconstitutional.

Fact: Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct is unconstitutional as it collaterally affects the substantive rights of litigants.

Fact: The Rules of Professional Conduct has a self-defense built in where non-disclosure is mandated where information would adversely affect the integrity of the judiciary. All non-disclosure and confidentiality is accomplished in the "rules" by direct reference to Rule 1.6.

Fact: The Rules of Professional Conduct are not enforced by the Attorney General. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court enforces the 'rules' through internal organizations within the judicial branch.

Fact: As a legal professional, the Attorney General must FOLLOW the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Fact: The US Constitution is the supreme law of the land.

Fact: The Pennsylvania Constitution may not infringe on the protections provided by the US Constitution.

Fact: Pennsylvania law must be constitutional - A REQUIREMENT of the PA Constitution and the US Constitution.

Fact: The Attorney General has the responsibility and obligation to address unconstitutional laws which affect every Pennsylvanian.


ISSUE: How do you approach the constitutionality of a law which requires silence/confidentiality/non-disclosure by all legal professional/lawyers/judges.

ISSUE: How do you approach the constitutionality of a law which permits (mandates) fraud for the purpose of concealing a prior fraud?

ISSUE: How do you approach the constitutionality of a law which permits (mandates) fraud which prevents the prior fraud from being rectified?


PROBLEM: Challenging an unconstitutional state law (which has been enacted in every state 1984-2009)
- without any assistance from lawyers/legal professionals
- where lawyers/legal professionals are permitted (mandated) to commit fraud to prevent your effort
- where lawyers/legal professionals are mandated to confidentiality and non-disclosure
- where the court staff are lawyers/legal professionals permitted (mandated) to commit fraud to prevent and conceal the issue

- where the unconstitutional law has been improperly enacted by the state supreme court
- the state supreme court cannot strike the law without violating the law

- where all federal lawyers (government) are prevented from intervention (McDade-Murtha Amendment)
- where the federal court staff are lawyers/legal professionals permitted (mandated) to commit fraud to prevent and conceal the issue (Local Rules)


SOLUTION: A pre-emptive Constitutional Challenge in Federal Court which would return the litigants to the state court with their constitutional rights 'restored' and with protection of the Rule of Law.
Success would require the attorney general to default in the matter.
- by doing nothing and remaining silent, the attorney general/lawyer does not violate the law
- by removing the discretionary decision from the judiciary, a judge does not violate the law in granting the 'default'
- after the fact, the argument that the 'mandate' is discretionary could made and upheld in any disciplinary proceedings

The integrity of a judiciary permitted (mandated) to commit fraud to prevent and conceal the issue would be adversely affected by any and every discretionary decision. DEFAULT is the best, most effective lawful and constitutional approach.

District Court	DEFAULT by 56 state attorneys general. A late-filed, electronically submitted, improperly titled document attributed to PA AG Kane which required a discretionary judicial response action resulted in dismissal. There is no evidence of any judicial involvement.
Reconsideration?	Denied.
Third Circuit Court	Decision of the District Court was affirmed. There is no evidence of any judicial involvement.
Reconsideration?	Denied.

BACK TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA... with Rule 1.6 still preventing the rule of law and my constitutional rights. This would demonstrate the issue, build evidence and adversely affect the integrity of the judiciary. No alternative.

In the Superior Court of Pennsylvania multiple appeals which referred to the issue of the Constitutional Challenge were reported to the Pennsylvania Attorney General as required by law and procedures. After the notices were sent, a document was filed with the Superior Court. The Superior Court responded to the document. Requests for those documents were refused. The clerks removed the entry. Motions for the Production of the documents were denied without explanation. There is no evidence of any judicial involvement.

FACT: Two secret orders were issued by unidentified courts to Attorney General Kathleen Kane which prevented her from the responsibilities of her office and mandated her silence regarding the issue.

Evidence was reported to law enforcement that the appeals to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania were intercepted and prevented from any judicial review.

The Superior Court staff (lawyers/legal professionals) are permitted (mandated) to commit fraud to prevent and conceal the issue according to Rule 1.6. HOWEVER, were they to claim Rule 1.6 Confidentiality when faced with the violations of state and federal law and evidence of denial of access to the courts and other constitutionally protected rights, THEY WOULD PROVE THE LAW WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As the actions of the lower court were done in clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the protection of absolute judicial immunity is not available. This may be hindering the Superior Court judiciary from covering for the court staff.

After the report to Law Enforcement, a Montgomery County Grand Jury called Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane for questioning. Violations of Grand Jury secrecy were purported reasons for the interview, however AG Kane was not permitted to speak about the grand jury investigation.

Two secret court orders from two unidentified courts.
An alleged violation of a prior Grand Jury secrecy.
Grand Jury secrecy imposed regarding their investigation.

A great clandestine effort has been put forth to silence and prevent the Attorney General from investigation and performing the responsibilities of her office.

These pre-emptive efforts of the unidentified judiciary appear to violate the separation of powers and the PA Constitution. The Judicial branch is ordering the Executive branch to neglect the laws of the Legislative branch.

An apparent overthrow of the Pennsylvania government by a judiciary which has demonstrated a lack of judicial independence to review cases before the courts, and the acceptance of the fraudulent, illegal and unconstitutional actions of the court staff. ALL CAUSED AND CONCEALED BY RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION which the Supreme Court did NOT have the authority to enact where not "consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant." Pa Constitution Article 5 Section 10 (c)

Rule 1.6 has undermined the authority and independence of a judiciary held hostage which overreaches and usurps the authority of the state and federal government. One Law. Every State. Affects every judiciary at state and federal levels. Silently and Confidentially ignoring the rule of law and the Constitution of the United States.

The American Bar Association. The organization responsible for the 'Rules' presented as an ethical standard - but lacking ethics, morals and legalizing fraud for lawyers - has affiliated organizations and members in every state and federal court. Their 1983 exclusion of the 'fraud provisions' was deliberate. The resulting injustice clear. The effort to execute and conceal the sedition of the American government accomplished pursuant to the same law. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.


LOGIC: If Attorney General Kathleen Kane recognizes the unconstitutional aspects of Rule 1.6, non-disclosure would not be obligated defend the law. WHAT WOULD KATHLEEN KANE DO?

She's Kathleen Kane. Kathleen Kane does not do 'unconstitutional'.

Kathleen Kane would not be silenced by an unconstitutional law which mandates her silence and participation in a conspiracy.

Kathleen Kane is going to 'DO SOMETHING" and the constitutions and the law support her actions.

How do you silence a "Rule 1.6 liberated Kathleen Kane"?

Issue court orders which silence her and prevent her action and investigation. Threaten sanctions and contempt of court for breaching those improper orders... Broadcast false information about her being 'above the law'... with a history of violating 'secrecy and confidentiality'... based on leaked reports from a grand jury... regarding the purported purpose of their investigation which was also leaked. Find a homophobe state representative to propose her impeachment because SHE WAS RIGHT about marriage laws... but he's still a homophobe.

Did I mention I was from Montgomery County? Two of those Appeals related to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. My divorce has been before 20 members of the Montgomery County Judiciary. In 2011, Judge Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio, wife of Grand Jury Special Prosecutor Thomas Carluccio and then-President of the Montgomery County Bar Association, issued a deliberately defective and void order in clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction causing absolute judicial immunity to be unavailable for the entire bench. She did it to conceal another defective and void order in the matter from 2007 which undermined every proceeding, denied the rule of law, constitutional rights and subjected me to a level of injustice, surveillance and harassment that should have lead to suicide. Apparently, no court will address the defective and void order. And certainly not when it will 'clear the bench' and subject each judge to liability for damages.

The scandal of Rule 1.6 is big. Very big. Huge. It has been referred to as 'the worst kept secret in Pennsylvania" but is a national crisis. HUGE.

On CNN in November, Kane indicated:
“I knew that I was walking into public corruption. Which again is why I ran.”

“But I will tell you this. Even I am shocked at the level of public corruption.”

“I am shocked at how deep it goes.
I am shocked at how powerful it is.
I have never seen anything like this. It’s breathtaking.
It has been described by the people familiar with what is happening as shameful.”

“But, if this can be done to me as Attorney General, the chief law enforcement officer of the 5th largest state in the country, I am sickened to think what can and may be done to regular, good people who don’t have the resources that I have to challenge it.”

---

If you are thinking that this whackjob just doesn't want to be divorced. WRONG. When you have no protection of the law and no constitutional rights, you have no life. Every crime committed against you is ignored and excused. Every fraud and false allegation is prosecuted to the fullest extent by a 'corrupted' judiciary. Any success can be taken from you by false litigation. I have been unemployed since March 2007. Homeless since 2011. Destitute since 2007. Involved in constant litigation since 2007. When you have no rights, you face 3 possible destinations... 1) Homeless/Destitute 2) Incarcerated 3) Suicide.

---

UnConstitutional Law ? SILENCE ... (Secret Orders + Secret Courts)*Appeals + Grand Jury = SILENCE.

While it is clear why Attorney General Kathleen Kane is being SILENT, why has the news media neglected to present the story?

Montgomery County: Court Ordered Obstruction of Justice

It is two Montgomery County cases which necessitated the efforts which revealed that Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information is unconstitutional. Most every aspect is documented in the court record.

Proving that once an act of judicial corruption or injustice occurred a litigant was deprived of any protection of the law; deprived of their constitutionally protected rights and liberties; and deprived of any resolution or remedy FOREVER. The injustice could be used (secretly) to affect and leverage any future matters which would come before the court. FOREVER. REALLY.

That injustice would also require legal professionals to ignore any future crimes committed against the victim where it might reveal that earlier judicial corruption and injustice. FOREVER. REALLY.

The lawyers broke the system. Well, the lawyers had the judges break the system and THEN held the judiciary hostage and compelled them to actions which undermine the entire government.

The Constitution is not dead... it is being ignored... and those actions are concealed by an unconstitutional law improperly enacted in every state... and a federal law which requires the participation of government lawyers.

THE REASON INJUSTICE IN AMERICA IS IGNORED.

The laws is the law, but this Rule 1.6, which is aggressively enforced, requires lawyers and legal professionals to be silent.

AS THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW WAS BEING PRESENTED AND DEMONSTRATED IN THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, THE JUDICIARY HAS ACTED TO CONCEAL THE EMBARRASSMENT AND SHAME OF THEIR EGREGIOUS VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST.

Where the state Attorney General must be advised of the constitutional issue before the courts, two secret courts have issued two secret orders requiring the inaction of the attorney general.

Where the state Attorney General would seek to investigate further, Montgomery County has acted further to silence the attorney general and prevent investigation and prosecution of their corruption.

All efforts are about non-disclosure. It is reasonable and logical to relate the efforts to Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information.

Rule 1.6 is unconstitutional and has been improperly enacted by the state supreme court, the attorney general could expose the unconstitutional law without violating it.

When Rule 1.6 could no longer prevent it's own exposure to the public, the courts have acted by secret court order to mandate silence. If the attorney general speaks out about Rule 1.6, the AG would violate that court order and be sanctioned.

The secret court orders violate the constitutionally protected rights of a litigant. They will not hold up to any scrutiny on appeal, but the secret orders have provided a few more months of non-disclosure Misinformation can be used to attack the attorney general, and the court orders prevent her from any explanation or defense.

The cases in Montgomery County were so unjust. The Rule of Law ignored. Every member of the judiciary sacrificing their integrity to conceal the loss of the integrity of the prior judges. Those two cases have been before 20 members of the Montgomery County Judiciary. Those cases demonstrate the misuse of county resources and the involvement of the Superior Court authorizing intrusive surveillance. Those two cases demonstrate that the participation of EVERY legal professional was affected. They all did nothing. They all ignored everything.

After years of constant terror, the needle in the haystack of injustice was found. A Law which required legal professionals to do nothing... to ignore everything... and maintain confidentiality. A law which excused acts of fraud which were done to conceal the prior fraud. A law which allowed further acts of fraud which were done to conceal the prior fraud. A LAW THAT ONLY THE LAWYERS HAD TO FOLLOW.

A law that endorsed and concealed judicial corruption and injustice at EVERY level of the state and federal judiciary.

The twisted corruption of the Montgomery County Judiciary has exposed sedition by the American Bar Association in every state and federally. Exposed the actions of the affiliated bar associations to interfere with the administration of the courts at every level.

The Montgomery County Judiciary blew it. HUGE.

Their corruption has exposed the reason for the Constitutional Crisis in the US.

Their corruption has exposed the reason INJUSTICE is ignored by the legal community.

A lawyer who initially had been very skeptical of the Constitutional Challenge summed it up succinctly after he reviewed the details.

"Wait until the People realize what you have discovered."

JUSTICE IS COMING.

The broad actions of the US Department of Justice since the filing of the Constitutional Challenge in August 2013 demonstrates efforts to address Rule 1.6 injustice while the matter avoids media attention and broad exposure. Those actions are recognized as interim actions which indicate the intention to do the right thing... but doing it confidentially, until this law is stricken.

Basic PsyOps Protocol

In my 'survival kit', I have always had what I referred to as 'my rules'. They were the way of compartmentalizing experiences into categories and approaches. It required my recognition of my experience and the recognition of the reaction of people to hearing of my experience.

Everyone knew Oliver Douglas was perfectly sane while everyone else in Hooterville was "not". I knew what it was like to be "a sane man in an insane situation". If you want the experience, discuss Arnold Ziffel with someone from Hooterville and THEN with someone who is NOT from there.

This morning, I stumbled upon the scholarly journals which not only put a more 'polite' description and definition to the categories (without expletives - but me loves my expletives sometimes) BUT reviewing the educated categorical definitions and aspects showed that those aspects were specifically being targeted by those who were seeking to undermine and destroy me.

I never would have put the sentence together as was done in prolly the most violent episode of BANSHEE. It'd be kind of arrogant and that is not my style. It would also suggest that my actions were calculated in some way. I did what I did because of who I am... and out of necessity. There were no survival guides. I did immediately recognize "it" as soon as Antony Starr said it.

"Basic Psy Ops protocol. The only way to overcome a physical advantage is to establish a psychological one."

I suppose that was what I did. However, I had called it "Mindfuck me and I will mindfuck you right back, mothafukkah." Their team may have been bigger and better equipped, but I knew everything. They only knew their part. TRUTH was on my side. TRUTH is powerful - when YOU know the difference between truth and non-truth. TRUTH is a definite psychological advantage.

One sentence recognized and defined the situation early on and guided my survival through the last 10 years. It applied to everything. The TRUTH of the entire experience. "I am a sane man dealing with an absolutely insane situation. Every person in a position to help has acted improperly in direct violation of procedures and the law preventing the resolution of any matter… they each make the situation worse… NO ONE HELPED."

Every scholarly paper seems to indicate, albeit in hindsight, that I was on the path to discovering the RULE 1.6 INJUSTICE all along.

Everyone should insist on being treated fairly - to stand up for our rights without violating the rights of others by tactfully, justly and effectively expressing our experience, opinions and feelings.

JUSTICE IS COMING.

I will present some of the 'scholarly' info in a later post. I have not posted them here because they all have a major shortcoming. The articles neglect one area. When the psychological information is used in efforts to undermine a target. The PsyOps part of the information. It kind of blew me away to see it documented and summarized where the items read like a laundry list of actions which effectively undermine a person psychologically.

Federal Crimes: Neglect of Constitutional Challenge

There is no Rule 1.6 exception available in any of the following definitions of federal crimes.

18 U.S.C. Section 1.
“Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.” U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 .Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

“Any judge or attorney who does not report such judges for treason as required by law may themselves be guilty of misprison of treason,” 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.

"Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. [Citations.]" (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).

Another federal statute permits any citizen to file a lawsuit in the federal courts to obtain a court order requiring a federal official to perform a mandatory duty and to halt unlawful acts. This statute is Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

This is one of the most important tools to fight corruption in government offices that is immunized by the mob mentality of the system. The federal crime reporting statute requires anyone knowing of a federal crime to promptly report it to a federal court (or other federal officer), and requires federal judges to receive that information and any evidence, as part of his administrative duties. (The judge has no immunity for misconduct related to this administrative requirement).

Title 18 U.S.C. § 2. Principals.
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.Note: The legislative intent to punish as a principal not only one who directly commits an offense and one who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" another to commit an offense, but also anyone who causes the doing of an act which if done by him directly would render him guilty of an offense against the United States. Case law decisions: Rothenburg v. United States, 1918, 38 S.Ct. 18, 245 U.S. 480, 62 L.Ed. 414, and United States v. Giles, 1937, 57 S.Ct. 340, 300 U.S. 41, 81 L.Ed. 493.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3. Accessory after the fact.
Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States had been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of felony).
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Every person who, under color or any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State of Territory, subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Title 42 U.S.C § 1985 Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
(1) Preventing officer from performing duty. If two or more persons ... conspire to prevent ... any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties.

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; ... or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985 pertains to a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights,
(1) to prevent an officer from performing a duty;
(2) obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror;
(3) or depriving persons of rights or privileges.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Action for neglect to prevent conspiracy
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in the preceding section [42 USCS § 1985], are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses to do so, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action, and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefore, and may recover not exceeding five thousand dollars damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) the Supreme Court addressed the availability of a cause of action directly under the Constitution in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), in which damages were sought against Federal Bureau of Investigation agents for violation of fourth and fifth amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that "where the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court must entertain the suit. Id. at 681-82. "Where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. at 684."

Misprision: the deliberate concealment of one's knowledge of a treasonable act or a felony.

18 U.S. Code § 2382 - Misprision of Treason
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.


SO IT BEGS THE QUESTION.... Why has every member of the United States Government who has been notified of the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6 failed to take any action? Is it a demonstration of the usurpation of all government authority by a judiciary held hostage by the American Bar Association.